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Abstract 
Many sub-Saharan African countries have been diversifying their export portfolios 
away from primary commodities into non-traditional high-value crops to increase 
their export earning and as a pro-poor development strategy to reduce poverty. 
Several studies have documented the positive contribution of the horticultural 
export sector in reducing poverty. However, there are concerns that the 
proliferation and enhanced stringency of food-safety standards that are imposed 
by high-income countries can negatively affect the competitiveness of producers 
in developing countries and impede actors from entering or even remaining in 
high-value food markets. In parallel with changes in official standards, 
supermarket chains in Europe have developed prescriptive, production-oriented 
standards, e.g. the European Union Retailers Produce Working Group for Good 
Agricultural Practices (GlobalGAP), and are asking their suppliers for produce to 
be certified according to food-safety and quality standards.  
Compliance to these standards for developing countries small-scale producers 
necessitate costly investment in variable inputs and long term structures. Thus 
unlike larger commercialized farms, smallholder farmers are faced with financial 
constraints and human resources limitations in complying with standards. 
Consequently, small-scale producers, which are the very target of many 
agricultural development programs that aim at poverty reduction in line with the 
first Millennium Development Goal (MDG), could become losers of this 
development. Yet, in some cases, others argue that such standards can play a 
positive role, providing the catalyst and incentives for the modernization of export 
supply and regulatory systems and the adoption of safer and more sustainable 
production practices. The central item of this research is therefore to test these 
propositions using data collected from Kenyan small-scale vegetable producers.  
Data were collected by means of farm household surveys in five export vegetable 
producing districts of Kenya from September 2005 to August 2006. Overall, 21 
sub-locations were randomly selected from the five districts by Probability 
Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling technique and a total of 539 vegetable 
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producer households were selected randomly for the interviews. For each 
randomly selected household the survey combined a single visit (re-call survey) 
and a season-long monitoring of production practices.  
Different econometric models are applied to address the research questions. First, 
two-stage standard treatment effect model and propensity score matching 
techniques are used to investigate small-scale producers’ decision to adopt 
GlobalGAP private production standards and examine whether investment in 
food-safety standards compliance pays off for small-scale producers. Next, the 
impact of standards on value of production and pesticide use are investigated by 
applying three-stage damage control production framework that enables to 
control for a multiple endogeneity problem. Finally, health and environmental 
impact of adopting standards are evaluated by making use of a two-stage Poisson 
regression model. 
The results of the study can be summarized into three major categories. First, 
smallholders as compared to large-scale farmers face difficulties in complying 
with the standards due to a range of constraints. Results show that access to 
information, capital, services and availability of labor are major factors influencing 
the ability of small-scale producers to adopt standards and exploit export 
opportunities for agricultural and food products in developed country markets. 
Standards do not however eliminate smallholder farmers as a whole from export 
markets but they discriminate within the group of smallholder producers. Hence, 
the results support the findings of studies which submit that resource poor 
farmers with limited access to information and services face difficulties to comply 
with certification schemes. On the other hand small-scale farmers who do adopt 
the standards enjoy a range of benefits including higher net-income and stronger 
bargaining positions with exporters. The financial internal rate of return on 
investments in standards compliance at farm level is remarkably high even when 
pessimistic assumptions are made. Comparing the financial internal rate of return 
to the medium term lending rate by banks in Kenya, it is reasonable to conclude 
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that investment in standards compliance pays off for small-scale producers in 
Kenya even in the absence of external support. 
Second, there is indication that adoption of standards can induce positive changes 
in production systems of small-scale farmers. Although there is no significant 
difference in pesticide expenditures, export producers complying with standards 
significantly use less toxic pesticides. A shift to less hazardous pesticides as a 
result of adoption could potentially imply less pesticide intoxication by farmers 
and farm workers, less adverse impact on the environment as well as enhanced 
food-safety. Results also show that both domestic and export vegetable farmers 
use pesticide below the financial optimum. However export vegetable producers 
use significantly higher quantity of pesticides compared to domestic producers 
although revenue amongst the two groups does not differ.  
Third, results show that adoption of production standards reduces production 
externalities such as pesticide ascribed incidence of acute poisoning symptoms 
and its associated cost-of-illness. Ceteris paribus, farmers who adopt standards 
experience 78% lesser incidence of acute illness and spent about 50% less on 
restoring their health compared to non-adopters. Although the health costs 
examined in this study are limited to treatments related to a few visible acute 
health impairments (which could be just a small part of the total health cost), they 
still account for about 86.4% of the mean household chemical expenditure per 
cropping season for non-adopters and 39.6% of adopters. Likewise adoption of 
standards has a significant positive impact on improved crop management 
practices, for example safer and environmentally more benign pesticide use, 
which is likely to reduce external costs of production. 
Generally the empirical results support the notion that it is the asset-poor with 
limited access to information and service that may be left out from participating in 
these high-value export market chains. Small-scale farmers who adopted 
GlobalGAP standards nevertheless have been enjoying significant financial and 
non-financial benefits supporting the argumentation that standards can also serve 
as a catalyst to change and improve the production systems of farmers in 
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developing countries. Thus, institutional arrangements that enhance small-scale 
farmers' physical, social and human capital are vital to influence farm household 
decisions towards adoption of emerging standards. Both public and private sector 
support for small actors in the supply chain is important to adopt a strategic 
perspective in addressing the challenges presented by high-value agricultural and 
food markets in the context of evolving food-safety standards. Government could 
promote awareness of the benefits of good agricultural practices and promote 
their wider use, improve the necessary infrastructure, develop an enabling 
legal/regulatory framework to facilitate compliance with standards control points 
and compliance criteria, provide and strengthen extension services and support 
private sector activities. It is also important that the government provide support 
to strengthen well-functioning groups of smallholders and self-help groups as 
well as using various tools to reduce compliance costs of emerging private 
standards. 
The opportunities for smallholders to remain actively involved in lucrative export 
market also depend on the strategies chosen by export companies. It is important 
that companies adopt strategic planning that minimizes the negative impact of 
enhanced standards in marginalizing the poorest segment of the rural producers. 
Donors and other private sector actors also have a key role to play in enhancing 
small-scale producers capacities to comply with private-sector standards 
In the light of these challenges, considerations also need to be given to policies 
that shift small-scale producers away from the most demanding global markets. 
It’s important for smallholders to diversify their product categories, invest on 
better post-harvest qualities and partake in domestic and south-south trade, the 
market that might be growing fast in the next two decades. From the standard 
setter point of view it is also crucial that the emerging private standards are/will 
be smallholder friendly, which is acceptable to both buyers and producers and 
could be implemented without a significant donor support.  
Key words: adoption, efficiency, environment, export vegetables, farmer’s health, 
 food-safety standards, GlobalGAP, Kenya, pesticide, productivity 
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Zusammenfassung 
Viele afrikanische Länder südlich der Sahara haben ihr Exportportfolio von 
traditionellen primären Nahrungsmitteln hin zu hochwertigen Kulturen 
diversifiziert. Dies dient zum einen der Erhöhung der Exporterlöse und zum 
anderen als armutsorientierte Entwicklungsstrategie mit dem Ziel der 
Armutsreduzierung. Mehrere Studien zeigten bereits die positive Rolle des 
Gartenbauexportsektors bei der Armutsbekämpfung. Jedoch gibt es 
Befürchtungen, dass sich die starke Zunahme und erhöhte Stringenz von 
Lebensmittelstandards, die von einkommensstarken Staaten eingeführt werden, 
negativ auf die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Erzeuger in Entwicklungsländern 
auswirken. Zudem können die Akteure beim Neuzugang oder sogar beim 
Verbleiben auf hochwertigen Nahrungsmittelmärkten behindert werden. Neben 
Änderungen der gesetzlichen Standards haben europäische Supermarktketten 
produktionsorientierte Standards entwickelt, z.B. die European Union Retailers 
Produce Working Group for Good Agricultural Practices (GlobalGAP), die ihre 
Anbieter ersuchen, ihre Produkte entsprechend ihrer Standards für 
Nahrungsmittelsicherheit und –qualität zu zertifizieren.  
Für kleinbäuerliche Produzenten in Entwicklungsländern ist die Einhaltung dieser 
Standards mit kostenintensiven Investitionen in neue Betriebsmittel und 
langfristige betriebliche Strukturen verbunden. Im Gegensatz zu größeren 
kommerzialisierten Landwirten, unterliegen Kleinbauern höheren finanziellen 
sowie personellen Beschränkungen. Folglich könnten kleine Erzeuger, auf die viele 
landwirtschaftliche Entwicklungsprogramme zur Armutsbekämpfung im Sinne 
des ersten Millennium-Entwicklungsziels (MDG) ausgerichtet sind, zu Verlierern 
dieser Entwicklung werden. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es Behauptungen, dass 
solche Standards einen positiven Beitrag leisten können, indem sie Anreize für die 
Modernisierung des Exportangebots und der Regulierungssysteme sowie der 
Adoption sicherer und nachhaltiger Produktionspraxen setzen. Das Hauptanliegen 
dieser Arbeit liegt deshalb in der Überprüfung dieser Aussagen unter Verwendung 
von Daten kenianischer kleinbäuerlicher Gemüseproduzenten. 
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Die Daten wurden mittels Haushaltsbefragungen in fünf kenianischen Distrikten, 
in denen Gemüse für den Export angebaut wird, vom September 2005 bis August 
2006 erhoben. Insgesamt wurden 21 Bezirke aus den fünf Distrikten durch das 
'Probability Proportional to Size' (PPS) Auswahlverfahren zufällig ausgewählt, aus 
denen insgesamt 539 Gemüse anbauende Haushalte für die Interviews zufällig 
ausgewählt wurden. Für jeden zufällig ausgewählten Haushalt beinhaltete die 
Befragung einen einzelnen Besuch ('Recall-survey') und wiederholte 
Beobachtungen über die gesamte Anbaupriode ('Season-long monitoring survey') 
zur detaillierten Erfassung der Produktionverfahren des Gemüsebaus. 
Verschiedene ökonometrische Modelle wurden angewandt für die Untersuchung 
der zugrunde liegenden Fragestellung. Eingangs wird mit einem zweistufigen 
simultanen Mehrgleichungsmodell zur Bewertung des Maßnahmeneffekts 
('standard treatment effect model') unter Gebrauch des 'Propensity Score 
Matching'-Ansatzes die Entscheidung der Kleinbetriebe,  gemäß privater EU- 
Lebensmittelmittelstandards zu produzieren, untersucht, und überprüft ob sich für 
die Kleinbauern die Investitionen und die Einhaltung der Standards lohnt. 
Daraufhin wird der Einfluss von Standards auf die Produktivität des Ertrags und 
den Gebrauch von Schädlingsbekämpfungsmitteln untersucht. Um dem multiplen 
Endogenitätsproblem gerecht zu werden, wird ein 'dreistufiges 
Schadensfunktions-/Produktionsfunktions-Modell ('damage control/production 
function model) verwendet. Abschließend wird der Einfluss der Einhaltung von 
Standards auf Gesundheit und Umwelt anhand verschiedener Indikatoren 
bewertet. 
Die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Arbeit können in drei Kategorien 
zusammengefasst werden. Erstens, wegen einer Reihe von Einschränkungen haben 
Kleinbauern verglichen mit Großbetrieben Schwierigkeiten in der Erfüllung von 
Standards. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Fähigkeit von Kleinbetrieben, Standards 
zu befolgen und somit die Möglichkeit Nahrungsmittel für Märkte der 
entwickelter Länder zu produzieren, durch Faktoren wie dem Zugang zu 
Informationen, Kapital, Dienstleistungen und Verfügbarkeit des 
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Produktionsfaktors Arbeit beeinflusst werden. Standards verdrängen im 
Allgemeinen nicht kleinbäuerliche Produzenten von den Exportmärkten. Es findet 
eher ein Differenzierung innerhalb der Gruppe der Kleinbetriebe statt. Die Befunde 
stützen Ergebnisse anderer Studien, dass Landwirte, die über weniger Ressourcen 
verfügen und einen beschränkten Zugang zu Informationen und Dienstleistungen 
haben, sich Schwierigkeiten gegenübersehen, die Anforderungen zur 
Zertifizierung zu erfüllen. Andererseits erzielen Kleinbetriebe, die gemäß den 
Standards anbauen, normalerweise ein höheres Nettoeinkommen und genießen 
meist eine bessere Verhandlungsposition gegenüber den Exporteuren. Der interne 
Zinsfuß der Investitionen zur Einhaltung von Standards auf der einzelbetrieblichen 
Ebene ist bemerkenswert hoch, selbst unter pessimistischen Annahmen. Vergleicht 
man den internen Zinsfuß mit dem durchschnittlichen Kreditzins, den Banken in 
Kenia im Zeitraum dieser Studie veranschlagt haben, stellt man fest, dass die 
Investition sich für kenianische Kleinbetriebe sogar ohne externe Unterstützung 
lohnt. 
Zweitens, die Adoption von Standards kann positive Veränderungen in 
kleinbäuerlichen Produktionssystemen hervorrufen. Obwohl es keinen 
signifikanten Unterschied in den Ausgaben für den 
Schädlingsbekämpfungsmitteleinsatz gibt, verwenden Erzeuger, die die Standards 
erfüllen, weniger toxische Pestizide und erwirtschaften einen höheren Ertrag als 
andere. Eine Verschiebung zu weniger gefährlichen 
Schädlingsbekämpfungsmitteln infolge der Einhaltung von Standards kann zu 
weniger Pestizidvergiftungen der Bauern und Landarbeiter, zu weniger 
nachteiligen Auswirkungen auf die Umwelt und zu einer höheren 
Nahrungsmittelsicherheit führen. 
Drittens, die Einhaltung der Produktionsstandards kann dazu beitragen, dass 
negative externe Effekte reduziert werden, wie z.B. das Auftreten akuter 
Vergiftungssymptome, bedingt durch den Schädlingsbekämpfungsmitteleinsatz 
und den damit verbundenen Kosten der Krankheit. So erleiden Bauern, die 
Standards erfüllen, ceteris paribus, 78% weniger akute Krankheiten und geben ca. 
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50% weniger für die Wiederherstellung ihrer Gesundheit aus, als Bauern, die nicht 
gemäß den Standards produzieren. Obwohl sich die in dieser Arbeit ermittelten 
Gesundheitskosten nur auf Behandlungen einiger sichtbarer und akuter 
Beeinträchtigungen der Gesundheit beschränken (und somit lediglich einen 
kleinen Teil der Gesamtgesundheitskosten darstellen können), verursachen diese 
Kosten von 86,4% der durchschnittlichen Haushaltsausgaben für Pestizide in einer 
Anbauperiode für Bauern, die die Standards erfüllen, und 39,6% bei Produzenten 
die sich nicht an die Standards halten. Die Erfüllung der erforderlichen Standards 
weist auch einen signifikant positiven Einfluss auf verbesserte Anbaumethoden 
auf, zum Beispiel ein sichererer und umweltfreundlicherer 
Schädlingsbekämpfungsmitteleinsatz, der wahrscheinlich die externen Kosten der 
Produktion reduzieren wird. 
Im Allgemeinen deuten die empirischen Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass arme Bauern 
mit beschränktem Zugang zu Informationen und Dienstleistungen von der 
Partizipation an diesen hochwertigen Exportwertschöpfungsketten ausgeschlossen 
werden könnten. Kleinbauern, die GlobalGAP Standards erfüllten, haben 
signifikante Vorteile finanzieller sowie nicht-finanzieller Art genossen. Dies zeigt, 
dass Standards auch als ein Beschleuniger dienen können, um Produktionssysteme 
in Entwicklungsländern zu verändern und zu verbessern. So können institutionelle 
Maßnahmen, die das materielle, soziale und das Human-Kapital der Kleinbauern 
erhöhen, ausschlaggebend bei Haushaltsentscheidungen zur Einhaltung von neu 
entstehenden Standards sein. Sowohl die öffentliche als auch private Förderung 
von Kleinbetrieben bzw. Kleinunternehmer in der gesamten Wertschöpfungskette 
ist strategisch wichtig  will man die heutigen Anforderungen der Agrar- und 
Nahrungsmittelmärkte im Hinblick auf sich entwickelnden Lebensmittelstandards 
erfüllen. Regierungen könnten das Bewusstsein der Vorteile der Einhaltung der 
guten fachlichen Praxis und ihren breiteren Gebrauch fördern, die notwendige 
Infrastruktur verbessern, unterstützende gesetzliche und regulierende 
Rahmenbedingungen schaffen, um die Einhaltung von Standardkontrollpunkten 
und Einhaltungs-Kriterien zu erleichtern, sowie Beratungsdienstleistungen 
verstärkt anbieten und die Tätigkeiten des Privatsektors begleiten. Wichtig ist 
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darüber hinaus, dass die Regierung Unterstützung für gut funktionierende 
Gruppen von Kleinbauern und Selbsthilfegruppen zur Verfügung stellt sowie das 
Verwenden verschiedener Methoden stärkt, um Kosten, die bei der Einhaltung von 
neu entstehenden Standards entstehen, zu reduzieren. 
Die Gelegenheiten für Kleinbauern, auf dem lukrativen Exportmarkt aktiv 
involviert zu bleiben, hängen auch von den gewählten Strategien der 
Exportunternehmen ab. Private Unternehmen sollten bei ihrer Strategie 
berücksichtigen,  dass das ärmste Segment der ländlichen Produzenten möglichst 
weiterhin an den Prozessen teilnehmen kann. Bei der Steigerung der Kapazitäten 
der Kleinproduzenten, die Standards des privaten Sektors zu erfüllen, kommt  den 
Geldgebern der öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe und anderen privaten 
Organisationen eine Schlüsselrolle zu. 
Im Hinblick auf diese Herausforderungen sollte vermieden werden, die 
Kleinproduzenten von den globalen Märkten ganz zu verdrängen. Dabei ist es 
wichtig, dass Kleinbauern ihr Produktportfolio diversifizieren und Investitionen 
durchführen, die die Produktqualität auch im besseren Nachernte-Prozess 
verbessern,  um  weiterhin am Süd-Süd-Handel teilzunehmen, einem Markt, der in 
den nächsten zwei Jahrzehnten schnell wachsen könnte. Aus der Sicht der 
Institutionen die Standards entwickeln, ist entscheidend, dass die Standards die 
Bedingungen der Kleinbauern ausreichend berücksichtigen und gleichzeitig die 
Ansprüche der Verbraucher erfüllen sowie langfristig ohne Subventionen von 
Entwicklungshilfeorganisationen  implementiert werden können.  
Schlüsselwörter: Adoption, Exportgemüse, Gesundheit, GlobalGAP, Kenia, 
 Pestizide, Nahrungsmittelsicherheitsstandards, Produktivität, 
 Umwelt, Wirtschaftlichkeit 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and research problem 
Today, about 1.1 billion people continue to live in extreme poverty on less than 
US$ 1 a day. Another 1.6 billion live on between US$ 1–2 per day. Three out of 
four poor people in developing countries- (83 million people) lived in rural areas 
in 2002 (WDR 2008). Most depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, directly or 
indirectly. So a more dynamic and inclusive agriculture is required to accomplish 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and to get more people out of 
poverty. The first MDG goal, to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, in 
particular depends on raising the productivity of agriculture. However, in today’s 
more integrated world economy, success in productivity-based agricultural 
growth crucially depends on the expansion of market opportunities. Improving 
the competitiveness of developing countries agricultural products in international, 
regional, and domestic markets is the key to expanding market opportunities. 
In recent years, governments and development agencies have sought to promote 
the diversification of agrifood exports in order to accelerate economic growth, 
expand employment opportunities, and reduce rural poverty. Particular attention 
has been given to facilitating the exports of higher value foods-including fruits 
and vegetables. For these commodities international trade has exhibited 
considerable growth in recent decades. According to Lambaset (2005), high-value 
products provide an opportunity for farmers in developing countries to compete 
for a share of this lucrative export market. Trade in horticultural products is often 
considered an example of successful exports in some developing countries, with 
some of them managing to gain access into the horticultural value chains.  
Based on the most recent trade statistics (UNCTAD 2008), it is estimated that total 
sub-Saharan Africa exports of fresh fruit and vegetables (FFV) amounted to some 
US$2 billion in 2006. South Africa, with FFV exports worth almost US$1.2 billion, 
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accounted for almost two thirds of the regions FFV exports in value terms. Côte 
d'Ivoire (US$195.2 million in 2006) and Kenya (US$178.2 million in 2004, estimated 
at US$215 million for 2006 by extrapolating the 2004 figure based on growth in 
trading partners’ imports of FFV from Kenya between 2004 and 2006) are also 
important exporters, followed by Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, 
Namibia, Senegal, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (each 
of which exported FFV exceeding US$25 million). In several sub-Saharan Africa 
countries, the FFV sector contributes significantly to the total exports of 
agricultural products. For example, FFV exports accounted for 29% of South 
Africa’s agricultural exports in 2006. For all sub-Saharan Africa countries as a 
group, FFV represented 11.7% of all agricultural exports (UNCTAD 2008). 
Domestic markets for high-value crops are also the fastest-growing agricultural 
markets in most developing countries, expanding up to 6–7% a year, led by 
livestock products and horticulture (WDR 2008). As incomes rise, supermarkets 
become more dominant in the domestic retail sales of agricultural products-
reaching 60% in some Latin American countries (WDR 2008). The poverty impacts 
of this growth (both domestic and global market) depend on how the rural 
population participates in high-value markets, either directly as producers (as in 
Bangladesh) or through the labor market (as in Chile). 
Studies in Kenya have shown that French bean production alone provides half a 
million people with their main source of income. In a survey of five major bean-
growing districts, Anyango and Nabwile (1995) found between 17 and 40% of the 
growers to be women. In another study comprising beans, tomato and cabbage 
growers, Michalik (1994) found 21.5% of the farmers being women. In addition to 
income generation, vegetables are vital for the supply of vitamins and other 
micronutrients to consumers. In addition, export of exotic vegetable species such 
as French beans, snow peas and Asian vegetables have contributed about US$ 100 
million to the foreign exchange earnings of Kenya in 2002. A study conducted by 
the Institute of Development Studies (McCulloch and Ota, 2002) on the relevance 
of export vegetable production for poverty alleviation in Kenya showed a 
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significant positive impact of the industry on producers and the workforce 
employed in the sector. This is reflected in generation of employment in pack 
houses in urban areas, in farms owned or under contract by exporters as well as 
through the direct purchase from small-scale farmers. In addition, export 
vegetable production in Kenya is concentrated in areas severely affected by 
absolute poverty and hence is expected to contribute to poverty reduction. 
Enhancing smallholder participation needs market infrastructure, upgrading 
farmers’ technical capacity, risk management instruments, and collective action 
through producer organizations (Lambaste, 2005). Addressing the stringent 
sanitary and phytosanitary standards in global markets is an even bigger 
challenge. In the past few years, for Kenyan producers, the challenge of 
international competitiveness in higher value food trade has become increasingly 
linked to the development of capacity to manage food-safety. In Kenya’s main 
destination markets, especially, in the European Union (EU), official food-safety 
requirements are becoming more stringent, while new standards are being applied 
to address previously unknown or unregulated hazards. In parallel with changes 
in official standards, public oversight have been accelerated moves by the private 
sector to address food-safety risks and otherwise address the (environmental and 
social) concerns and preferences of consumers and civil society organizations. 
Supermarket chains in Europe have developed prescriptive, production-oriented 
standards, the EU Retailers Protocols on Good Agricultural Practices 
(GlobalGAP)1, which are meant for growers of fresh fruit and vegetables and 
require certification by an independent internationally accredited certification 
body.  
                                                 
1 This study was conducted when EurepGAP, Version 2.1 (October 2004) was relevant. Since then 
EurepGAP has changed its name and logo to GlobalGAP, arguing that its proclaimed role in 
promoting the harmonization of good agricultural practices schemes had moved beyond Europe. 
The name change was announced at the 8th EurepGAP Conference, the EurepGAP Asia 
Conference, held in Bangkok on 6th and 7th September 2007. Therefore, throughout this thesis 
consistently the word GlobalGAP is used, which would be synonymous to EurepGAP.    
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This proliferation and enhanced stringency of food-safety standards represent 
potential barriers to Kenyan farmers seeking to expand their trade in higher value 
foods. Yet, they may also represent a catalyst for the upgrading of production 
operations, and for improved collaboration between the public and private 
sectors. According to Henson and Jaffee (2006) a major implication of adopting the 
standards as catalysts for development is the need to view compliance as a 
strategic issue, so that the opportunities and challenges are managed to 
competitive advantage.  
In this context, it is essential to understand the current status and likely trajectory 
of agrifood standards, the feasible range of commercial, administrative and 
technical options available to African farmers, firms, and governments, and the 
underlying economics of such responses. Therefore, this study analyses the 
expected impact of private food-safety standards on small-scale producers welfare 
in particular and the horticultural export sector in Kenya in general, which in turn 
provide the necessary information basis for identifying further research needs and 
for developing policy recommendations that can induce change towards more 
sustainable horticultural production and marketing systems in Eastern Africa.  
1.2 Objectives of the study 
This study aims at investigating the extent to which food-safety standards 
imposed by the EU private retailers affect the welfare of small-scale farmers in 
Kenya. The impact of these standards on smallholder welfare is explored by 
making comparison between different categories of smallholder participating in 
the export sector.  
The specific objectives of the study are to:  
i. Investigate the nature and magnitude of costs of compliance with 
GlobalGAP standards. 
ii. Examine determinants of adoption of GlobalGAP standards and estimate 
the impact of standards on farm financial performance.  
iii. Analyse profitability of investment in GlobalGAP certification. 
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iv. Examine the impact of GlobalGAP standards on pesticide use and farm-
level productivity.  
v. Estimate the effect of GlobalGAP standards on pesticide ascribed incidence 
of acute illness symptoms and its associated cost-of-illness.  
vi. Explore the impact of GlobalGAP adoption on improved management 
practices as proxy for environmental benefits. 
1.3 Organization of the thesis 
The remaining part of this thesis consists of six chapters and brief descriptions of 
these chapters are presented as follows. Following these introductory remarks, 
Chapter two is devoted to a review of trend in Kenyan horticultural industry and 
the evolving EU food-safety standards. It discusses the regulatory EU public 
standards in comparison with private voluntary food-safety standards. It 
specifically summarizes the implications of emerging standards on export growth, 
structure of agrifood supply chain, overall development and poverty reduction for 
developing countries. It also present the supply chain for fruit and vegetables in 
Kenya, the degree of smallholder participation in the vegetable export sector and 
the driving factors for the development of Kenyan horticultural export sectors. 
Chapter three presents the general conceptual framework for assessing the welfare 
impact of GlobalGAP certification. The chapter starts by discussing the diffusion 
of innovation and adoption of standards in more general terms and presents the 
welfare effects of GlobalGAP certification. It ends by presenting the general 
hypotheses of the study based on the concepts discussed in the previous sections.  
Determinants of adoption of GlobalGAP standards and the impact of standards on 
farm financial performance are analyzed in Chapter four. Specifically, this chapter 
tries to discuss the magnitude and nature of cost of compliance with GlobalGAP 
standards and provide answer whether investment in EU safety standards 
compliance pay-off for small-scale producers. Three alternative econometric 
models are also presented in detail that helps to answer the research questions. 
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Chapter five analyzes the role of adoption of production standards on the use of 
pesticides and value of production among export producers. It also provides some 
insight on the performance of farmers producing for domestic market in 
comparison with the export farmers. An extended three-stage damage control 
production framework that accounts for multiple endogeneity problems is 
discussed and applied.  
Chapter six assesses the effect of GlobalGAP standards on pesticide related acute 
illness and its corresponding cost-of-illness. It also explores the impact of 
GlobalGAP adoption on improved management practices as proxy for 
environmental benefits. To attain the objectives, the chapter presents a theoretical 
non-separable farm household model as a starting point and develops an 
empirical model to analyze the data.  
Finally, Chapter seven reports a general synthesis and conclusion of the study 
including policy implications of the research findings. The chapter closes with 
recommendation for further research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Kenyan Fresh Export Production and Emerging Food-safety 
Standards 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the evolution of food-safety standards in 
EU, compares the public regulatory versus private voluntary standards and 
discusses their possible implications on export growth, structure of agrifood 
supply chain, overall development and poverty reduction for developing 
countries. It also review the supply chain for fruit and vegetables in Kenya, the 
degree of smallholder participation in vegetable export and the driving factors for 
the development of Kenyan horticultural export sectors.  
2.1 Food-safety standards  
Food-safety is a matter of primary importance, because foods which are unsafe 
can easily affect consumer’s health and in addition destroy their trust into the 
supplier, with significant negative effects on its future sales (Fulponi, 2006). What 
makes it even more important is the fact that food-safety problems can affect a 
large number of consumers simultaneously throughout regions, since food is often 
distributed nationwide. The food-safety scandals of the 1990s have led 
governments of EU and retailers to enact strict food-safety standards covering 
four broad areas: pesticide residue limits, worker safety, packer hygiene, and 
traceability. In order to ensure that the food-safety standards are met, various 
quality assurance systems have been developed. They can be classified into 
systems of Good Practices1, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points systems 
(HACCP)2 and international standards set by the International Organization for 
                                                 
1 Good practices are guidelines to ensure minimum standards for food processing and storage. 
They include Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) and Good 
Hygienic Practices (GHP) (Luning et al., 2002). 
2 HACCP was developed in 1959 and deals with the prevention of food-safety failures in the food 
production. It covers the whole process of food production from growing to the preparation for 
consumption (Luning et al., 2002). 
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Standardization (ISO)3 (Henson and Reardon, 2005). The compliance of food 
suppliers with these systems is ensured either through first party auditing 
(suppliers audit themselves), second party auditing (the retailer performs the 
audit) or through a third party auditing (which is supposed to be independent 
from the other parties). 
Although a matter of public importance, globalization in the food sector with 
supply chains crossing many national borders, growing product differentiation 
and new technologies, made it increasingly difficult for national governments to 
regulate matters of food-safety and quality in detail (Hatanaka et al., 2005). In 
response to the problems of governmental regulation bodies to keep pace with 
new developments in the food sector, private food-safety and quality standards 
emerged during the 1990s. One common formula in the discussion about public 
and private food standards is that public standards are more concerned with 
physical product characteristics and to a lesser extent with processes, while 
private standards are concerned with physical and process attributes, both to 
ensure a certain product characteristic as well as a certain production process 
itself.  
2.1.1 Regulatory public standards 
 In the case of the EU the tightening of public product standards has to be seen in 
the context of various ‘food scares’ (Table 2.1) that have shattered public trust in 
food production, as well as in the context of harmonization and rationalization of 
standards across countries and product areas (Humphrey, 2005). One of the most 
important changes in public product standards was laid with the EU directive 
42/2000/EC on Maximum Residual Levels, which came into force in July 2001 as 
part of the EU pesticide regulation harmonization program (EU 2000). The 
program requires safe levels of pesticide use to be established by scientific testing, 
usually based on data submitted by agrochemical companies. Apart from some 
                                                 
3 For example ISO/9000 series specify quality system requirements and the ISO/22000, which deal 
with food-safety management systems and the requirements for any organization in the food chain 
(Færgemand and Jespersen, 2004). 
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other important changes (Humphrey, 2005), the new EU regulations also require 
inspection of all imports of plant products, which creates new costs for developing 
countries’ producers, particularly for producers sending only small batches to the 
EU.  
Table 2.1 Examples of major food scares in industrialized countries 
Year Event Countries 
1987 - 1988 Beef hormone scare Italy/EU 
1988 Poultry salmonella outbreak/scandal UK 
1989 Growth regulator scare for apples USA 
1996 - 1997 Microbiological contamination, berries USA, Canada 
1995 - 1997 Avian flu spreads to humans Hong Kong, Taiwan 
1999 Dioxins in animal feed Belgium 
2000 Large-scale food poisoning, dairy Japan 
2001 Contaminated olive oil Spain 
2001 Foot and Mouth Disease UK/EU 
2007 Foot and Mouth Disease UK 
Source: Jaffee et al., 2005  
Furthermore, a significant shift has occurred in the way food production is 
conceptualized, away from pure product-control to a process-control approach, as 
it is clearly expressed in regulation (EC) No 178/2002, which came into effect in 
January 2005. Food-safety is viewed as an outcome of the value chain as a whole, 
stretching from primary production to the final consumer. This approach largely 
builds on the UK Food Safety Act of 1990, which shifted the responsibility for safe 
food to retailers and required them to show ‘due diligence’, which means they had 
to show that they employed all reasonable means in the stages of production, 
transport, storage and preparation of food to prevent health risks. This principle of 
due diligence has been taken onto the supranational level with the new EU 
regulation, which stipulates that food operators should have ‘primarily 
responsibility for ensuring food-safety’, and therefore must have a system in place 
to identify and respond to safety problems and are required to ensure the 
traceability of products. The latter refers to the requirement for food operators to 
be able to trace products up to the respective exporter in supplying countries, but 
Chapter 2  10 
usually not beyond this point. These process-oriented shifts in food-safety largely 
follow the Hazard Critical Control Point Analysis. This approach is widely 
applied as a sector-specific standard in the food and other sectors in order to 
contain risks at critical points within the production process (Humphrey, 2006). 
These important shifts in public regulation have had particular influence on the 
development of private standards.  
2.1.2 Private food-safety standards 
The line between public and private actors is frequently blurred and private 
standard setting processes usually involve different actors such as corporations, 
industry association, NGOs, development organizations, and the public sector 
operating on at different geographical scales (Humphery, 2006). While producers 
may have driven food chains in the past, often through spot-markets 
arrangements, retailers have gained control over supply chains with the ongoing 
concentration in the market place over the last two decades. For instance, at the 
end of the 1990s only five supermarket chains accounted for 75% of all grocery 
sales in the UK (Jaffee et al., 2005). Private retailers have become much more 
involved in imposing requirements on how food is produced throughout the 
commodity supply chain, even to the degree of monitoring and controlling 
production in developing countries (Dolan et al., 1999). 
Today, the motivation for private food-safety standards is much more strategic. 
Retailers have moved into domains such as product development, 
branding/private label development, distribution and supplier selection as 
corporate strategies in order to increase rents in a highly competitive market. 
Fierce competition among retailers in Europe not only spurred processes of 
innovation, but also the need to express social responsibility and accountability as 
a strategy of corporate benchmarking in times of increased societal reflexivity. The 
standards help firms to gain access to new markets and to coordinate international 
production due to a standardization of product requirements across suppliers, 
therefore helping to reduce their transaction costs (Henson and Reardon, 2005; 
Hatanaka et al., 2005). Furthermore, they help retailers to protect their reputation 
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and therefore to maintain customers loyalty, which can be easily jeopardized by a 
food-safety problem (Fulponi, 2006). Achieving these goals required a 
restructuring of value chains, with most significant impacts on the sourcing of 
fresh produce. Initially they were aimed at addressing the problem of microbial 
contaminants in food. They later evolved to cover three broad areas: i) pesticide 
residue standards, including pesticide usage, handling, and storage as well as 
disposal of pesticide containers and leftover pesticides, ii) hygiene standards, 
including sanitation of grading and storage facilities as well as general personal 
hygiene, and iii) traceability requirements, including documentation of production 
activities, especially pesticide usage, planting and spraying dates, and labeling of 
graded produce (Jaffee et al., 2005). 
The private food-safety standards that have an international scope and are applied 
in the fresh produce vegetable and fruit sector are very similar. The reason is that 
many of them are build around the same principles such as HACCP, ISO, GAP 
and GMP. Tesco’s Nature’s Choice (UK), Mark’s and Spencer’s Field to Fork (UK) 
or Carrefour’s Qualité Superior (France) are prominent examples of company-
based standards, which are applied exclusively to value chains governed by these 
retailers (value chain specific standards). Despite the significant market share of 
some large retailers, the most profound impact arises from the development of 
private collective standards being set and enforced by global standard networks. 
The most prominent of them have been the British Retail Consortium (BRC), 
Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), the 
International Food Standard (IFS), ISO 9000 and 14000, the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) and GlobalGAP. These are usually applied sector-specifically. 
Fulponi (2006) refers to these standards as ‘private voluntary standards’ (PVS). 
These standards arise on three levels. First, they are a response to public 
regulatory pressure such as BRC, a standard that governs issues of Good 
Manufacturing Practices (Processing) and was largely a response to the UK Food 
Safety Act. Second, they may develop from civil society’s pressure or from a 
development context as in the case of the ETI. Third, they may be regarded as an 
effort to harmonize standards themselves as it is the case with the GFSI or 
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GlobalGAP. To enhance credibility and externalize monitoring costs, most of the 
standards such as GlobalGAP, ISO 9000 and 14000, BRC and ETI are enforced 
through third party certification, i.e. an independent, accredited certification body, 
which inspects and audits the respective producers on an annual level.  
Although most of these private voluntary standards are relevant for the 
horticultural sector in Kenya, they are often more stringent than GlobalGAP and 
primarily adopted by large-scale producers. There were no smallholder groups 
certified under these standards during the survey period except for GlobalGAP. 
Hence the study focuses primarily on smallholders producing under GlobalGAP 
standards. 
2.1.3 GlobalGAP standards for fruits and vegetables 
The GlobalGAP guidelines reflect a harmonization of the existing safety, quality, 
and environmental guidelines of the major European retailers, and are a response 
to increasing consumer interest in food-safety and environmental issues 
(GlobalGAP 2004). The detailed production protocols were first developed for 
fruit and vegetables and now also cover flowers and grains. GlobalGAP has a 
growing membership of retailers, including leading food retailers such as 
Sainsbury’s, Tesco, Safeway, Coop Italia, Belgian Wholesale Markets, Waitrose 
and Kesko (GlobalGAP 2004).  
The Euro-Retailer Produce working group established its own standard for good 
agricultural practices, GlobalGAP, in 1997 based on retailer needs to reassure 
consumers that food was being produced in a safe and sustainable manner within 
context of a globalized food economy. Originally developed with reference to 
fruits and vegetables, it has expanded to include integrated assurance schemes for 
farms and aquaculture, as well as protocols for flowers and ornamentals. A 
protocol for green coffee protocol will soon be completed. Its organization has also 
evolved from a uniquely retailer dominated to one of partnership with producers 
and consults regularly with consumer groups, NGOs and governments in the 
developments of its protocols. 
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GlobalGAP is flexible and permits benchmarking of local schemes to GlobalGAP, 
thus extending participation under the scheme. This is seen as important in 
fulfilling a basic aim of facilitating trade in safe and sustainable farm production. 
As a business to business scheme the logo is available to accredited farmers when 
supplying manufacturers or retailers. It may not appear at point of sale to the final 
consumer since it is understood that all products offered for sale comply with 
basic implicit requirements. 
GlobalGAP is a quality and safety management system, providing tools for 
verifying best practices in a systematic and consistent way through the use of 
product protocols and compliance criteria. The GlobalGAP schemes are based on 
compliance to four main criteria: food-safety, environmental protection, 
occupational health and safety and animal welfare. The food-safety criteria are 
based on the application of HACCP principles, while criteria for the environment 
are designed to minimize negative effects of agricultural production. While a 
minimal level of occupational health and safety criteria are part of GlobalGAP, 
these are not to be considered in depth audits of social conditions. All GlobalGAP 
schemes require compliance with national and international legislation. 
Compliance with GlobalGAP is assessed on grounds of the control points, which 
are classified into three levels of importance, ranging from ‘major musts’ over 
‘minor musts’ to recommendations. Major musts have to be fulfilled with a 
compliance of 100% (GlobalGAP 2004). All control points that are viable for food-
safety and some points related to occupational safety belong to this category. A 
compliance of 95% is sufficient for the sum of minor musts. Those major and 
minor musts that are not fulfilled but were deemed as not being applicable for 
certain farms do not enter into the calculation of compliance. In contrast, 
recommendations have no minimum percentage that has to be complied with. 
Recommendations have therefore mainly the function of raising awareness for the 
topics in question (the control points for environmental protection belong to this 
category). 
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In case of non-compliance to one of the major musts that was not declared to the 
certification body, the certification is suspended for three month. A second 
violation of the same control point leads to a withdrawal of the GlobalGAP 
certificate. Declared violation of major musts compliance leads to a rejection of the 
produce that was affected by the non-compliance. In case of compliance with less 
than the required 95% of the minor musts, corrective measures have to be taken by 
the producer within a month – these corrections are subject to a subsequent 
inspection by the certification body (GlobalGAP 2004). Repeated violation of more 
than 5% of the minor musts leads to a suspension of the certificate for up to six 
months. Within these six months the issues have to be resolved – otherwise the 
GlobalGAP certificate is withdrawn (GlobalGAP 2004)4.  
Although approximately 66% of certified producers are located within the EU, 
GlobalGAP also gains in importance all over the world (GlobalGAP 2004). 
Especially, in North and South America GlobalGAP is already broadly 
implemented with certified growers in almost every country. Whereas, in Africa 
certified growers are mainly located on the eastern coast and in Asia GlobalGAP is 
mainly implemented in south-east Asian countries.  
GlobalGAP offers four options to producers who seek to obtain certification under 
the standard. Under Option 1, an individual farmer applies for certification. The 
farmer must carry out an internal self-inspection and undergo an external 
inspection by a certification body, which is a certification enterprise accredited by 
GlobalGAP. Under Option 2, a group of farmers applies for a group certificate. 
Under Options 3 and 4, individual farmers or farmer groups that have already 
implemented another standard can apply for a ‘GlobalGAP benchmarked scheme 
certificate’, i.e. GlobalGAP recognizes the existing standards scheme as being 
equivalent to the GlobalGAP standard (GlobalGAP 2004). The four key elements 
for group certification are described in the GlobalGAP General Regulations 
(GlobalGAP 2004). 
                                                 
4 For a listing of the specific criteria according to product scheme, see http://www.globalgap.org. 
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First, the group must have an operating Internal Management and Control System 
(ICS). This system includes quality control through written protocols and a 
procedure manual. This is supposed to guarantee that internal inspections are 
undertaken in a competent way. It also has a traceability system, which allows to 
separate GlobalGAP certified products from none certified, and also enables to 
trace back to the farm where the product was obtained. All registered members of 
the farmer group must be operating under the same management and subject to 
central management review. Farmers belonging to the farmer group must register 
for GlobalGAP certification for at least one whole year and all farmer groups must 
have internal audit procedures that establish a minimum of an annual inspection 
for each registered farmer. 
Second, each registered farmer should complete a farmer internal self inspection 
and this includes a completed internal self-inspection based on the GlobalGAP 
checklist, which must be available on each registered farm to be reviewed by 
either the internal or the external inspector. Internal self-inspection must be 
carried out at least once a year. 
Third, qualified staff must complete an internal inspection of all registered farms 
i.e. a minimum of one internal inspection per year of each registered farm must be 
carried out by qualified staff within the farmer group, or subcontracted to an 
external verification body different from the certification body responsible for the 
external verification. The annual internal inspection must be based on the 
GlobalGAP checklist. 
Fourth, external verification should be performed by GlobalGAP approved 
certification body. The external inspection is annual and made by taking a random 
sample that is, as a minimum, the square root of the total number of GlobalGAP 
registered farmers within the farmer group. 
In Kenya, only the first two GlobalGAP certification options were relevant at the 
time of this study. In the case of smallholders, an exporter or producer 
organization determines the type of certificate. The smallholder producer then 
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decides whether or not to implement the standards. To comply with the standards 
producers have to change their production technology, e.g. switch to less harmful 
pesticides. The standards also require lumpy investments like a grading shed, 
charcoal cooler, disposal pit, toilet, and pesticide store. An overview of selected 
GlobalGAP compliance criteria and investment required by small-scale producers 
is presented in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Selected GlobalGAP compliance criteria and investment required 
Compliance criteria  Investments required  
Record keeping and internal self 
inspection  
Office construction, office furniture, writing materials, 
technical staff etc. 
Crop protection Chemical store, use of Integrated Pest Management (IPM), 
shift to approved chemicals etc. 
Worker safety, health and welfare Construction of toilet and bath room, first aid equipments, 
protective clothing, disposal pit, potable water etc. 
Soil management and quality of 
water 
Soil and water testing etc. 
Product handling  Grading shed, charcoal cooler etc. 
Source: GlobalGAP, 2004 
2.2 Food-safety standards and their implications 
Over the past 50 years, progress has been made in lowering the barriers to trade 
through a removal of quotas, a reduction in tariffs and preferential trade 
agreements for developing country imports in western economies. This has 
benefited developing country export performance. Participation in international 
trade is generally recognized to favor economic growth and especially agricultural 
exports would promote development in low-income countries due to the link with 
the rural economy. However, it is argued that the gains from trade liberalization 
are offset by increasing food standards that are mainly imposed by high-income 
countries and increasingly dominate the world’s food trading system (Augier et 
al., 2005; Brenton and Manchin, 2002). These standards are argued to act as new 
barriers to developing country exports. Moreover, others argue that high 
standards concentrate the benefits of trade with processing and retailing 
companies and large farms, thereby casting doubt on the development impact of 
increased agricultural exports from developing countries. Standards would lead to 
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an unequal distribution of the gains from trade and result in the marginalization 
of poorer farmers and small agrifood businesses. 
2.2.1 Food standards role for export growth 
Although food standards have first emerged in high-income countries, they are 
increasingly spreading through developing countries as well, especially in their 
urban markets, and affect these countries through foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and agricultural trade. Food processing and retailing companies investing in 
developing countries require high standards from their suppliers to serve high-
standard markets in their home economies, to reduce transaction costs in regional 
distribution and supply chains, or to harmonize production and processing 
standards across subsidiaries of multinational holdings. Food standards further 
affect developing countries because exports to high income countries have to meet 
the high standards in these countries. 
There is uncertainty on how food standards affect developing country exports. 
Some studies argue that standards are new trade barriers that are offsetting the 
gains from trade liberalization and diminish the export opportunities for 
developing countries (Augier et al., 2005; Brenton and Manchin, 2002). Others 
argue that compliance with food standards can be a catalyst for upgrading and 
modernization of developing country’s food supply systems and for export 
growth (Jaffe and Henson, 2005; Henson and Jaffee, 2006).  
Food standards have the potential to be used as protectionist tools or as a 
(scientifically-justified) excuse for protectionism by industrial countries. Standards 
can be set higher for imports than for domestically produced goods or countries 
could apply discriminatory measures to different importing countries. Standards 
can be designed to protect national industries rather than consumer health. 
Increased trade liberalization creates incentives for countries that see quotas 
removed and tariffs reduced, to indeed (mis)use standards to bar developing 
country exports and protect domestic farmers and agrifood companies (Neff and 
Malanovski, 1996). The empirical evidence on this is mixed. Some argue that the 
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protectionist use of standards and trade disputes over food quality and safety 
issues has increased in the past decade and is likely to increase in the future. For 
example, Mathews et al. (2003) note that several countries effectively discriminate 
by having zero-tolerance for salmonella on imports of poultry products while not 
attaining and not monitoring this standard for domestic supplies. Jaffee and 
Henson (2005) note an example from Australia prohibiting imports of sauces from 
the Philippines on the basis of containing benzoic acid while permitting imports 
from New Zealand of similar products containing that additive. No systematic 
research has been done on this issue and there is only anecdotal evidence on the 
discriminatory use of food standards. However, Jaffee and Henson (2005) argue 
that many of these anecdotal cases involve at least partially legitimate food safety 
and agricultural health issues and that no systematic evidence on the 
discriminatory use of standards is available.  
Apart from the discriminatory use of standards there is another reason why 
standards may act as barriers to trade for developing countries: the high cost-of 
compliance with food standards and the low capacity of developing countries in 
food safety. The compliance cost is likely to be higher for developing countries 
because they generally have insufficient food safety capacity. Developing 
countries lack the institutional, technical and scientific capacity for food quality 
and safety management. Hence adherence to high standards imposed by high-
income countries might require substantial investment – from the public sector as 
well as from the private sector – to realize that capacity. For poor countries, 
lacking the financial means, the cost of compliance with food standards might be 
too high and undermine their competitive capacity. Hence, standards could act as 
barriers to trade for developing countries facing particular weaknesses in food 
safety capacity. 
Some studies have estimated the cost of compliance to food quality and safety 
standards for specific cases and have demonstrated that these costs are relatively 
lower than generally assumed. For example Aloui and Kenny (2005) estimate the 
cost of compliance with sanitary and phytosanitary standards (SPS) to be 3% of 
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total costs of export tomato production in Morocco. Cato et al. (2005) have 
estimated the cost to implement compliance to safety standards to be less than 3% 
and the cost to maintain this compliance less than 1% of the total value of shrimp 
exports from Nicaragua. Another reason why compliance costs are high is the lack 
of harmonization in standards across countries and even across individual 
importers. It is argued that compliance costs could be substantially reduced if 
standards would be harmonized across countries and internationally uniform 
conformity assessment and certification producers adopted (Aloui and Kenny, 
2005). 
The cost of compliance might be relatively low compared to export earnings but 
the cost of non-compliance with standards is potentially very high. The inability to 
comply with food standards can lead to border detentions of produce and trade 
restrictions such as import bans for specific products. For example, in 1997 the EU 
banned fish exports from Kenya on grounds of food safety risks (Henson et al., 
2000) and from Bangladesh on the basis of incompliance with hygiene norms in 
processing plants (Unnevehr, 2000). Such detentions and import bans are 
extremely costly; in the short run in terms of immediate forgone export earnings 
and the waste these detentions generate; and in the long run in terms of damaging 
a country’s reputation and eroding its export competitiveness. For example the EU 
ban on fish exports from Kenya decreased export earnings by 37% (Henson et al., 
2000) and US border detentions of vegetable shipments from Guatemala made this 
country lose $ 35 million annually in the period 1995-1997 (Julian et al., 2000).  
Some developing countries have been successful in complying with increasing 
food standards. Among the success stories are Thai and Kenyan horticulture 
(Jaffee et al., 2005; Jaffee, 2003); Thai and Nicaraguan shrimp (Jaffee et al., 2005); 
and Indian spices (Jaffee, 2005). Instead of acting as barriers, emerging food safety 
and quality standard might provide incentives for developing countries for 
upgrading their export capacity and for gaining access to high value food markets. 
Jaffee and Henson (2005) note that the most successful countries and/or sectors 
have used high quality and safety standards to (re)-position themselves in 
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competitive global markets. In fact, standards provide a bridge between producers 
in developing countries and consumer preferences in high income markets and 
could be used as catalysts for upgrading and modernization of developing 
countries’ food supply systems and improving their competitive capacity. Food 
safety standards reduce transaction costs and promote consumer confidence in 
food product safety, without which the market for these products cannot be 
maintained or enhanced (Henson and Jaffee, 2006). Food standards provide 
opportunities that can be utilized by developing countries to their competitive 
advantage. If standards can be used as catalysts in such a way, they provide a 
basis for long term export growth. A key element in attaining these benefits is to 
be proactive in food quality and safety and facilitate business strategic responses 
(Jaffee and Henson, 2005). Compliance with stringent food quality and safety 
standards might create positive spillover effects into domestic markets and 
traditional agricultural supply systems (Henson and Jaffee, 2006). Attention to 
‘good agricultural practice’ and consumer health in export supply chains might 
spillover to more traditional and domestic agricultural and food markets. This 
might benefit the local population and domestic producers. 
2.2.2 Food standards and supply chain restructuring 
The way standards affect the structure of food supply chains in developing 
countries, is crucial for understanding not only the link between standards and 
export performance but also the link to rural development and poverty (Maertens 
and Swinnen, 2006b).  
Food standards pose specific challenges to small agro-food businesses, exporters 
and farmers in developing countries to stay in the business in high-standards 
export markets. These challenges arise from the financial and other constraints 
these small enterprises face in complying with food standards. They experience 
difficulties in accessing the necessary information on standards, in translating 
such information into specific investment needs, and in making the necessary 
investments for quality and safety upgrading while facing financial, technical and 
institutional constraints (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006b). Although, in general, the 
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cost of compliance with standards might be low relative to the total export value 
in a particular sector, this cost might be very high relative to the means of small 
firms and poor farmers (Reardon et al., 1999). Therefore the increased importance 
of food standards in global agricultural trade can lead to those weaker players 
exiting profitable high-standard export markets and hence to consolidation of the 
supply base. The literature has presented some evidence of ongoing consolidation 
of agricultural exporting and processing activities in developing countries. Dolan 
and Humphrey (2000) find that in Kenya and Zimbabwe smaller agro-food 
businesses increasingly squeezed out of fresh vegetable trade and that the fresh 
fruit and vegetable export sector is dominated by a few large agro-industrial 
companies and exporters. Also Jaffee (2003) points to that fact for the case of 
Kenya fruit and vegetable exports and estimates that 90% of the export volume is 
controlled by only six companies. There is also evidence of ongoing consolidation 
at the level of primary production. This is closely related to increased vertical 
coordination in the export supply chain.  
Compliance with increasingly complex and stringent food standards and 
monitoring of this compliance throughout the supply chain requires tighter 
vertical coordination at different nodes in the chain. The search for quality and 
high-standards is a key driving force of increased vertical coordination in global 
food supply chains (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006b). At the export-import node of 
the chain; importers in high-standard markets, especially the large retail chains, 
increasingly procure from a list of preferred suppliers in order to guarantee 
quality and safety of the produce. Being on this list and attract contract deals with 
importers becomes increasingly crucial for exporters in developing countries to 
gain and maintain market access. This is specifically tough for smaller exporters 
who are disadvantaged in vertically coordinated supply chains because they 
cannot provide the quantities large multinational food distributing companies 
demand. This might lead to further consolidation at the level of exporting 
companies. For example in Kenya, the few large fresh fruit and vegetable 
exporting companies who dominate the sector all have contracts with 
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supermarket chains in the UK and other European countries (Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000). 
Upstream the supply chain, vertical coordination between exporters /processors / 
retailers and primary producers in developing countries is increasing in response 
to increasing food standards. Traditional spot market trading systems with 
intermediaries or ‘middlemen’ are generally not effective in high-standards 
supply chains. In such trading systems, monitoring compliance with standards is 
extremely difficult and expensive in terms of transaction costs. Hence, as a result 
of increasing food standard, the food supply system is moving towards increased 
vertical coordination where contract-farming and integrated estate farming 
become increasingly important. In general, two distinct pathways of increased 
vertical coordination in high-standards food supply chains can be identified. 
First, buyers may increasingly rely on contract-farming with suppliers. As to 
guarantee product quality and assure process conformity with food safety 
standards, these buyers might choose to contract with larger farmers and / or to 
apply tighter contract coordination (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006b). Second, 
increasing standards might lead to a shift from smallholder contract based 
production towards large-scale vertically integrated estate production. This would 
be a more radical change of increased vertical coordination and implies exporters 
and agro-processing companies to start their own primary production on bought 
or rented land. Such an integrated way of production increases the scope for 
standardized production and for meeting high safety and traceability standards at 
low transaction costs. However, such large-scale integrated production entails 
risks for agro-exporting companies and increases other costs; e.g. supervision 
costs of labor and the cost of renting or buying land.  
2.2.3 Food standards implication for development and poverty reduction 
Understanding the link between standards on the one hand and export 
competitiveness and performance of developing countries on the other hand is 
crucial in the design of a broader development agenda. Yet, an even more critical 
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issue for policy makers concerned with equitable growth, is to understand the link 
between food standards, developing country agricultural exports and poverty in 
those countries. As indicated by the Jaffee et al. (2005) the cost and structural 
changes associated with compliance with food standards can cause significant 
redistribution of welfare across countries, along the supply chain and in societies. 
Such redistribution determines the capacity of high-standards agricultural trade to 
serve not only as a basis for long term export growth and a tool for upgrading and 
modernizing developing country food supply systems but also as an engine for 
economic growth and poverty reduction. Some authors argue that high standards 
agricultural trade may do little for the fate of poor farmers and fishermen as they 
are likely to be excluded from high-standards supply chains while the rents in the 
chain are extracted by multinational companies and developing country elites        
(Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Farina and Reardon, 2000; Reardon et al., 1999).  
The general view in the literature is that small farmers, and especially the poorest 
ones, are increasingly being squeezed out from high-standards production and 
trade. Many authors point to the fact that poor farmers do not benefit from 
agricultural trade because high standards impede their participation in export 
supply chains (Reardon et al., 2003; Pimbert et al., 2001; Kerallah, 2000; Gibbon, 
2003). This exclusion of the smallest farmers is argued to happen either because 
contract-farming is biased towards large farmers or because large-scale vertically 
integrated production crowds out small suppliers. First, contract-farming might be 
biased to larger farmers because of the high transaction costs processing and 
exporting firms face in sourcing from a large number of (dispersed) small 
suppliers (Key and Runsten, 1999). Especially monitoring conformity with 
standards might involve very high transaction costs. Second, smaller and poorer 
farmers might need more intensified farm extension and additional financial 
assistance in order to meet quality and safety standards. The burden this brings to 
exporting companies might lead them to choose to contract only larger farmers.  
Participation of small enterprises and poorer farmers in high-standards export 
production and trade is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an enhanced 
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welfare effect of high-standards agricultural trade; these agents also need to 
effectively benefit from this participation (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006b). It has 
been repeatedly argued in the literate that the gains from high-standards 
agricultural trade are captured by foreign investors and developing country elites 
(Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Farina and Reardon, 2000; Reardon et al., 1999). 
Contract-farming has been criticized as a tool for agro-industrial firms and food 
multinationals to exploit unequal power relationship vis-à-vis farmers and to 
extract rents from the supply chain to the disadvantage of poor farmers (Warning 
and Key, 2002). Consolidation of the export supply base and vertical coordination 
in the supply chain can amplify the bargaining power of large exporting 
companies and displace decision-making authority from the farmers to the 
downstream agroindustrial companies. This would strengthen the capacity of 
large companies to extract rents from the chain (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006b).  
2.3 Overview of the Kenyan horticultural sector 
Horticultural exports have grown dramatically in many sub-Saharan African 
countries while many other agricultural export commodities have faced stagnation 
and declining world market prices. The Kenyan horticultural export industry has 
been most successful and is now by far the largest exporter of vegetables to the 
European Union (GoK 2006). The exports of vegetables have increased quickly 
over the last decade, surpassing coffee - historically Kenya’s most prosperous 
export crop - as the nation's second major source of foreign exchange in the 
agricultural sector next to tea.  
The value of horticultural exports raised between 1980 and 2000 from 50 to nearly 
250 million US$ (Jaffee, 2003). After the year 2000, this development continued 
and the value of horticultural produce (in terms of gross market production value) 
increased to over 550 million US$ in 2005 (GoK 2006). The value share of 
horticultural products in percent of total export value grew in the same time 
(2001-2005) from 31 to 41%, underlining the growing importance of horticulture 
for the Kenyan economy (GoK 2006). As shown from Figure 2.1 the volume of 
fresh produce exports did not drop since 2003. Besides its high growth, the 
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horticultural industry (both export and domestic) currently contributes about 19% 
of Kenya’s annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (GoK 2006). The importance of 
the horticulture sector is also reflected by the large number of people employed in 
the sector ranging from 50,000 to 116,000 in 2005 (Dolan, 2005; Humphrey et al., 
2004).  
The major export vegetable crops are green beans, peas and Asian vegetables 
(such as karella, chillies, aubergines and okra) with beans and peas mostly being 
exported to the EU. The main flowers exported include roses, carnations, statice 
and a variety of summer flowers (voor den Dog, 2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Trends in vegetable exports from Kenya.  
Source: HCDA, 2008 
The vast majority of this produce (89%) is destined for Europe, with the United 
Kingdom (UK) market absorbing the major share. Kenya also exports Asian 
vegetables to the Middle East market (Harris et al., 2001). Besides UK most of the 
Kenyan exports also goes to the Netherlands, France and Germany. This is 
demonstrated in Table 2.1. For fruits, the picture is more complex with passion 
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fruit mainly going to the UK, avocado mainly going to the Netherlands and 
France, while mango going almost exclusively to the Middle East.  
The concentration of products in a very small number of markets implies that the 
development in these markets become crucial. In Europe in general and in the UK 
in particular, large supermarket chains play a dominant role in the retail of fresh 
produce. In the UK, the supermarkets sell around 70% of total fresh produce while 
the remaining 30% is channeled through wholesale markets (Barrett et al., 1999). In 
general, the supermarkets have a similar share of trade in Northern Europe while 
they are much less dominant in Southern Europe where much fresh produce is 
still sold on traditional markets and through independent greengroceries. France 
is somewhere in the middle. Everywhere, though, supermarkets are gaining 
market shares. 
Table 2.3 Markets for Kenyan fresh horticultural exports by crop type and country 
      (% of export volume) 
Crop type UK Netherlands France Germany Rest of Europe 
Middle 
East 
South 
Africa 
Total fresh horticulture 35 33 10 7 3 7 5 
Cut flowers 16 65 1 9 3 4 1 
Green beans 56 0 29 3 3 0 10 
Snow and snap peas 73 9 5 7 3 0 3 
Asian vegetables 66 1 4 12 1 0 16 
Avocado 1 46 32 9 2 7 3 
Mango 4 1 1 1 1 92 1 
Passion fruit 49 18 16 6 9 1 0 
Source: HDCA, 2004 
Note: The percentage may not add up to 100 since it is rounded to the nearest digit. 
The growing dependence of Kenyan exporters on the UK market had important 
consequences for the production and processing of horticultural products. For 
example, in the 1960s horticultural products were grown by smallholder farmers, 
sold to a small number of exporters, and channeled through wholesale markets to 
UK retailers. According to Gray and Kleih (1997), in that period wholesalers 
controlled 90% of the UK fresh horticultural trade. When the UK supermarkets 
Chapter 2  27 
entered the fresh vegetables trade, they too purchased product from the wholesale 
market. However, this system could not achieve the quality and quantity that 
supermarkets required. As a result, by the 1990s, this loose network between the 
UK importers and an array of exporters became a coordinated value chain 
dominated by a few UK supermarkets (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). The strong 
link to the UK can be seen as an advantage for the export industry, because UK's 
supermarkets have maintained a product differentiation strategy which allows 
higher margins (Jaffee, 2003).  
Beside the export sector, the domestic market also plays an important role for the 
economy at large and farmers’ welfare in particular. Comparing the two sectors in 
terms of intensity of production, it is apparent from Figure 2.2 that volumes of 
vegetables produced for the domestic market by far exceed those of the export 
market and thus also far more smallholders participate in local than export market 
production (Mithöfer et al., 2008). The domestic vegetable sector contribution to 
the total GDP however is lower compared to the export vegetable sector.  
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Figure 2.2 Kenya vegetable productions for local market by crop and year.  
Source: Mithöfer et al., 2008 
Most of the produce for the local market is marketed through the informal sector, 
i.e. open markets and kiosks, and currently only 5% are sold through 
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supermarkets (Tschirley et al., 2004). So far, their production is not governed by 
production standards and their enforcement, e.g. on maximum residue levels 
(MRL), and tests related to food safety issues are rarely done. Within the next 
years, retail shares of supermarkets are expected to increase to 10-20% (Tschirley 
et al., 2004) and concerns over food safety issues of vegetables produced for the 
local markets are growing (Kedera, 2006).  
2.3.1 Supply chain for fruit and vegetables in Kenya 
The market channels vary widely depending on the market location and on the 
characteristics of the producers. Domestic produce for rural markets is delivered 
directly from local farms while urban market chains require transportation. 
Smallholders rely on wholesalers, retailers or brokers, while larger producers 
usually have the resources to supply urban markets through own transportation 
(Minot and Ngigi, 2003). The ongoing spread of supermarkets even in rural areas 
supports this competitive advantage of larger-scale producers as larger suppliers 
lower retailer’s transaction costs. This tendency can be shown by the supply 
composition of fresh fruit and vegetable of Uchumi5 supermarket. The same 
trends can be observed in the supply chains for the export of fruits and vegetables. 
However, this trend is not generally observable, as Nakumatt and Mugoya 
supermarkets sources of fresh fruit and vegetables are focused on small-scale 
farms (Neven and Reardon, 2005).  
Minot and Ngigi (2003) emphasize that smaller producers commonly use longer 
supply chains. Consequently, the market gets more concentrated. This is typically 
accompanied by smaller margins for those small-scale farmers who depend on the 
longer chains. Consequently further vertical integration of the supply chain takes 
place (Neven et al., 2005).  
Currently most of the export horticultural produce is channeled through the 
supermarket chain, while a smaller part is channeled through the wholesale chain 
into the European Union. The wholesale chain is mainly supplied by small and 
                                                 
5 Uchumi, Nakumatt and Mugoya are the biggest supermarkets in Kenya 
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medium size producers, while in the supermarket chain large growers dominate 
(Barrett et al., 1999). Small-scale producers often operate as individuals or as a 
member of out-grower schemes. Figure 2.2 shows the fruit and vegetable supply 
chain to illustrate the different choices the actors have in selling their produce. 
 
Figure 2.3 Supply chain of fruits and vegetables in Kenya 
Source: Own presentation 
The concentration of exporters in Kenyan horticulture is quite low compared to 
horticultural industries in other counties. There are about 400 exporters active, 
although no more than half of these are active at the same time (Jensen, 2005). 
About half of the exporters can be said to be so-called 'briefcase exporters', i.e. 
part-time exporters who go in and out of the market according to the market 
situation. They are only present at market peaks such as Mother's Day and 
Christmas for flowers and the European winter months for temperate vegetables. 
These exporters have no structures in place in the sense that they do not have 
farms on their own, nor do they have permanent trading structures like lorries 
and cold stores, but rent transport vehicles and space in cold stores when it is 
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necessary. While the number of these exporters is large, the amount they export is 
very small, somewhere between 2 to 10% (Jensen, 2005). About 90% of exports are 
done by constant year round exporters. Most of these have their own farms and 
supplement the export volume by buying from other farmers either large or small-
scale commercial farmers or smallholders. A few exporters do not source from 
other farms than their own. 
2.3.2 The role of small-scale producers 
Although solid quantitative evidence concerning the actual number of small-scale 
farmers involved in export fresh vegetable production in Kenya is controversial, 
there is a general consensus that smallholder farmer participation in export 
markets has been significant. Estimates from the early 1990s suggest that 
smallholders supplied over half of the export vegetable production (Kimenye, 
1993; Jaffee, 1995). More recently, the Horticultural Crops Development Authority 
(HCDA) estimated that 70% of exported vegetables are produced by smallholders 
(Harris et al., 2001). According to interviews with four leading exporters, Dolan 
and Humphrey (2000) conclude that just 18% of vegetables for export come from 
smallholders. They also found that smallholders are unable to comply with food-
safety and quality requirements imposed by supermarkets and other buyers. They 
argue that these requirements are leading exporters to grow their own produce or 
purchase from large-scale commercial farms. On the other hand, exporters may 
wish to under-report the share of production that comes from smallholders to 
satisfy European buyers who are suspicious of smallholder quality control (Harris 
et al., 2001). Jaffee (2003) interviewed several exporters and estimated that 
smallholders account for 27% of exported fresh vegetables. A recent census 
estimated the current number at about 12,000 smallholders producing for the 
vegetable export market in nine districts of Kenya in the end of 2005 (Mithöfer et 
al., 2008). The data from the 2000 Rural Household Survey suggest that almost all 
farmers, large and small, rich and poor, participate in some form of horticultural 
production. 
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One of the difficulties in estimating the number of participating smallholders is 
the definition of the small-scale producers. With an exception of Mithöfer et al. 
(2008), in most of these estimate small-scale producers are defined as farmers with 
less than 10 acres of land while medium-scale and large-scale producers are 
farmers with between 10 to 20 and larger than 20 acres respectively (Harris et al., 
2001). However recent discussions with experts from Kenya reveal that these 
classifications do not reflect the reality on the ground. The experts instead define 
small-scale horticultural producers as farmers with less than 5 acres of land under 
horticulture, whereas farmers with 5 to 10 acres of land and greater than 10 acres 
under horticultural production as medium- and large-scale producers, 
respectively (Mithöfer et al., 2008). Thus, this definition is applied throughout the 
thesis instead of the former classifications. 
2.3.3 Development of Kenyan horticultural export sector 
The horticultural sector in Kenya can be considered a successful case of export 
diversification. Minot and Ngigi (2003) identified the reasons for such a success. 
First, Nairobi’s location as a centre of air transport between Europe and the East 
and Southern African region, and Kenya’s role as a major tourist destination, 
ensure that there is sufficient northbound air cargo to transport exports. Second, 
preferential treatment under the Lomé Convention between African Caribbean 
Pacific (ACP) countries and the EU provides concessionary access for Kenyan 
flowers and vegetables to the European market. Third, the sustained demand for 
horticultural products as a result of high and growing incomes in Europe provides 
a stable and growing market for Kenyan producers. Fourth, close co-operation 
with the supermarket chains in Europe and a smooth adaptation to the new 
criteria defined in the various labels by supermarkets and other market sources. 
Finally, the presence of ample local and international investors, particularly in the 
cut-flower business, provides Kenya with an added advantage (Markandya et al., 
1999; voor den Dog, 2003). 
There were also a number of trade related development assistant (TRDA) 
activities that contributed significantly to the development of the Kenyan 
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horticultural industry. By far the most ambitious TRDA undertaken in Kenyan 
horticulture ever is a project sponsored by the Japan Bank for International 
Corporation (JBIC) entitled ‘the Horticultural Produce Handling Facilities project’. 
The project aimed at establishing seven local satellite depots located in the main 
growing areas and linked to a large auction house facility in Nairobi managed by 
the HCDA. The original idea was that the HCDA should source supply from 
smallholders organized in farmers’ groups, process the produce at the satellite 
depots and auction it off to exporters in the auction in Nairobi. The whole 
approach soon showed to be infeasible due to the requirements of the major 
companies for assured and traceable supplies.  
The Fresh Produce Exporters Association (FPEAK) is another main association 
representing fruit and vegetable exporters. Historically, it has mainly served the 
interests of small and medium-sized exporters, while the largest have either 
preferred to lobby on their own or worked their influence through the Kenyan 
Flower Council as most of the largest exporters produce flowers too.  FPEAK’s 
main source of finance has until recently been United State Agency for 
International Development (USAID). It has undertaken traditional industry 
coordination functions as well as provided extension services and run traditional 
development projects mainly focused on linking smallholders to exporters by 
establishing farmer groups. The support to farmers’ groups have consistent in 
solving their input and credit problems and more recently to assure compliance 
with MRLs and secure traceability. While the assistance to smallholders and 
exporters are generally viewed favorably, the organization itself has failed to 
develop in a sustainable way (ECI 2001).  
The Pesticide Initiative Program (PIP) was launched in 2001 under the auspices of 
the COLEACP, an EU funded organization that promotes horticultural trade from 
ACP countries. One component of PIP, the ‘Good Company Practices’ component, 
involves the provision of assistance to individual companies within a number of 
ACP countries in order to design or improve food-safety control and risk 
management systems and to provide technical assistance and training to company 
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staff and smallholder out growers. The initiative is demand-driven with sub-
projects being negotiated with individual export companies with the support 
tailored to the specific conditions, goals, and capacities of each company. 
Finally, the Horticulture Development Centre (HDC) is another USAID-funded 
program managed by the agribusiness firm Fintrac Inc. and was established in 
October 2003. The objective is to increase smallholders’ income through crop 
diversification, improvements in production, post harvest technologies and 
market linkages. The project currently targets smallholder production for both the 
export and the local market of passion fruit, vanilla, spices, flowers, fruit and local 
market vegetables. It also trains smallholders in various standards such as limits 
on pesticide residues and the private standard GlobalGAP.  
2.3.4 Kenya Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) initiatives 
There have been efforts in Kenya to benchmark national Good Agricultural 
Practice (GAP) schemes for horticultural products to GlobalGAP. First in June 
2005 the GlobalGAP Technical and Standard Setting Committee (TSC) approved 
equivalent status for the seventh edition of the Kenya Flower Council (KFC) 
standard. This completed the process of benchmarking against the GlobalGAP cut 
flower and ornamentals standard. Second, in August 2007, the GlobalGAP TSC 
approved equivalent status for the KenyaGAP standard, developed by the Fresh 
Produce Exporters Association of Kenya for fruit, vegetables and flowers, 
successfully completing a benchmarking process initiated in 2005 (UNCTD, 2008).  
The Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) first developed the national horticultural 
code of practice through its multi-stakeholder national food-safety committee. The 
purpose was to develop a national baseline that would provide guidance to all 
producers on basic GAP principles, workers’ health and safety and environmental 
conservation. In 1977, FPEAK established its own code of practice for FFV, which 
was revised in 1999, and again in 2003 to develop it into KenyaGAP. The visit of 
chairman of GlobalGAP to Kenya in 2005 provided an opportunity for clarification 
and deeper understanding of GlobalGAP benchmarking procedures, with a focus 
Chapter 2  34 
on how smallholders could be accommodated into a national scheme 
benchmarked to GlobalGAP (UNCTD, 2008). As a result, the national GlobalGAP 
TSC was commissioned to establish interpretation guidelines for the GlobalGAP 
fruit and vegetables standard for Kenyan smallholders with a view to facilitating 
cost-effective and sustainable certification of small-scale growers.  The launch of 
the GlobalGAP benchmarked Kenyan equivalent standard, KenyaGAP, has been 
cited as a role model for the region in pushing towards global harmonization of 
GAP in Africa and demonstrates how it is possible to incorporate smallholder 
needs into emerging private standards like GlobalGAP. 
2.4 Summary 
Over the past five decades, production and trade of agricultural commodities have 
played a major economic role in many developing countries, especially in the 
small and least developed ones. This progress is partially attributed to the 
lowering of the barriers to trade through a removal of quotas, a reduction in tariffs 
and preferential trade agreements for developing country imports in western 
economies. As a result many sub-Saharan African countries have been 
diversifying their export portfolios away from primary commodities into non-
traditional exports with more auspicious market trends. In particular, horticultural 
production has been indicated as a sector that can provide real opportunities for 
enhancing farm incomes and reducing poverty and since export of vegetables 
involves a much higher rate of labor inclusion than traditional export crops, it also 
suits donor’s support of labor-intensive trade.  
However, it is argued that the gains from trade liberalization are offset by 
increasing food standards that are mainly imposed by high-income countries and 
increasingly dominate the world’s food trading system. Exporters are required to 
conform to increasingly stringent regulations and in many cases, private-sector 
standards. There has been increasing awareness of health risks related to food 
consumption in many developed countries and as a result it has become a clear 
objective of governments and private sector in these countries to maintain a low 
level of these risks. Developing countries at large and Kenya in particular are 
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generally more concerned with food security (i.e. there being sufficient nutrients 
available for the population) than food-safety for consumers.  However, from the 
developing country perspective, food-safety issues have important implications 
for export opportunities to countries with a low risk tolerance. To reduce the risk 
intrinsic in the global trading of food and other agricultural products, these 
products are confronted with stringent technical requirements at the country and 
business level.  
Thus, there are concerns that the enhanced stringency of food-safety standards 
that are imposed by high-income countries can negatively affect the 
competitiveness of producers of developing countries. First, small-scale producers 
may be squeezed out of the vegetables value chains because exporters prefer to 
work with larger farmers who can be coordinated more easily. Second, private 
standards may contribute to a shift away from procurement from independent 
producers through contract farming towards increased agro-industrial production 
in estates. Yet, in some cases, contrary to the these hypothesis others argue that 
such standards can play an important and positive role, providing the catalyst and 
incentives for the modernization of export supply and regulatory systems and the 
adoption of safer and more sustainable production practices. By certifying the 
quality of their products through standards schemes, developing countries’ 
farmers can add value to their products, differentiate them and climb up the value 
chain. This study tries to test these propositions from an illustrative cases study on 
vegetable exports from Kenya. 
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Conceptual Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
The production of food products in developing countries for export markets to 
industrialized countries is constrained primarily by lack of information. Producers 
are often unaware of consumer preferences and regulatory standards of the 
importing country. Policies to enhance higher environmental and health standards 
of food production are rarely existing because of weak institutions and poor 
capacities of regulatory enforcement. Likewise consumers in importing countries 
are often misinformed about the actual production conditions in the developing 
countries. Their perception can be heavily influenced, for example, by reports of 
misuse of outdated pesticides, child labor, or otherwise poor labor conditions etc. 
Nobel laureate Spence (1974) suggests, that a mechanism is needed that will solve 
the problem of asymmetric information. Certification is a means of providing 
information to the buyer that the product conforms to clearly defined standards. 
At the same time certification can be a vehicle to induce producers to adopt safer 
and environmentally more benign crop management practices. In this chapter an 
attempt is made to highlight the general conceptual framework for understanding 
the adoption process from the producer perspective and at the same time the 
potential impact of GlobalGAP certification on both producers and consumer 
welfare. Nevertheless specific theoretical model relevant to specific research 
questions are presented in the subsequent chapters. 
3.2 Innovation and adoption of standards 
Adoption and diffusion of innovations theory (David, 1969; Rogers, 1995; Sunding 
and Zilberman, 2001; Zilberman and Waibel, 2007) has been widely used to 
identify factors that influence an individual’s decision to adopt or reject an 
innovation. “An innovation is an idea, practice or object that is perceived as new 
by individual or other unit of adoption. The perceived newness of the idea for the 
individual determines his or her reaction to it” (Rogers, 1995). Rogers identifies 
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five characteristics of an innovation that affect an individual’s adoption decision. 
These are (i) relative advantage, which is the degree to which an innovation is 
perceived as being better than the idea it supersedes; (ii) compatibility, or to the 
degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent with the existing values 
and beliefs, past experiences and the needs of potential adopters; (iii) complexity, 
which is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as relatively difficult to 
understand and use; (iv) trialability, or the degree to which an innovation may be 
used experimentally on a limited basis; and (v) observability, which is the degree 
to which the results of an innovation are visible to others. The relative advantage 
and observability of an innovation describe the immediate and long-term 
economic benefits from using it whereas compatibility, complexity, and trialability 
indicate the ease with which a potential adopter can learn about and use an 
innovation (Rogers, 1995). Although this concept is relatively old, it is relevant for 
most current adoption studies. However it is important to note that it may not 
altogether be applicable for the case of adoption of standards. 
For the purpose of this study, GlobalGAP is considered as an innovation. The 
adoption and certification of this standard cannot be seen as a single event that 
takes places on a farm. It rather must be described as a process over time with 
different stages from the first knowledge of the standard until its implementation. 
The process of compliance can be described as a process, which consists of at least 
three stages: 1) information, 2) decision and 3) implementation. At the first stage, 
the information stage, the producer obtains information and knowledge on the 
standard. He or she becomes aware of the existence of the standard and gains 
knowledge on how the standard works. The information stage is essential to pass 
to the subsequent steps of the compliance process, as certain knowledge on the 
standard is necessary to form an attitude toward the standard and to make a 
decision. It is vital to emphasize the critical importance of this stage in developing 
countries like Kenya. In such countries the largest number of producers faces great 
difficulties in accessing information, due to limitations including the lack of 
formal education and poor infrastructure. These limitations create obstacles to 
information access. At the second stage, the decision stage, the producer makes a 
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decision on the implementation of the standard. Once the decision to implement 
the standard is made, the producer enters the implementation stage. The 
implementation stage consists of the actual adoption of the standard and the 
introduction of the standard’s requirements on the farm.  
The decision to adopt safety standards is also an investment decision. This 
decision may involve sizeable fixed costs (e.g. grading shed, pesticide store, office 
etc), while the benefits realized over time. The choice of whether or not to adopt 
emerging standards will, therefore, be based on a careful assessment of a large 
number of technical, economic and social factors. The technical feature of the 
standards may have a direct consequence on the decision making process. The 
potential capability of the standards, in terms of enhancing yield, reducing cost of 
production and giving rise to higher profit, are also substantially important. The 
problem, however, is that when a technology first introduced, uncertainty with 
respect to its functioning under local settings is often high. Also, it is difficult to 
tell its economic outcome with certainty. However, over time, as farmers adopt 
and become familiar with the new technology, the uncertainty and the cost 
associated with it will fall.  Some farmers may fail to adopt the standards totally if 
they think that it simply doesn’t function well under their circumstances, or if the 
size or type of their farm operation is not suited to the technology in question.  
The economic theory of adoption is generally based on the assumption that the 
potential adopter makes a choice based on the maximization of expected utility 
subject to different constraints. Faced with high cost of compliance and complexity 
of the standard, farmers generally examine the perceived benefit vis-à-vis the 
expected cost before making any kind of decision to adopt the standard. 
3.3 Welfare effects of GlobalGAP certification 
The analysis of the economic consequences of GlobalGAP certification in welfare 
terms can be illustrated by considering some simplified assumption. Considering 
the case where there is no certified vegetable market at the beginning, partial 
equilibrium implications are apparent on the right hand side of Figure 3.1 that 
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shows the non-certified quantity demanded, MWP, which represent the marginal 
willingness to pay and quantity supplied, MPC, which represent the marginal 
private cost of fresh vegetables, where a* and qo* are the pre-certification 
equilibrium price and quantity of vegetables, respectively. However, every unit of 
production is associated with negative health and environmental externalities as 
represented by MEC, which represent marginal external cost. A certification 
scheme like GlobalGAP is introduced, and a portion of the vegetable producers 
changes their practices to meet the new requirements. Two markets are now 
relevant, the one for certified vegetables and the other for uncertified ones, 
assuming that there exist producers and consumers which maintain the new 
market. The certified and uncertified markets are denoted by sub-scripts c and u, 
respectively. 
If indeed a market for certified vegetables appears and consolidates, where agents 
participate voluntarily, it is because both suppliers and consumer of this market 
obtain some benefits. However, although it might be likely that they will be better 
off than with only the non-certified products market situation, this is not 
necessarily the case. It will depend on the specific market conditions. Assuming 
they were better off, both producers and consumers of this market would incur 
welfare gains. The externals benefiting from the certified market would gain, since 
now the negative externalities are smaller per unit of vegetables provided. The net 
result would be an improvement in welfare, depending on what is the effect of the 
certification on the consumers and producers of uncertified vegetables. 
The existence of a certified market affects the outcome in the uncertified one. 
There is likely to be a decrease in the demand for uncertified vegetables, 
represented in Figure 3.1 with a shift of the marginal willingness to pay curve to 
the left, from MWP to MWPu. For the case that the marginal private cost in the 
non-certified market remain unchanged, the equilibrium quantity and the 
marginal price is represented by b* and qu*. It is also assumed that the marginal 
external cost (MECu) in the non-certified market segment remain the same with 
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the original one (MEC). In terms of welfare, consumers’ surplus refers to A, 
producers' surplus to B, and externalities refer to C.  
  
 
Figure 3.1 The theoretical welfare effects of GlobalGAP certification 
Source: Own presentation 
The certified vegetable market is represented on the left hand side of Figure 3.1. 
The marginal private cost for certified market (MPCc) intersects the vertical axis 
above MPCu, showing additional costs producers would have to incur when 
following certification standards. Similarly the marginal willingness to pay for 
certified market (MWPc) intersects the vertical axis at a higher value than MWPu, 
which captures the idea that willingness to pay for the first unit is higher when the 
product is certified. To simplify the presentation, the marginal private cost 
functions are represented with the same slope in certified and uncertified markets, 
even if in general they could be different. It is plausible to assume that negative 
externalities of certified production are lower than under conventional production 
schemes as represented by MECc. In this situation, the price in the uncertified 
market (b*) is lower than its counterpart in the certified market (c*). The welfare 
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surplus for consumers, producers and externals in the certified market are 
represented by areas D, E and F, respectively. 
The segmentation of the market, caused by the introduction of certification policy, 
generated a surplus equivalent to area A+B+D+E-C-F to be compared with the 
surplus before the market segmentation. The comparison can also be broken down 
by type of agents. Thus sum of the producers surpluses B and E can be compared 
to the original producer surplus. Likewise, consumers surpluses A and D can be 
weighted against the producer surplus before the market segmentation, and C and 
F compared to the original external costs. 
This general framework for assessing the welfare impact of GlobalGAP 
certification illustrates the societal gains that in principle can be expected from 
certification. In reality of course the welfare analysis of the economic consequences 
of certification can be more complex as pointed out by Sedjo and Swallow (2002), 
for instance if the assumptions presented above are relaxed. However, it is 
important to note that this general framework helps to identify the major research 
questions emerging from such interventions. For this study it is not possible to 
estimate the overall welfare impact of standards on producers and consumers at 
the national level but an attempt is made to estimate on different components of 
producers’ welfare. 
3.4 Research hypotheses  
A summarized schematic presentation of the link between standards and 
household welfare is shown in Figure 3.2. Adoption of production standards like 
GlobalGAP can improve human and social capital, thus increasing farmers’ 
efficiency and improving the efficiency in the use of production inputs. 
Improvements in human and social capital result from learning new input use 
techniques via extension or technology transfer between farmers and from export 
companies. Improved farmer efficiency leads to enhanced productivity which in 
turn increases household income. Adoption of GlobalGAP also offers a set of 
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opportunities in which conventional inputs especially agrochemicals can be used 
more effectively and environmental friendly. 
Standards, if adopted could reduce exposure of farmers to highly toxic pesticides 
and hence their cost of pesticide-related illnesses. In this way farmers are likely to 
have an improved health status. It also offers an opportunity for conservation of 
natural resource capital, such as biodiversity especially due to the proper use of 
agrochemicals. Finally, measures taken to meet export market requirements for 
food-safety usually have spill-over benefits for other (non-export oriented) local 
producers or for domestic consumers.  
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Figure 3.2 Schematic presentation of the link between standards and household 
 welfare 
Source: Own presentation 
Thus, it is of interest to determine which factors facilitate the adoption of the 
standards, and which factors bring about productivity and, therefore, lead to an 
improved income. A two-stage framework is used for impact assessment of food-
safety standards in Kenyan small-scale export vegetable producers. Stage one 
identify which technical, socio-economic, institutional and policy factors influence 
adoption of standards. In stage two, the effect of standards adoption on household 
income, pesticide use, household health and environment is assessed. The 
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respective impact indicators are listed in the respective chapters. In addition, the 
financial internal rate of return of investment in standards compliance is also 
estimated. In general the study rests on the overall hypothesis that adoption of EU 
private food-safety standards by small-scale producers leads to improved 
household income, better farmer health and improved environment. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Investment in EU Private Food-safety Standards: Does it Pay Off for 
Small-scale Producers in Kenya? 1 
 
4.1 Introduction 
One strategy employed by Kenya and other sub-Saharan African countries to 
achieve higher rates of growth in agriculture and to reduce poverty is 
diversification of export portfolios away from primary commodities into non-
traditional exports with more auspicious market trends (Harris et al., 2001). 
Participation in international trade is generally recognized to favor economic 
growth and especially agricultural exports would promote development in low-
income countries due to the link with the rural economy (Aksoy, 2005). 
Smallholders participating in export vegetables, whether as producers or the 
workforce employed in the sector, are better off than non-export smallholders, 
with average annual household incomes being almost five times higher 
(McCulloch and Ota, 2002). However, there is a concern that the emerging food-
safety standards imposed by industrialized countries can lower the 
competitiveness of developing countries and impede actors from these countries 
from entering or remaining in high-value food markets (Augier et al., 2005).  
Several authors have found that smallholders, especially the poorest ones, are 
increasingly being squeezed out from high-standards export production (Barrett et 
al., 1999; Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Farina and Reardon, 2000; Reardon et al., 
2003; Weatherpoon and Reardon, 2003; Jensen, 2004; Okello, 2006a; Humphrey, 
2006). Comparing large-scale and small-scale export producers in Kenya, Mausch 
et al. (2007) also demonstrated that Kenyan large-scale export vegetable producers 
easily cope with EU standards, as the investments are relatively low compared to 
the net revenues these farms generate. However, for small-scale producers it takes 
                                                 
1 An adapted version of this chapter is forthcoming in Journal of International Food and 
Agribusiness Marketing. 
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much longer to “break even” (Mausch et al., 2007), which supports the ‘barrier’ 
hypothesis. On the contrary, Henson and Jaffee (2006) and Maertens and Swinnen 
(2006) argue that compliance with food-safety standards can be a catalyst for 
upgrading and modernization of developing countries food supply systems.  
As stated in chapter two, from a development perspective the increase of food-
safety standards by the importing countries generally reflect the preferences of 
developed country consumers. Production standards focus on high quality 
produce and place importance on traceability of the produce through the entire 
production chain to ensure strict adherence to total quality management (Jenson, 
2004). In theory, adoption of food-safety standards provides a broad spectrum of 
potential direct and indirect benefits to the farmers including positive health and 
environmental impacts stemming from changes in pesticide use and hygiene 
practices (Okello, 2006b). In addition widespread adoption of standards by export 
producers may induce some spill-over effects of the good agricultural practices to 
domestic production and thus benefit domestic consumers. On the other hand 
stringent food-safety standards may impose severe restrictions for those 
smallholder producers whose production conditions are still rudimentary. Thus 
unlike larger commercialized farms, smallholder farmers are faced with financial 
constraints and human resources limitations in complying with standards. 
Consequently, small-scale producers, which are the very target of many 
agricultural development programs that aim at poverty reduction in line with the 
first Millennium Development Goal (MDG), could become losers of this 
development.  
The smallholders’ ability to maintain and strengthen their role in horticultural 
exports will depend on their capacity to adapt to these changes and fully comply 
with the emerging standards. Compliance to these standards entails costly 
investments in inputs, particularly the switch to approved pesticides, and long-
term structures like a grading shed, charcoal cooler, disposal pit, toilet, and 
pesticide store. These investments are “lumpy” and mostly specific to the fresh 
export vegetable business.  
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While much research addressed impacts of standards on developing countries at 
the macro level (Henson and Loader, 2001; Jaffee et al., 2005; Henson and Jaffee, 
2005; Aloui and Kenny, 2005; Manarungsan et al., 2005; Henson and Jaffee, 2006), 
less attention has been given at the level of small-scale producers. Among the 
studies which looked at small-scale producers are the study by Okello (2006b), 
who investigated the impact of compliance with international food-safety 
standards on Kenyan green bean producers, the studies by Maertens and Swinnen 
(2006) and Minten et al. (2006) that focused on the export vegetable industry of 
Senegal and Madagascar, respectively. 
The specific objectives of this chapter are: (1) to investigate the nature and 
magnitude of costs of compliance with GlobalGAP standards, (2) to examine 
determinants of adoption of GlobalGAP standards, (3) to estimate the impact of 
standards on farm financial performance and (4) to analyze profitability of 
investment in GlobalGAP certification.  
In addressing these four objectives, this chapter contributes to the previous studies 
in two major areas, namely with regard to micro-econometric modeling and with 
regard to empirical data on smallholders in this sector. In much of the previous 
literature on private standards, self-selectivity (or endogeneity of adoption of 
standards) is usually ignored. This chapter addresses this issue using a two-stage 
standard treatment effect model complemented by propensity score methods and 
matching techniques. With regard to the data, the chapter draws upon a relatively 
large sample data set, which is collected via re-call and season-long monitoring 
survey. Although some prior studies have tried to estimate the income effect of 
standards, none of them has tried to answer whether investment in food-safety 
standards compliance pays off for small-scale producers using net-income as 
proxy.  
The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 presents the theoretical 
framework. The data collection methodology and the analytical model are 
presented in section 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Section 4.5 presents the results and 
in section 4.6 some conclusions are drawn and the policy implications are pointed.  
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4.2 Theoretical framework 
The manner in which agricultural households respond to interventions is a critical 
factor in determining the relative merits or demerits of alternative option. In 
economic theory, the problem of production, consumption and labor supply 
decisions are usually analyzed separately through the behavior of the three classes 
of agents (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). The first one is producers who maximize 
net revenue with respect to levels of products and factors, subject to constraints 
determined by market forces and technology, secondly consumers who try to 
maximize utility with respect to the quantities of goods consumed, subject to 
constraints determined by market forces, income, household characteristics and 
tastes and thirdly the workers who try to maximize utility with respect to income 
and leisure subject to constraints determined by the market wages and total time 
available and worker characteristics.  
The agricultural household model recognizes that the household decision maker is 
often engaged simultaneously in production, consumption and work decisions. 
The household has a dual role of producer and consumer, and makes production, 
labor allocation, and consumption decisions that may be interdependent of one 
another depending on market forces. By consuming all or part of its own output, 
which could alternatively be sold at a given market price, the household implicitly 
purchases goods from itself. By demanding leisure or allocating its time to 
household production activities, it implicitly buys time, valued at the market 
wage, from itself (Singh et al., 1986). This household behavior has necessitated the 
integration of the three decision problems into a single household problem. Since 
first developed by Singh et al. (1986), farm household models were used 
frequently to address research questions related to the complex behavior of farm 
households and it is based on the assumption that for any production cycle, the 
household maximizes a utility function: 
);,,( mimm zlrcuU =                            (4.1) 
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It is assumed that households derive utility from consumption of on-farm goods 
( mc ), market goods ( mr ), leisure (home time) ( il ) and vector of other factors that 
shift the utility function ( mz ). The household maximizes utility subject to a set of 
constraints, namely cash income constraints, (Equation 4.2), time constraints 
(Equation 4.3) and technology constraint (Equation 4.4). 
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Where iQ  and mip , denote the quantity and price of farm output respectively; w  
and ix  represent the price and a vector of inputs used for farm production 
activities respectively, D  and al  are total household labor endowment and labor 
devoted to own farm activities, respectively; uZ  denotes a vector of exogenous 
farm and community level characteristics that shift the production function 
whereas E  and G  represent unearned income and adoption of GlobalGAP, 
respectively. As mentioned in the previous chapters, it is assumed that the 
adoption GlobalGAP code of practices will increase complexity and reduce 
flexibility that translate into increased amount of labor allocated for farm 
production activities. In this case, the amount of labor devoted to own farm 
activities al  and possibly the use of other farm inputs ix  are a function of G , the 
adoption of GlobalGAP standard. 
A technology-constrained measure of household income is obtained by 
substituting Equation (4.4) into Equation (4.2) (Huffman, 1991; Fernandez-Cornejo 
et al., 2005). 
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The Lagrangian technique is used to solve the household utility maximization 
problem. The Lagrangian solution to the household constrained maximization 
problems yields a system of first order conditions, which constitute the structural 
form of the model. The structural form of the model can then be solved for the 
reduced form that gives the endogenous variables as a function of exogenous 
variables. The first-order conditions for optimality can be obtained by maximizing 
the Lagrangian expression L over a set of choice variables. 
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The GlobalGAP adoption decision may be obtained from the following Kuhn-
Tucker conditions:  
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where cU , rU and lU  are the partial derivatives of the function U. It is assumed 
that the production function is concave and G  and 0≥al . The GlobalGAP 
adoption decision condition is obtained from the optimality conditions, Equation 
Chapter 4  50 
(4.8) and Equation (4.7) and Equation (4.11), noting that the expression in brackets 
in Equation (4.8) is the total derivative dGdQ / .  
0)'/)(/()'/()/( =−− dGdldGdxwdGdQp aii λμ                                 (4.13) 
But from Equation (4.11) and Equation (4.12), )/(/ rlm UUp=λμ , then 
0)'/)(/(()'/()/( =−− dGdlUUpdGdxwdGdQp arlmii                        (4.14) 
The left-hand side of this expression may be interpreted as the marginal benefit of 
adoption of GlobalGAP, )/( dGdQpi  minus the marginal cost of adoption, which 
includes the marginal cost of the production inputs, )'/( dGdxw i , and the marginal 
cost of labor )'/)(/(( dGdlUUp arlm , brought about by adoption of GlobalGAP. It 
will not be optimal to adopt if the marginal benefit of adoption falls short of the 
marginal cost of adoption.  
4.3 Data  
To generate the empirical basis for this study, data collection was conducted at 
vegetable grower level. A multi-stage sampling procedure was used to select 
districts, sub-locations2 and small-scale vegetable producers, respectively. The first 
stage was to select five districts purposively from the two major vegetable 
producing provinces (namely Nyeri, Kirinyaga, and Murang'a Districts in Central 
Province and Meru Central and Makueni Districts in Eastern Province). Selection 
was based on the intensity of export vegetable production, agro-ecology, types of 
crop produced and accessibility. Meru District is located at higher altitude 
primarily producing French beans while Nyeri, Kirinyaga, and Murang'a Districts 
are situated at middle altitude producing a range of green beans and peas. 
Makueni District is located at lower altitude mainly producing Asian vegetables. 
These districts represent approximately 50% of smallholders producing for the 
                                                 
2 Sub-location is a set of villages and represents the lowest administrative unit in Kenya. 
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vegetable export market (Mithöfer et al., 2008). Since the size of export vegetable 
producers among the districts vary and to ensure that every element in the target 
population has an equal chance of being included in the sample, Probability 
Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling technique is used. Lists of all smallholders in 
export production, which were compiled as an update on smallholders 
participation in export production at the sub-location level (Mithöfer et al., 2008), 
served as a sampling frame for this study. Overall, 21 sub-locations were 
randomly selected from the five districts by PPS sampling procedure and a total of 
439 export vegetables producer households were chosen randomly for the 
interviews. 
Table 4.1 Description of sample size by district 
Province District Households producing vegetable for export 
Number of samples 
sub- location 
Number of households 
surveyed 
Central Nyeri 1584 6 122 
 Kirinyaga 3073 7 116 
 Muranga 472 2 44 
Eastern Meru Central 1480 4 120 
 Makueni 650 2 37 
Total 5 7259 21 439 
Source: Own survey 
Data collection took place during the 2005/2006 cropping season. For each 
randomly selected farmer the survey combined a single visit (re-call survey) and a 
season-long monitoring of household production practices. The data were 
collected by trained enumerators supervised by the researcher using structured 
questionnaires. The re-call survey questionnaire covered specific information on 
the characteristics of household members, household income (both farm and off-
farm), household assets such as land size, livestock ownership, farm machinery 
and household equipments and access to different services like credit, irrigation, 
formal contract and group membership. The respondents were also asked for their 
perception of the costs and benefits associated with compliance with GlobalGAP 
standard. The season-long monitoring survey form was used to record inputs and 
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outputs related to export vegetable production. Besides personal interviews, a 
series of formal and informal farmer group discussions were also conducted to 
complement the household survey. 
4.4 Analytical models   
The purpose of the estimation that follows is to identify the determinants of 
adoption of GlobalGAP standards and to measure the impact of adoption on 
income of those who adopt standards. Using the estimation results a financial 
cost-benefit analysis is further conducted to examine whether investment in food-
safety standards compliance pays off for small-scale producers. The major 
question is what would the income of GlobalGAP adopters have been if they had 
not adopted standards? To answer this question a suitable comparison group of 
non-adopters whose outcomes, on average, provide an unbiased estimate of the 
outcomes that the adopters would have had in the absence of standards needs to 
be identified. Finding a valid counterfactual is necessary because adopters are not 
placed randomly and the decision to adopt depends on individual, household, 
community characteristics and other exogenous factors.  
To account for self-selection as a source of endogeneity, and to investigate the 
robustness of the econometric estimates, three alternative models are applied in 
this analysis by drawing upon findings in the literature that deals with treatment 
effects models (Rosenbaum, 1983; Heckmann, 1988; Green, 1997; Angrist, 2001; 
Wooldrige, 2002). The first model is a two-stage standard treatment effect model 
in which determinants of adoption and the income effect are estimated 
simultaneously. The second one is a regression model based on propensity scores 
and the third model applies a matching techniques. Propensity score matching 
estimators are not consistent estimators in the presence of hidden bias, however 
instrumental variables estimation can provide consistent estimation of causal 
effects even in the presence of hidden bias. It is apparent that if selection is based 
on unobservable variables, then the estimation of the last two models is not 
efficient. At this point no stand is taken on what is the correct assumption 
regarding the presence of hidden bias. The chapter presents all three sets of 
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estimates as a benchmark to compare the results and confirm the robustness of the 
results to different assumption. In the following section the model specifications 
are described. 
Two-stage Standard Treatment Effect Model 
Unlike the conventional selectivity model in which the effects of adoption are 
calculated using the sub-samples of adopters and non-adopters separately, the 
standard treatment effect model uses all the observations. In this model, the 
observed indicator variable, iG , indicates the presence or absence of treatment, 
which in this case refers to adoption of GlobalGAP standards by household i. 
Formally, given the unobserved or latent variable, *iG , and its observed 
counterpart, iG  (dummy for adoption of GlobalGAP), the treatment-effect 
equation can be expressed as: 
iii uXG += β*                             (4.15) 
iiii eGVY ++= γα                         (4.16) 
1=iG if 0* >iG , otherwise 0=iG                       (4.17) 
where iX  is a non-stochastic vector of observed farm and non-farm characteristics 
determining adoption, iY  denotes the vegetable export production net-income, iV  
is a vector of exogenous variables thought to affect farm financial performance 
and iu  and ie are random disturbances associated with the adoption of GlobalGAP 
and the impact model. Note that it is not possible to simply estimate Equation 
(4.16) because the decision to adopt may be determined by unobservable variables 
that may also affect net income from vegetable export production. If this is the 
case, the error terms in Equations (4.15) and (4.16) are correlated, leading to biased 
estimates of γ , which is the income effect of adopting GlobalGAP. The selection 
bias is corrected by assuming a joint normal error distribution, and using a two-
stage procedure. In the first stage a probit model is used to estimate determinants 
of GlobalGAP adoption. The predicted probability of adoption, obtained from the 
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adoption decision model, is used as an instrument for estimating the effect of 
adopting GlobalGAP in the second stage impact model. However whether or not 
the effect of a treatment (GlobalGAP adoption) can be correctly estimated using a 
two-stage regression importantly depends on the validity of the exclusion 
restriction. Hence for identification purpose, the analyses follow the usual order 
condition that iX  contains at least one element not in iV  imposing an exclusion 
restriction in Equation (4.16)3. The general form of the first stage adoption model 
is expressed as:  
ADOP = f [AGEH, AGSQ, EDU1, EDU2, FEMA, LIVE, FERT, FACI, MACH, RADI, 
 TVUS, MOBI, TRAI, EXTE, CONT, GROU, IRRI, EXPO, OFFF]      
The dependent variable adoption of GlobalGAP standards (ADOP) equals one, if 
the household has commenced to comply with GlobalGAP code of practices 
during interview period in the 2005 cropping season, and zero otherwise. It is 
generally assumed that the household’s aim to maximize its expected utility 
subject to various constraints determines the decision to adopt emerging 
standards. Based on this assumption, the following observable factors are 
hypothesized to affect the adoption decision. 
First, the household’s endowment with family labor is expected to positively affect 
the probability of adoption, given the added labor requirements for certified 
export vegetable production. In the model the number of adult females (FEMA) is 
used as a proxy. Human capital is another factor that can influence the decision to 
participate in a certification scheme. Age of household head (AGEH), age square 
(AGSQ), his or her educational attainment (EDU1) and the level of education of 
that household member who had the highest educational attainment (EDU2) are 
taken as proxies. While for education the relationship is assumed to be positive, 
the opposite may be the case for age as young farmers may show a higher 
tendency to adopt innovations.  
                                                 
3 Instrument such as year’s of group membership is considered as variable that causally affect 
adoption of GlobalGAP but do not have a direct causal effect on the outcome and thus satisfy the 
exclusion restriction.. 
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Ability to undertake additional investments as required by the GlobalGAP food-
safety standards suggests a positive link to farm resource endowment variables, 
thus the value of livestock (LIVE), the value of farm machinery (MACH) and 
facility index4 (FACI) are included. However asset variables may be endogenous 
as the decision to buy livestock, machinery and other assets might be jointly 
determined with the decision to adopt GlobalGAP standards. To correct for an 
endogeneity problem related to these variables assets purchased after the 
adoption period were excluded5. Communication and information related 
variables include level of agricultural training (TRAI) prior to adoption, total 
hours spent on listening to radio per week (RADI), total hours spent on watching 
television per week (TVUS), use of mobile phone prior to adoption (MOBI) and 
contact to extension service (EXTE). It is expected that these variables enhance the 
ability of farmers to quickly acquire, synthesize and respond to changes, thereby 
increasing the probability of adoption of GlobalGAP.  
Access related variables include access to formal contract (CONT), duration of 
group membership (GROU), use of irrigation (IRRI) and participation in off-farm 
activities (OFFF). Note that these variables are measured prior to the adoption 
period. To undertake the necessary investment to comply with GlobalGAP 
requirements farmers usually organize themselves in a group, which is one of the 
certification options.  
In the estimation of the second-stage impact model, net-income from export 
vegetables (NETI) is the dependent variable. Net-income is computed as total 
revenue from all export vegetables minus all variable costs including family labor 
                                                 
4  Facility index: Dh = ΣDih (1-Pi)   Pi = ni/n     
where Dih = 1 if household h has access to facility i ; the facilities are having cemented floor, 
number of rooms, access to pipe water, and being less than 100 meter from water source; Pi is the 
probability of having facility i; ni = number of households which have a facility i; and n = total 
number of households (McCulloch and Ota, 2002). 
5 The first small-scale producers in Kenya started to adopt GlobalGAP in 2003/04 and to clearly 
establish the causal relationship the exogenous variables used in the adoption model are measured 
in a way that reflects the situation prior to the adoption period. 
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per cropping season. The value of family labor was approximated by the existing 
wage rate in the nearest village. The primary interest is to analyze whether 
adoption of GlobalGAP (ADOP) has an effect on the net-income of the household6. 
The general form of the income effect model is given as: 
NETI = f [AGEH, AGSQ, EDUC1, LAEX, LIVE, OFFF, ADOP, IRRI, DISTDUM]  
Some of the exogenous variables of the adoption model are also used in the 
second stage income model considering the exclusion restriction imposed on the 
income equation. These are age of the household head (AGEH), age square 
(AGSQ) as a proxy for experience, educational attainment of household head 
(EDU1) to capture the managerial ability of the farmers. The value of livestock 
(LIVE) owned by household is expected to have a positive impact on net-income 
from export vegetables since households with more livestock have more manure, 
which can have positive impact on productivity and further livestock can be used 
as collateral to obtain credits. Additional variables included in the model are land 
allocated under export vegetables (LAEX)7, participation in off-farm activities 
(OFFF) and access to irrigation water (IRRI). Heterogeneity in agro-ecology 
usually is a strong factor explaining the variation in the net-income thus a series of 
district dummies (DISTDUM) is included to capture the environmental factors. A 
descriptive summary of the variables used in both models is presented in Table 
4.2. 
Propensity score methods and matching techniques 
The other methods used in the literature to correct for selectivity bias are 
propensity score methods and matching techniques. These methods are applied 
for the analysis to complement the results of the two-stage estimates. For these 
                                                 
6 The fixed costs are not included in the computation of net-income, however they are taken into 
account in later section of cost-benefit analysis. 
7 Variables MACH & FACI are excluded from the second stage model since they are highly 
correlated with LAEX. 
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techniques to be valid, the fundamental assumption is ignorable treatment 
assignment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and can formally be represented by: 
XGYY i /),( 21 ⊥                          (4.18) 
where Y1 and Y2  are net-income from export vegetables for adopters and non-
adopters, respectively. This assumption states that, conditional on a set of 
observables X, the respective treatment outcome is independent of actual 
treatment status (adoption of GlobalGAP).  
Considering the underlying assumption of ignorability of treatment, the 
propensity score is used as control function in the second model to overcome the 
endogeneity problem of adoption variable. The propensity score is estimated 
using probit or logit model and indicates the conditional probability of adoption 
given observable regressors X.  
The structural equation then is expressed as: 
iiii ePscoreGVY +++= μγα                         (4.19) 
where: 
)/1Pr()( XGXPscore i ==                                               (4.20) 
The third model bases on matching techniques, which have to deal with the 
challenge of defining an observationally similar group of non-adopters to that of 
adopters. Smith and Todd (2005) demonstrate that impact estimates calculated 
using matching methods are highly sensitive to matching method itself, but 
robustness can be improved by restricting matches only to those adopters and 
non-adopters who have a common support in the distribution of propensity 
scores. Therefore, the impact is estimated by applying the common support 
condition and further checking for robustness by using four different methods for 
selecting matched non-adopters namely stratification matching, nearest neighbor 
matching, radius matching and Kernel matching. 
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Table 4.2 Summary of variables used in estimations (N = 439) 
Variables  Unit Mean Std. Dev. 
Household characteristics     
Age of the household  head (AGEH) years 45.657 12.66  
Age square (AGSQ) years 2266 1249.01  
Female household member (FEMA) numbers 2.663 1.67  
Highest grade attained by household head only (EDU1) years 8.595 3.47  
Highest grade attained by other adult household members 
(EDU2) 
years 8.925 4.47  
Asset holding and household wealth     
Total land size (LAND) acres 2.711 2.57  
Land size under export vegetables (LAEX) acres 0.287 0.22  
Proportion of land that is fertile in percentage (FERL) % 95.009 19.84  
Value of livestock (LIVE) ‘000 KSh 21.379 14931.93  
Value of farm machinery (MACH) ‘000 KSh 17.540 49359.44  
Facility index (FACI)  1.199 0.85  
Income variables     
Net-income from export vegetables per cropping season (NETI) ‘000 KSh 5.941 15201.38  
Total revenue from export vegetables per cropping season (EXIN) ‘000 KSh 33.864 43102.97  
Total annual crop income (CRIN) ‘000 KSh 79.941 81372.2  
Communication behavior variables     
Television use per week (TVUS) hours 8.399 11.41  
Radio use per week (RADI) hours 27.018 16.08  
Number of major agricultural training (excluding GlobalGAP) 
attended in the past three years prior 2005 (TRAI) 
number 5.493 3.82  
Use mobile phone prior to adoption dummy (MOBI) 1/0 0.877 0.33  
Contact with extension service dummy (EXTE) 1/0 0.777 0.416  
Access related variables     
Participation in off-farm activities dummy (OFFF) 1/0 0.141 0.35  
Number of years the head has been involved in formal contract 
(CONT)  
years 2.330 2.64  
Number of years the head has been a group member (GROU) years 1.927 2.53  
Irrigation use prior to adoption dummy (IRRI) 1/0 0.945 0.23  
Notes: The exchange rate at the time of the survey was approximately 72 Kenyan Shilling 
(KSh)/US$. 
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability.  
Source: Own survey 
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4.5 Results and discussion 
The data analysis is performed in three steps. First, a description of the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the sample of export vegetable producers 
comparing adopters and non-adopters is presented. Second, the results of the 
regression are discussed and, third, using the estimation results the financial 
internal rate of return (FIIR) of smallholder’s investment to meet GlobalGAP 
compliance is computed. 
Descriptive statistics 
As a starting point to compare GlobalGAP adopter categories, chi-square and t-
test procedures are used for those variables, which are hypothesized to influence 
adoption are presented (see Table 4.3 and 4.4). In Table 4.3, the differences 
between the adopter categories in terms of access and communication related 
variables, such as participation in off-farm activities, access to credit service, 
participation in agricultural training, use of television, reading printed materials, 
access to mobile phone, duration of group membership and opinion leadership 
are significantly different below the 0.1 level of probability. Adopters of 
GlobalGAP have higher levels of access to credit, training, reading printed 
materials and use of television than non-adopters. Adopters also consider 
themselves as opinion leaders, have higher levels of access to mobile phone and a 
higher share of them are a members of grower groups. 
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Table 4.3 Chi-square analysis of GlobalGAP adopters by some selected variables         
 
Adopters             
(N = 149) 
Non-adopters       
(N = 290) 
Chi-square a 
Variable N % N %  
Gender of household head      
 Male 132 88.59 239 82.41 2.868* 
 Female 17 11.41 51 17.59  
Participation in off-farm activities       
 Yes 14 9.40 47 16.21 3.069* 
 No 135 90.60 243 82.79  
Use of television      
 Yes 90 64.29 127 44.56 14.616*** 
 No 50 35.71 158 55.44  
Reading printed materials      
 Yes 112 80.00 199 69.82 4.952** 
 No 28 20.00 86 30.18  
Access to credit service      
 Yes 48 32.21 51 17.59 12.059*** 
 No 101 67.79 239 82.41  
Participated in agricultural training       
 Yes 87 58.39 125 43.10 9.210*** 
 No 62 41.61 165 56.90  
Access to mobile phone       
 Yes 141 94.63 244 84.14 10.045*** 
 No 8 5.37 46 15.86  
Group member      
 Yes 144 96.64 196 67.59 47.584*** 
 No 5 3.36 94 32.41  
Opinion leadership      
 Yes 89 63.57 134 47.02 10.315*** 
 No 51 36.43 151 52.98  
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability. 
Source: Own survey 
From Table 4.4 the wealth-related variables such as value of livestock owned, 
facility index and value of farm machinery owned, and the household 
characteristics variables such as education level of the head and other adult 
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household members are statistically significant different below 0.1 level of 
probability between the two groups. Moreover, access and communication related 
variables such as access to mobile phone, television use, access to extension 
service, duration of group membership access to irrigation water and number of 
major agricultural training subjects attended differ significantly below 10% level 
of probability. However, there is no significant difference between the two groups 
in terms of some household characteristics variables such as age and number of 
female household members.  
Table 4.4 Analysis of t-test for selected variables (N = 439) 
Variables  
 Adopters   
(N = 149) 
Non-
adopters   
(N = 290) 
t-stata 
 
Age of the household  head  (years)  45.38 46.18 -0.53 
Age square (years)  2,212 2,297 -0.57 
Female household member   2.80 2.62 0.85 
Highest grade attained by household head only   9.42 8.07 3.28*** 
Highest grade attained by other adult household members   9.77 8.89 1.67* 
Total land size (acres)  2.97 2.66 0.99 
Land size under export vegetables (acres)  0.34 0.27 2.42** 
Proportion of land that is fertile in percentage (%)  97.80 97.24 0.33 
Value of livestock  (‘000 KSh)  26.92 19.45 4.33*** 
Value of farm machinery (‘000 KSh)  37.43 13.39 2.19** 
Facility index   1.59 1.03 5.68*** 
Net-income from export vegetables per cropping season       
(‘000 KSh)  
 13.54 2.71 5.26*** 
Total revenue from export vegetables per cropping season    
(‘000 KSh) 
 21.18 8.56 5.39*** 
Total annual crop income (‘000 KSh)  101.07 67.85 3.49*** 
Television use per week (hours)  11.43 7.93 2.58** 
Radio use per week (hours)  27.82 25.36 1.42 
Number of major agricultural training subjects attended   6.81 5.26 3.61*** 
Number of years the head has been involved in formal contract   2.66 2.30 1.18 
Number of years the head has been a group member   3.15 1.33 5.83*** 
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability.  
Source: Own survey 
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The results suggest that GlobalGAP adopters have a higher level of household 
members’ education, more livestock, higher number of farm machinery, and 
higher level of facility indexes than the non-adopters. The length of membership 
in grower groups, level of training, intensity of television use, contact with 
extension personnel, access to irrigation water and use of mobile phone are also 
significantly higher for GlobalGAP adopters compared to their counterparts. As 
shown in Table 4.4, total annual crop income, total revenue from export vegetables 
per cropping season and actual mean net-income from export vegetables is also 
significantly higher for GlobalGAP adopters than for non-adopters.  
This simple comparison of the two groups of smallholders suggests that adopters 
and non-adopters differ significantly in some proxies of physical, human and 
social capital prior to the adoption period. For those farmers who adopt standards, 
the descriptive analysis depicts a substantial amount of income benefit compared 
to non-adopters. In the subsequent part of the chapter, a rigorous analytical model 
is estimated to verify whether these differences in mean household income 
remains unchanged after controlling for all confounding factors. To measure the 
financial benefit of adopting standards, it is necessary to take into account the fact 
that individuals who adopt GlobalGAP might have achieved a higher level of 
economic performance even if they had not adopted. 
Costs and benefits of compliance with GlobalGAP standards 
Implementation of GlobalGAP necessitates changes of production practices and 
investment in infrastructure. This can impose substantial costs on smallholder 
export farmers and may be a constraint to adoption. Table 4.5 presents estimated 
costs of compliance with GlobalGAP standards incurred by individual farmers 
and donor and/or exporters contracting the farmers. Estimates for the expenses at 
household level for the adopters are obtained from the household survey whereas 
the total certification cost including the share covered by exporters as well as 
donors is acquired from AfriCert8. The estimates show that the costs of compliance 
                                                 
8 AfriCert is one of the few certification companies operating in Kenya to carry out certification 
services for mainly agricultural production and processing systems. 
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with GlobalGAP standards for small-scale export vegetable producers operating 
under option two certification scheme is about 36,600 KSh per individual member 
of the group and about 8,390 KSh per group member by the exporters and/or 
donors. The investment cost borne by individual farmers’ accounts for 
approximately 30% of their total annual crop income. 
The bulk of costs incurred by individual farmers (about 90%) are for investment in 
infrastructure and equipment that farmers must have as a pre-condition for 
implementing standards. These represent the non-recurring costs and are 
primarily meant for record keeping and in support of internal self-inspection (e.g. 
office construction and furniture), crop protection (e.g. chemical store, pesticide 
disposal pit), worker safety, health and welfare (e.g. waste disposal pit, toilet and 
bathroom) and product handling (e.g. grading shed and charcoal cooler). Some of 
these structures like grading shed, office and charcoal cooler are established at the 
farmer group level and hence the costs incurred per individual is relatively low 
compared to the costs incurred for other structures. Such investments are more of 
a constraint for small-scale farmers as compared to large-scale farms, which 
generally face less financial restrictions to purchase equipment and build facilities. 
This is also reflected in the respective pay off periods for such investments. 
Mausch (2007) calculated static break even points for the returns of investments 
related to certification, which for a typical large-scale producer is reached one year 
after attaining certification status, while a typical smallholder needs more than 
two years to break even. 
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Table 4.5 Cost of compliance with GlobalGAP standards 
Cost incurred by individual farmer  Cost incurred by exporter per farmer 
Requirement 
Cost 
(KSh) Life span   Requirement 
Cost 
(KSh/year) 
Application as a legal 
business (group) 
100 Annual  Internal audits    530 
Application for water 
permit  
1,500 Annual  Pre audits (paid once) 1,250 
Toilet 9,000 5-10 years  Certification audits 1,650 
Bathroom 3,500 5-10 years  Training 2,333 
Grading shed 1,500 5-10 years  MRLs testing   875 
Fertilizer store 3,000 5-10 years  Water analysis    28 
Chemical store 4,500 5-10 years  Soil analysis    28 
Waste disposal pit 750 3 years  Organic fertilizer test    33 
Pesticide disposal 2,500 3 years  Quality controller 
salary 
  417 
Charcoal cooler 1,500 5-10 years  Technical assistant 
salary 
1,250 
Office 667 5-10 years    
First aid kit 900 3 years    
Protective clothing 4,000 3 years    
Knapsack sprayer 2,575 3 years    
Harvesting buckets 195 3 years    
Record keeping 420 Annual    
Total 36,607    8,394 
Source: Own calculation based on data of AfriCert 
The cost incurred by exporters and/or donors is primarily for auditing, training, 
testing for maximum residue levels of toxic substances (MRLs), soil and water 
analysis, salary for technical assistants and staff in charge of quality control. These 
constitute the recurring costs and largely accrue annually. Exporters, who received 
support from donors to subsidize the certification for smallholders mostly pay for 
these costs. 
Figure 4.1 highlights a number of wider benefits from compliance with 
GlobalGAP as perceived by the survey respondents. Smallholder growers who 
adopted the protocol appreciated to be part of a group going through the 
GlobalGAP compliance process. They also perceived that adoption would assure 
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them of markets and higher price as well as timely payment by the exporters. 
Many also perceived that implementation of GlobalGAP at the farm level 
increased quality of production and reduced the amount of reject by the buyer. 
Under GlobalGAP, agrochemicals are stored and handled by trained individuals 
and many growers felt that their health is better protected. Likewise the 
installation of disposal pits for the waste generated on the farm, clean toilets, baths 
and hand-washing facilities was perceived by the respondents as a reason for 
better hygienic conditions. In addition GlobalGAP adopters expressed pride in the 
neatness of their farms compared to the situation before compliance. Finally, 
another perceived benefit of the farmers is improved bargaining power with their 
buyers, which enable them to more easily switch from one buyer to another. The 
question remains whether these benefits are large enough to offset the investments 
associated with GlobalGAP compliance, which is going to be addressed in the 
following section. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Widening access to market and security
Promotion of worker safety and good health
Increased consumer welfare
Increased prices and timely payments
Increased quality production and reduce reject
Good bargaining power with exporters
Increased knowledge on chemical use and access
to credit
Percent (%)
 
Figure 4.1 Adopters’ perception of benefits of GlobalGAP protocol (N= 149) 
Source: Own survey 
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Factors influencing GlobalGAP adoption  
The stage one of the treatment effect model provides the predicted probabilities of 
adoption. The null-hypothesis that all variables can be dropped is rejected at less 
than the 1% level of significance and the Wald Chi-square is 67.65 (Table 4.6). 
Among the statistically significant variables in the adoption model, the coefficient 
that captures education of the household member and the educational status of 
the household head takes a positive sign corroborating the hypotheses. It is 
reasonable to assume that the decision to adopt GlobalGAP is not only made by 
the head of the household alone but also by other educated adult members of the 
household. The adoption model results support this notion. This observation is in 
line with the thought that an educated member of the household confers a positive 
externality on the illiterate agents in the household by sharing the benefits of his 
or her literacy (Basu et al., 2000; Asfaw and Admassie 2002). The household 
decision to adopt GlobalGAP is also positively and strongly related to the level of 
agricultural training received prior to GlobalGAP adoption, which once again 
indicates the importance of knowledge in the adoption decision. 
As expected, the household wealth proxies such as value of livestock, facility 
index and value of farm machinery owned prior to adoption take a positive sign9 
all suggesting the positive role of household wealth in the adoption decision. This 
could imply that the higher the capacity of the household to absorb risk and 
finance an investment in additional activities, the greater the likelihood of 
adopting standards.  
Among the communication variables, there is no evidence that access to 
government extension service increases the likelihood of adoption of standards. 
As expected radio use and television use increase the likelihood of positive 
adoption decision. Radio is extensively used in the research area and the primary 
                                                 
9 Prior to running the model, a technique of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was employed to detect 
the problem of multicollinearity among some wealth related regressors. The results show that 
there is no strong correlation among the variables since the values of VIF are by far less than 10. 
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features listened to are the news and entertainment. However, there are 
agricultural programs on television and radio, which increase awareness of 
emerging standards and influence the adoption decision. The more a farmer 
listens to the radio or watches TV, the more likely h/she is to learn of GlobalGAP 
contribution. Access to mobile phone by the household is also positively and 
strongly related with the adoption decision pointing to the positive role of 
information technologies in bridging the gap between farmers and information 
source, which is primarily the exporter companies in Kenya.  
 As expected, the coefficients of most access related variables have their 
hypothesized signs. The variable group membership takes a positive sign, which 
implies that farmers who have been a group member for many years prior to the 
adoption period are more likely to adopt standards vis-à-vis farmers with few 
years of group membership. Since one precondition of GlobalGAP certification for 
small-scale farmers is that they organize themselves in a group, the dynamics and 
cohesiveness of the group plays a crucial role for the implementation of the 
protocol and the group’s successful certification. Grower groups often provide 
some of the services farmers require for meeting standards. In this study, most 
smallholders affiliated with a group depended on a technical assistant either hired 
by the group or the buyer (exporter) to meet technical requirements of standards. 
Such tasks include pest scouting, record keeping, pesticide application, etc. The 
present results confirm the findings of Okello (2006a), who also pointed out that 
the future of smallholders to maintain their position in the export market lies in 
banding together into groups that collectively invest in fixed and specific assets. 
The results further show that the experience in contract farming, measured by the 
time period a farmer has produced under contract with an exporter prior to 
adoption is positively associated with the adoption decision. This result is 
reasonable when considering the role of exporter in the supply chain especially in 
provision of technical service and information. The majority of the exporters in 
Kenya have trained technical personnel who provide services for the smallholders 
producing export crops for them. 
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Table 4.6 Two-stage treatment effect model results 
Two-stage treatment effect ( model 1) 
Adoption Model Income Effect Model 
Variables 
Estimated a 
Coefficient 
Rob. Stand. b 
Error 
Estimated a 
Coefficient 
Rob. Stand. b 
Error 
AGEH -0.009 0.004 478 463 
AGSQ 0.001 0.000 -5 4 
EDU1 0.020** 0.008 279 303 
EDU2 0.037* 0.019   
FEMA 0.056 0.051   
LIVE 0.001*** 0.000 0.12* 0.07 
LAEX   17,793*** 4,705 
FERL 0.008 0.006   
FACI 0.434*** 0.119   
MACH 0.001* 0.000   
TVUS 0.010* 0.007   
RADI 0.016** 0.006   
MOBI 0.343* 0.182   
TRAI 0.043* 0.024   
EXTE 0.315 0.222   
CONT 0.080** 0.035   
GROU 0.240*** 0.050   
IRRI 0.599* 0.358 1,648 3,391 
OFFF -0.555** 0.270 -2,962 2,719 
MERU (Base)     
KIRINYAGA   1,386 2,643 
MURANGA   4,268 3,857 
NYERI   9,608*** 2,677 
MAKUENI   -769 6,216 
ADOP   9,707** 4,804 
CONSTANT -4.131*** 1.458 -22,348* 12,052 
Log pseudo-likelihood -3,312.03   
Wald Chi-square   67.65   
Prob > Chi-square     0.0000     
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability. 
b Standard errors are computed with clustering at the smallholder group level since farmers are 
organized into groups to get the certificate. 
Source: Own survey 
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Besides farmer involved in contract schemes have high probability to obtain credit 
either in cash or kind from exporters, which can facilitate the adoption decision. 
Given the required investment to establish the necessary infrastructure to comply 
with standards, access to credit from exporter companies plays a crucial role in 
mitigating the financial constraints faced by many smallholders.  
The likelihood of adopting standards also increases significantly with the access to 
irrigation. Most export crops are susceptible to water stress, which can seriously 
affect crop quality and most buyers that enforce GlobalGAP reject such quality. 
Participation in off-farm activities is strongly and negatively correlated with the 
adoption decision. This indicates a time constraint and underlines the fact that if 
farmers engage in certified export production they must specialize. 
The impact of GlobalGAP on smallholder income 
The comparison of mean income between adopters and non adopters demonstrate 
that adopters of standards earn a higher net-income from export vegetable 
production. To verify whether this difference can be attributed to adoption of 
standards, the income effect model is estimated using different econometric 
procedures (Table 4.6 and 4.7). 
Adoption of GlobalGAP standards is strongly and positively associated with 
household net-income in all the econometric models showing the robustness of the 
result. Ceteris paribus, adoption of GlobalGAP protocol results in an increase in 
net-income from export vegetables of 9,707 KSh in the treatment effect model. In 
the case of the regression based on propensity score (model 2), two alternative 
specifications are estimated. First only the propensity score and the adoption 
variables are included in the equation and in the second part other control 
variables in addition to the propensity score are included. Both estimation results 
show a positive and strong effect of adoption of standards on net-income from 
export vegetables. Keeping other variables constant, adoption of GlobalGAP 
standards result in an increase of the export vegetables net-income of 8,127 KSh 
and 7,481 KSh in the first and second specification, respectively.  
Chapter 4  70 
Table 4.7 Estimation results based on propensity-score 
Regression based on propensity-score (model 2) 
Without Control Variables With Control Variables 
Variables 
Estimated a 
Coefficient 
Rob. Stand. b 
Error 
Estimated a 
Coefficient 
Rob. Stand. b 
Error 
AGEH   513 496 
AGSQ   -6 5 
EDU1   294 318 
EDU2     
FEMA     
LIVE   0.12* 0.07 
LAEX   17,792*** 4,787 
FERL     
FACI     
MACH     
TVUS     
RADI     
MOBI     
TRAI     
EXTE     
CONT     
GROU     
IRRI   1,952 3,543 
OFFF   -2,912 2,801 
MERU (Base)     
KIRINYAGA   8,93 2,671 
MURANGA   4,197 3,931 
NYERI   9,454*** 2,785 
MAKUENI   -849 6,404 
ADOP 8,127*** 2,358 7,481*** 2,276 
Propensity score 9,059** 4,522 2,062 5,906 
CONSTANT 152 1,674 -21,745* 11,894 
Log pseudo-likelihood 15.79 6.27 
Wald Chi-square 0.000 0.000 
Prob > Chi-square 0.14/ 0.12 0.32/ 0.28 
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability.  
b Standard errors are computed with clustering at the smallholder group level.  
Source: Own survey 
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Table 4.8 reports estimates of the impact of GlobalGAP adoption based on the 
propensity score matching technique. The average difference in net-income 
between adopters and their matches provides an estimate of the average treatment 
effect on the treated. The first column of Table 4.8 gives mean outcomes among 
treatment cases (i.e. export vegetables net-income of adopters), while the second 
column gives the mean outcomes among the set of matched controls (i.e. export 
vegetables net-income of non-adopters). The difference between these two is the 
estimate of the unconditional average treatment effect, corrected for the possibly 
confounding effects of observed covariates. The impact estimates are robust to the 
different estimation methods: the four methods give remarkably similar estimates 
and show a significant difference between the groups of adopters and non-
adopters. Among the four matching methods used the stratification technique 
gives the highest net-income differentials of 10,279 KSh whereas the radius 
matching method gives the lowest value of 8,839 KSh (Table 4.8). 
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Table 4.8 Net-income differentials using PPS matching methods (model 3) 
Variable Adopters Non-adopters 
Difference = 
average treatment 
effect on the 
treated 
t-stat a 
  
Method 1: Stratification matching Stratification with 5 blocks under common support 
Number of observation 149 288   
Net-income from export vegetables - - 10,279 3.452*** 
(2,977.56)b 
Method 2: Nearest neighbor 
matching  
Only 59 non-adopters have bee matched to the 149 adopters 
under common support 
Number of observation 149 59   
Net-income from export vegetables 13,073 3,763 9,310 2.876*** 
(3,237.32) 
Method 3: Radius matching Non-adopters within 0.1 PPS under common support 
Number of observation 139 281   
Net-income from export vegetables 11,741 2,902 8,839 3.93*** 
(2,244.76) 
Method 4: Kernel matching Kernel-weighted average of all control farmers under 
common support 
Number of observation 129 256   
Net-income from export vegetables 13,073 3,130 9,943 4.060*** 
(2,449.23) 
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability. 
b The number in brackets shows bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replication samples. 
Source: Own survey 
As shown in Table 4.6 and 4.7, there are other variables other than adoption that 
affect net-income of export vegetables. The coefficient of the area under export 
vegetables is positive and strongly correlated with net-income. Keeping all other 
factors constant, an increase in area under export vegetables by an acre results in 
an increase in household net-income of 17,793 KSh. The coefficient of livestock 
value is positive and significant in both models, which suggest that farmers with 
more livestock tend to have higher net-income from export vegetables. Perhaps 
due to the availability of more manure, which can have positive impact on 
productivity and further livestock can be used as collateral to get credits. 
Although the coefficients are not significant at the 10% level, participation in off-
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farm activities is negatively associated with the net-income, whereas a higher 
education level of the household head and access to irrigation contribute 
positively to net-income. Agro-ecological and location variations also affect the 
household net-income from export vegetables as revealed by the significant 
coefficient of the district dummy.  
In summary, results of all econometric models are robust and support the notion 
of financial benefits from introducing food-safety standards to small-scale farmers 
in Kenya. In the next section these findings are used to examine if the estimated 
additional benefits are large enough to payback the initial investment in the 
implementation of standards.  
Profitability of investment in standards compliance 
In the previous section the incremental financial benefit from investment in 
GlobalGAP certification, were estimated. This section addresses the question 
whether these benefits are sufficiently large to cover non-recurring and recurring 
costs of obtaining and maintaining the certification standard and render the 
investment profitable. This is analyzed by considering two scenarios taking into 
account the planting schedule of smallholders in Kenya. Scenario one assumes 
that smallholders plant three export crops per year, which is the most frequent 
case in Kenya and scenario two considers the worst case situation of two cropping 
season only. Assuming a constant impact of GlobalGAP on net-income in all 
cropping seasons, of 8,727 KSh10, the annual net-income attributable to GlobalGAP 
adoption is approximately to 22,443 KSh under the three-cropping season scenario 
and 14,962 KSh under the two-cropping season scenario. Using cost data 
presented in Table 4.4, the Financial Internal Rate of Return (FIRR), Net Present 
Value (NPV), Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) and pay off period are computed and 
presented in Table 4.911.  
                                                 
10  Average estimated income across all econometric models is used. 
11 The life span of most of the investments is assumed to range from five to ten years and hence the 
cost-benefit analysis is conducted considering five, seven and ten year life span of the investment. 
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First, it is assumed that farmers pay all the costs including auditing, training and 
the tests. Considering three-cropping season per year and a constant net-income 
over the life span of the investment, the estimated FIRR is 33% for the conservative 
five years and 42% for upper limit ten years life span of the investment. However 
when two- cropping season per year are considered the IRR declines to minus 1% 
for five year and 15% for ten year life span of the investment.  
In the second scenario it is assumed that  external agencies (donors or exporters) 
cover the annual audit fees, training and the tests as it has been the case for small-
scale farmers in Kenya (see Table 4.5). Under all the scenarios, the FIRR is high 
ranging from 30% from two-cropping season up to 66% for the three-cropping 
season scenario (see Table 4.9 for detail). The pay off period analysis demonstrates 
that smallholders can recover their investment cost in two to three years under 
three-cropping season scenario. However if two-cropping season without any 
donor/ exporter support scenario is considered, it takes up to seven years to 
recoup their initial investment cost.  
Table 4.9 Profitability of investment in GlobalGAP compliance 
 Three-cropping seasons  Two-cropping seasons 
Life span      
of the 
investment 
Decision 
criteria a 
Farmer pays          
all the costs 
Donor or exporter 
pays some the 
cost b 
 Farmer pays 
all the costs 
Donor or exporter 
pays some the 
cost 
5 years FIRR 35 60  -1 30 
 NPV 28,721 59,181  -7,062 23,398 
 BCR 1.37 2.23  0.91 1.49 
7 years FIRR 41 65  10 37 
 NPV 47,343 90,327  3,624 43,294 
 BCR 1.56 2.78  1.04 1.85 
10 years FIRR 44 66  15 40 
 NPV 74,528 125,873  13,232 64,577 
 BCR 1.68 3.17  1.12 2.11 
 Pay off period 3 years 2 years  7 years 3 years 
a Discount rate used for the computation of NPV and BCR is 7%. 
b Exporter/ donor pays about 8,394 KSh per group member for auditing, training, MRLs testing, 
soil and water analysis, salary for technical assistants and staff in charge of quality control (see 
Table 4.5). 
Source: Own survey 
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This analysis did not incorporate the risk inherent to the investment and compare 
the findings against alternative investment option that are available to smallholder 
due to lack of information. However when comparing the FIRR to the medium 
term lending rate by banks in Kenya, which is about 12%, investment in EU 
private food-safety standards compliance pays off for small-scale producers in 
Kenya even in the absence of external support. Yet, the question remains whether 
many small-scale farmers in Kenya can finance the initial cost of about 37,000 KSh 
in year zero to start up the implementation of the protocol and at the same time 
the donor/ exporter continue their financial and technical support.  
4.6 Conclusions 
Results of this study show that that GlobalGAP adopters are statistically 
distinguishable from non-adopters in the principle measures of household wealth 
(value of livestock, value of farm machineries and facility index), access to 
information (use of television and radio, use of mobile phone and level of 
training), access to services (group membership, use of irrigation and access to 
formal contract) and household characteristics (educational level). This implies 
that access to information, capital and services are major factors influencing the 
ability of small-scale producers to adopt standards and exploit export 
opportunities for agricultural and food products to developed country markets. 
These results empirically demonstrate the general argument in the literature 
(Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Weatherpoon and Reardon, 2003; Okello, 2006a) that 
resource poor farmers with limited access to information and services face 
difficulties in complying the emerging standards.  
On the other hand the econometric model results also show that those who adopt 
standards enjoy a substantial income benefit. The FIRR, computed for different 
cost and benefit scenarios display that investment in EU private food-safety 
standards pays off for small-scale producers in Kenya. The foregoing analysis has 
dealt only with the direct financial benefit from adoption of standards, 
nevertheless as noted earlier, adoption of standards have indirect benefits such as 
potential spill over effects on domestic production, stronger bargaining positions 
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with exporters, domestic food-safety, farmers’ health and the environment. Thus 
the economic internal rate of return which could not be calculated here would be 
higher if positive externalities are accounted for.  
The above discussion has one major message for policy: it is the asset-poor with 
limited access to information and service that may be left out from participating in 
these supermarket chains. Implication for policy is that smallholders need to be 
focused for building their physical, social and human capital. The government and 
the private sector can help farmers expand and upgrade their range of assets and 
practices to meet the new requirements of supermarkets and other coordinated 
supply chains. The options include public investments in increasing farmers’ 
productivity and connectivity to markets, and public-private partnerships to 
promote collective action and build the technical capacity of farmers to meet the 
new standards. Up to now, the role of the public sector in this development was 
rather limited compared to the private sector. Nevertheless if it is the policy goal 
of the Kenyan government to keep as many smallholders as possible in the export 
market by helping them to get certified with the emerging standards, the question 
is at what costs this can be achieved. So far the donors have picked up some of the 
bill for supporting the smallholder in attaining standards and some exporters have 
also helped farmers overcome their asset constraints and improve their business 
image by providing technical assistance. There is no simple answer to these 
challenges. It is very important to consider alternative strategies that can integrate 
the marginalized farmers into less demanding global market with less rigid 
standards such as Middle East and Asian countries and at the same time invest in 
connecting them to the domestic market.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Do EU Private-sector Standards in Kenya Reduce Pesticide Overuse 
and Raise Productivity?1 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The increase in demand for high-value horticultural produce by developed 
countries consumers’ has encouraged farmers in developing countries to diversify 
their traditional food crop based cropping system into fruits and vegetables. This 
change was accompanied by the increased use of external inputs like fertilizers 
and chemical pesticides. In horticultural crops agrochemical inputs such as 
pesticides play an important role to meet the quality requirements of wholesale 
and retail agents, i.e. to deliver produce with specific physical attributes, such as 
color, shape, size and spotlessness (Thrupp et al., 1995). While agrochemical inputs 
contributed to increased production, high levels of pesticide use have been 
associated with negative externalities. In the developing countries short-and-long-
term human health effects resulting in significant health costs of rural households 
were reported (Wilson and Tisdell, 2001; Antle and Pingali, 1994; Pingali et al., 
1994; Ajayi, 2000; Antle and Capalbo, 1994). However also ecological effects on 
non-target plants and animals (Thrupp et al., 1995; Pimentel and Greiner, 1997) 
and damage to the soil and water quality of the agro-ecosystem (Pimentel and 
Greiner, 1997) were shown to occur in agriculture worldwide.  
Increasingly, pesticide residues above maximum residue limit (MRL)2 have 
resulted in food-safety concerns for both domestic and foreign consumers. 
Retailers and consumers in the importing European countries have become 
increasingly concerned about the prevailing production methods in the exporting 
countries. Various rules and regulations have been put in place to protect 
consumers and farm workers from pesticide intoxication and restore consumer 
                                                 
1 A paper based on this chapter is under review for the Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
2 MRL means the maximum concentration of a pesticide residue that is legally permitted or 
recognized as acceptable in or on a food or agricultural commodity. 
Chapter 5  78 
confidence. At present, over 250 control points have been identified in GlobalGAP 
for fresh fruit and vegetables, of which over 50% define criteria for the correct use 
of chemicals for pre-and post-harvest treatment (GlobalGAP, 2004). To comply 
with these standards producers have to change their production technology, e.g. 
switch to less harmful pesticides and invest in structures like  grading shed, 
charcoal cooler, disposal pit, toilet and washing facilities, pesticide store etc. 
Some argue that such stringent food-safety standards pose major challenges for 
small-scale producers’ and may drive them out of international markets for high-
value food products (Augier et al., 2004). Yet, in some cases, others argue that such 
standards can play a positive role, providing the catalyst and incentives for the 
modernization of export supply and regulatory systems and the adoption of safer 
and more sustainable production and processing practices (Jaffee and Henson, 
2004; Maertens and Swinnen, 2006). In the previous chapter it is shown that 
adoption of standards has a positive effect on income although for smallholders it 
takes longer to recover their investment. In addition to the direct financial effect 
one might consider the positive external effects stemming from changes in 
pesticide use and various hygiene practices associated with adoption as a major 
non-financial benefit. However, no empirical evidence exists either to confirm or 
refute the hypotheses that food-safety standards generate positive external effects 
for farmers adopting it. This chapter extends the analysis to capture pest 
management issues and hereby assess the potential impact of standards on 
productivity and changes in pesticide use. 
Using cross-section farm-level data, collected from a random sample of 539 
Kenyan small-scale vegetable producers, this chapter deals with the following 
questions: (i) how do smallholder export vegetable producers differ with domestic 
vegetable producers in terms of pesticide use and yield? ii) Does the adoption of 
production standards affect the overall use of pesticides among export producers? 
And (iii) does the adoption of production standards affect the yield of export 
producers? To answer these questions an econometric model was applied taking 
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into account potential problems of endogeneity and/or selectivity with respect to 
pesticide use, choice to produce for export market and the adoption of standards.   
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the 
data and sampling design. The analytical model and the specification of the 
reduced form equations are presented in section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents empirical 
results and in section 5.5 some conclusions and implications are pointed out. 
5.2 Sampling design and data 
A multi-stage sampling procedure was used to select districts, sub-locations and 
small-scale vegetable producers, respectively. As discussed in chapter 4, at the 
first stage five districts were purposively selected from the two major vegetable 
producing provinces (namely Nyeri, Kirinyaga, and Murang'a Districts in Central 
Province and Meru Central and Makueni Districts in Eastern Province) based on 
the intensity of export vegetable production, agro-ecology, types of crop produced 
and accessibility. Meru District is located at higher altitude primarily producing 
French beans while Nyeri, Kirinyaga, and Murang'a Districts are situated at 
middle altitude producing a range of green beans and peas. Makueni District is 
located at lower altitude mainly producing Asian vegetables such as okra, chilies 
and aubergines. These districts represent the major export vegetable producing 
areas, which cover approximately half of all smallholder vegetable export 
producers (Mithöfer et al., 2008). Since the number of export vegetable producers 
among the districts varies and to ensure that every element in the target 
population has an equal chance of being included in the sample, Probability 
Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling technique is used. Overall, 21 sub-locations 
were randomly selected from the five districts by PPS sampling procedures and a 
total of 539 vegetable producer households (both export and domestic market 
vegetable producers) were selected randomly for the interviews. Of these 149 are 
GlobalGAP adopter export farmers, 290 are non-adopter export farmers and 100 
are domestic vegetable producers. GlobalGAP adopters in this case is defined as 
small-scale export producers who have either already obtained GlobalGAP 
certificate or are in the process of obtaining the certificate under Option 2. 
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Data collection took place during the 2005/2006 cropping season. For each 
randomly selected farmer the survey combined a single visit (re-call survey) and a 
season-long monitoring of household production practices. The season-long 
monitoring data was collected for both dry (November 2005 to February 2006) and 
rainy seasons (May 2006 to August 2006). However the data collected during the 
first monitoring survey (i.e. dry season) was incomplete due to prevalent drought 
in the survey areas. Thus, the analysis excludes the dry season data set and uses 
only the data collected during rainy season as well as the re-recall survey data. 
The data were collected by trained enumerators supervised by the researcher 
using structured questionnaires. The re-call survey questionnaire covered specific 
information on the characteristics of household members, household income (both 
farm and off-farm), household assets such as land and livestock ownership, farm 
machinery and household equipments as well as access to different services like 
credit, irrigation, formal contract and group membership. The season-long 
monitoring survey form was used to record inputs and outputs related to 
vegetable production. Besides personal interviews, a series of formal and informal 
farmer group discussions were also conducted to complement the household 
survey. 
5.3 Analytical model 
Following the works of Shankar and Thirtle (2005), Ajayi (2000), Hung et al. (2002), 
Pemsl (2005), Qaim (2003) and Qaim and Zilberman (2003), Lichtenberg and 
Zilberman (1986), this study takes a damage control approach to establish 
pesticide productivity and computing economic optima for pesticide use. The 
Cobb Douglas production function with logistic damage control function can be 
represented as:  
∑
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where Q  denotes total revenue per acre from vegetables3, the vector iW  includes 
labor, fertilizer, seed, number of vegetable crops grown, choice to produce for 
export, price of vegetable output, types of vegetables produced, access to 
irrigation, distance to market, quality of soil, age of the household head and iG  
denote adoption of GlobalGAP standards. A series of district dummy variables are 
also introduced in the model to capture the heterogeneity in location specific 
factors.4 The iβ ’s are the respective coefficients to be estimated, λ is constant and 
α is the parameter to be estimated for pesticides in the logistic damage function 
framework. 
Weather or not the effect of GlobalGAP adoption can be correctly estimated using 
regression analysis depends on the proper specification of the model. It is obvious 
that the introduction of a variable representing vegetable type in the model is 
crucial since price of output, yield and cost of inputs can potentially be 
confounded with the type of vegetable produced. However as mentioned earlier 
export vegetables production among smallholders are mostly district specific i.e. 
Meru farmers primarily produce French beans, Makueni farmers produce Asian 
vegetables and farmers in the other districts produce peas and French beans. The 
inclusion of vegetable type variable together with the district dummies can 
potentially create multicollinearity problem. However to check the robustness of 
the results to different specification, a sensitivity analysis is performed with and 
without variable representing vegetable type.  
Another long-standing problem with direct estimation of the production function 
is that the inputs are treated as exogenous, when the farmers decide their levels. 
Although this problem applies to all inputs, it is especially true of pesticides, since 
they are often applied in response to pest pressure (Huang et al., 2002). Hence, it is 
                                                 
3 We used total revenue instead of total yield to capture the variation in the quality of the produce 
and  at  the  same  time  avoid  the potential problem  of  aggregation  error. Unlike  other  crops,  for 
vegetables physical yield is meaningless. 
4 Average annual precipitation  is not  included  in  the model due  to  lack of data, nevertheless  the 
variation in rainfall is expected to be captured by the district dummies.  
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possible that the covariance of px and the residuals of the revenue function is non-
zero, a condition that would bias parameter estimates of the impact of pesticides 
on output. In other words, pesticides used by farmers may be endogenous to 
yields and a systematic relationship may exist among pests, pesticide use and 
vegetable yields. Equation (5.1) does not account for the possible selection bias of 
production of export vegetables and once participated in the export market, the 
adoption of GlobalGAP in the production function equation. The decision (a) to 
participate in export market and (b) to adopt standards may be determined by 
unobservable variables that may also affect productivity. If this is the case, it leads 
to biased estimates of the impact of adopting GlobalGAP. 
Table 5.1 gives an overview of model specification for revenue and pesticide use 
function (without consideration of potential endogeneity problem) and definition 
of variables included in the model. 
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Table 5.1 Model specification and definition of variables  
Model specification without considering potential endogeneity problems 
TRVG = f [SEED, FERT, LABO, PRES, CRNU, PEST, CRTY, ADOP, AGEH, PRPR, MARK, FERL, 
 IRRI, vegetable type dummies, district dummies]  
PEST = f [CRTY, ADOP, PEPR, FEPR, PRES, HHSI, CONT, AGEH, DIST, GROU, SYPT, FACI, TRAI, 
 CRED, APPL, FERL, vegetable type dummies, district dummies]  
Variable  Definition 
TRVG Total revenue of vegetables per acre per cropping season (KSh) 
PEST Total cost of pesticide use per acre per cropping season (KSh) 
AGEH Age of the household head (years) 
EDU1 Highest grade attained by household head (year) 
EDU2 Highest grade attained by other adult household members (years) 
HHSI Household size (adult equivalent) 
LITU Number of Tropical Livestock Unit owned 
SEED Seed cost per acre per cropping season (KSh) 
FERT Fertilizer cost per acre per cropping season (KSh) 
LABO Labor cost per acre per cropping season (KSh) 
LAEX Land size under export vegetables (acres) 
CRTY Choice to produce for export (1, if export market, 0 domestic market) 
CRNU Number of vegetable crops grown per cropping season 
PRPR Average vegetable output price ( KSh/kg) 
PRES Pressure of pest (scores from 1 to 9) 
ADOP Adoption of GlobalGAP dummy 
PEPR Price of pesticide (KSh/g) 
FEPR Price of fertilizer (KSh/kg) 
SYPT Pesticide poisoning cases one year prior to the survey 
FACI Facility index  
TRAI Number of major agricultural training subjects attended in the past three years 
prior 2005 
GROU Number of years the household head has been a group member 
CONT Number of years the household had a formal contract 
DIST Distance to extension service (km) 
CRED Amount of credit used for the past three years prior 2005  (‘000 KSh) 
APPL Primary applicator of pesticide (1, if household member, 0  casual labor) 
MARK Distance to nearest local market (km) 
FERL Proportion of land that is fertile in percentage (%) 
IRRI Access to irrigation dummy 
Source: Own survey 
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A Wu-Hausman specification test (Hausman, 1978) is performed to test the null 
hypotheses that (a) pesticide use, GlobalGAP adoption and choice to produce for 
export market are exogenous in the revenue function; and (b) GlobalGAP 
adoption and choice to produce for export market are exogenous in pesticide use 
function before further econometric analysis. The estimated Wu-Hausman chi-
square statistics are reported in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.2 Results of Wu-Hausman specification tests 
Null hypothesis 
Wu-Hausman F-
test statistics P-value 
Exogeneity of GlobalGAP adoption discrete choice in revenue 
function 3.78 0.053* 
Exogeneity of pesticide inputs use in revenue function 1.55 0.138+ 
Exogeneity of choice to produce for export market in revenue function 1.48 0.145+ 
Exogeneity of GlobalGAP adoption discrete choice in pesticide use 
function 4.15    0.043** 
Exogeneity of choice to produce for export market in pesticide use 
function 1.60 0.114
+ 
a Statistical significance at the  0.05 (**) , 0.1 (*) and 0.15(+) level of probability 
Source: Own survey 
The P-values of the estimated F-test statistics show that the exogeneity hypothesis 
is rejected in the revenue function for GlobalGAP adoption, pesticide use and 
choice to produce for export market at the 5% and 15% level of significance, 
respectively. The exogeneity hypothesis for GlobalGAP adoption and choice to 
produce for export market in pesticide use function is rejected at 5% and 15% level 
of significance, respectively. The results of the Wu-Hausman specification test 
suggest that farmers decision to produce export crops, adopt GlobalGAP and 
pesticide input use are endogenous in the revenue production function model and 
need to be accounted for to get efficient and consistent estimation. It is most likely 
that the destination markets and compliance with standards affect product prices 
received as well as input costs incurred. If this is the case, prices are not exogenous 
of the dependent variable revenues and costs. So it could be the case that due to 
the specification used, these equations will exhibit right hand side endogeneity. 
Yet endogeneity would remain a problem for the decision sequence in question 
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with a different specification that did not conflate price with the dependent 
variable i.e. total yield and pesticide quantity as a dependent variable instead of 
total revenue and pesticide cost. 
To empirically account for this multiple endogeneity and/or selectivity problem 
in the production function, a model that consists of three stages is used and looks 
as follows (Arendt and Holm, 2006; Wooldridge, 2002; Rivers and Vuong, 1988):  
Stage one: Adoption equation 
iii uXG += β*                 (5.2) 
 Stage two: Reduced form regression 
iiii eGVY ++= γα*                (5.3) 
⎩⎨
⎧ >= otherwise
GifG ii 0
1*1
                              (5.4) 
 Stage three: Structural equation 
iiiii vYGWQ +++= βγα                          (5.5) 
where *iG is the unobservable or latent variable for GlobalGAP adoption, iX  is a 
non-stochastic vector of observed farm and non-farm characteristics determining 
adoption5, *iY  denotes the expenditure on chemical pesticides, iV  is a vector of 
exogenous variables thought to affect pesticide use, iG  is the predicted value of 
GlobalGAP adoption from stage one, iQ  denotes total revenue per acre from 
export vegetables, iW  represent covariates expected to influence structural 
revenue equation, iY  denotes predicted value of pesticide use from stage two, and 
                                                 
5 Exogenous variables used in the first stage adoption equation are identical with what is presented 
in chapter four and thus it is not discussed in this chapter. 
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iu , ie  and iv  are random disturbances associated with the adoption of GlobalGAP, 
pesticide use and the revenue model.  
The purpose of stage one and two is to eliminate the problem of endogeneity of 
GlobalGAP adoption and pesticide use in the structural model. To solve this 
problem, the endogenous variable is first regressed on the instruments and then 
the estimated value of the endogenous variable is included in the structural 
equation instead of the endogenous variable itself (Greene, 1997; Wooldridge, 
2002). So in stage one, the probability of adopting GlobalGAP standards in 
function of a number of variables that explain the adoption decision using probit 
model is estimated. From this model, an estimate of predicted value of GlobalGAP 
adoption is constructed, which is then included in stage two and three of the 
model. In stage two of pesticide use is estimated based on the reduced form 
equation, which contains the instruments, the predicted value of GlobalGAP 
adoption from stage one, and a number of control variables. In stage three the 
structural equation is then estimated. In this stage, the dependent variable of 
interest, in this case total revenue per acre from vegetable production, is regressed 
on the estimated values of the endogenous variables from stage one and two. In 
doing so, the endogeneity problem of both variables is controlled at the same time 
in the structural model and estimates the impact of GlobalGAP adoption on total 
revenue. 
To examine the impact of participation of smallholders in export versus domestic 
market channels on pesticide use and total revenue, the same procedures are 
applied. At the first stage the determinants of participation in export market is 
estimated using the total sample (which includes both domestic and export 
farmers) to obtain the predicted value of participation then this variable is 
included in the second pesticide use function as discussed above. In the third 
stage the revenue function is estimated by including the predicted value of choice 
to produce for export market, which is obtained from the first stage and predicted 
value of pesticide use that is estimated from the second stage pesticide use 
function. Hence, pesticide use function and revenue function are estimated for 
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each stratum i.e. total sample that encompass domestic and export farmers and a 
sub-sample that include export farmers only. 
5.4 Results and discussion 
Descriptive analysis 
The most frequently grown export vegetable is French beans, whereas the most 
prevalent crop for the domestic market includes cabbage, tomatoes and kales. As 
shown in Table 5.3, of the total sample households in the five districts, 55.3% of 
them grow French beans on an average plot size of 0.35 acres per household. Peas 
and Asian vegetables are grown by 23.9% and 7.4% of the sample households 
respectively, on an average plot size of 0.28 and 0.38 acres. Among vegetables 
produced for domestic market, cabbage is produced by about 14.3% of the 
sampled households whereas kale and tomatoes are produced by 8.7% and 5.6% 
of the sample households respectively. Table 5.3 gives the number of growers, 
area allocated to each type of vegetable crop per household, total yield per acre 
and the average price received per kg of output. 
Table 5.3 Number of growers and farm size allocated to each type of vegetable 
(N=539)6 
Vegetable types  Count Percent Farm size (acres) Yield (kg/acre) Price (KSh/kg) 
French beans 298 55.3 0.35 1,732 33 
Peas 129 23.9 0.28 2,240 42 
Asian vegetables  40 7.4 0.38 1,416 25 
Cabbage 77 14.3 0.29 2,960 14 
Kale 47 8.7 0.22 3,968 12 
Tomatoes 31 5.6 0.25 2,232 18 
Source: Own survey 
                                                 
6 Vegetables produced solely for home consumption are not considered. The list includes only 
vegetables produced for commercial purpose either for domestic or export market. Asian 
vegetables category includes okra, chilies, karalla and aubergines. 
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Table 5.4 presents the t‐test comparison of means of selected production variables 
between  export  and  domestic  vegetable  producers  and  GlobalGAP  adopters’ 
categories. The total yield is significantly higher for domestic vegetable producer. 
However total revenue and net‐revenue per acre for export vegetable producers is 
not  significantly  higher  than  those  of  domestic  producers  in  contrary  to  other 
findings  (McCulloch  and  Ota,  2002).  The  data  only  captures  revenue  and  net‐
revenue of  the  rainy  season  and  if year‐round production  is  considered,  export 
farmers are likely to have higher income compared to those who produce for the 
domestic market.  
With the exception of labor cost and land use, export and domestic vegetable 
producers are distinguishable by other input costs such as fertilizer, seeds and 
pesticides. The cost of fertilizer is significantly higher for export vegetable 
producers whereas the cost of seeds is lower compared to their domestic 
counterparts. It is also clear from the descriptive statistics that domestic vegetable 
producers use less quantity of pesticides and spend less money on them than 
export vegetable producers. Results also show that domestic-oriented farmers use 
less herbicide than export-oriented farmers, but both use similar amounts of 
insecticide. For example, farmers producing for domestic market on average 
applied 0.87 kg of pesticides per acre, whereas export vegetable farmers used 1.1 
kg/acre. The lower pesticide quantities also translate into cost savings for farmers. 
Domestic vegetable producers spent 1,093 KSh/acre on pesticides; on average 
export farmers spent 1,730 KSh/acre. 
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Table 5.4 Comparison of export and domestic market vegetable producers in 
 Kenya 
Export vegetable producers   
(N= 439) 
 
Variables 
GlobalGAP 
Adopters 
Non-
adopters 
All 
exporters t-stat
a 
Domestic 
vegetable 
producers    
(N= 100) 
t-stata 
Net-income (KSh/acre) 39273 14290 23382 3.69*** 18156 0.99 
Total revenue (KSh/acre) 67325 40576 50311 3.47*** 45017 0.90 
Total yield (kg/acre) 1996 1449 1572 2.99*** 3215 -3.22*** 
Seed cost (KSh/acre) 7432 4036 5272 3.76*** 7320 -2.48** 
Fertilizer cost (KSh/acre) 8462 8931 8760 -0.58 6471 3.77*** 
Labor cost (KSh/acre) 9922 10800 10481 -0.75 10116 0.39 
Land size (acre) 0.34 0.27 0.30 2.42** 0.27 1.15 
Pesticide cost (KSh/acre) 1503 1860 1730 1.77* 1093 3.29*** 
Pesticide use (kg/acre) 1.13 1.07 1.09 0.40 0.872 1.97** 
Hazard Category I pesticide (kg/acre) 0.09 0.06 0.08 1.08 0.01 3.33*** 
Hazard Category II pesticide (kg/acre) 0.23 0.40 0.34 -2.69*** 0.53 -3.19** 
Hazard Category III pesticide (kg/acre) 0.09 0.13 0.12 1.92* 0.03 4.96*** 
Hazard Category IV pesticide (kg/acre) 0.68 0.48 0.55 1.65* 0.28 2.89*** 
Insecticide (kg/acre) 0.52 0.61 0.58 1.00 0.59 -0.13 
Herbicide (kg/acre)  0.58 0.40 0.47 2.24** 0.25 3.44*** 
Insecticide cost (KSh/acre) 827 861 848 0.21 779 0.59 
Herbicide cost (KSh/acre)  452 441 445 0.13 278 2.53** 
Vegetable output price ( KSh/kg) 35 28 34 2.22** 14 2.55*** 
Distance to nearest local market (km) 1.63 1.54 1.58 0.65 1.62 0.82 
Proportion of land that is fertile (%) 97.80 97.24 97.44 0.11 91.05 -3.29*** 
Access to irrigation dummy 0.96 0.86 0.92 7.64*** 0.90 0.44 
Number of crops grown per season 1.19 1.09 1.13 2.01** 1.18 -1.16 
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability     
Source: Own survey 
GlobalGAP adopters and non-adopters only differ significantly with respect to 
quantity of seed used and number of crops grown per cropping season. 
GlobalGAP adopters incur significantly higher seed costs, which partially might 
be attributed to high price for good quality seed that is demanded by exporters 
who pursue GlobalGAP standards. It is observed that the groups are 
indistinguishable with respect to total quantity of pesticide use per acre although 
the associated costs are significantly higher for non-adopters. Besides, the types of 
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pesticides used among the categories are compared, non-adopters uses 
significantly higher amount of Hazard Category II and III pesticides, which WHO 
classifies as highly toxic and toxic respectively, whereas the adopters use higher 
amount of Hazard Category IV, which WHO classifies as moderately toxic. The 
results also reveal that the adopters use significantly higher amount of herbicide 
per acre than the non-adopters even though the high herbicide quantity does not 
translate into higher cost. Total yield, total revenue and the net-revenue per acre 
are significantly higher for GlobalGAP adopters compared to the non-adopters. 
Stage two: pesticide use model results 
The results of pesticide use functions demonstrate that the model performed well 
in explaining pesticide use with reasonable explanatory power (adjusted R-
squared between 0.3 and 0.4) 
Most importantly, the regression model results demonstrate the effect of the 
choice to produce for export market (CRTY) and the adoption of GlobalGAP 
standards (ADOP) on expenditures of pesticide use. The positive and highly 
significant coefficient on the CRTY variable means that export vegetable 
producers spend higher cost for pesticides when compared to domestic vegetable 
producers. Ceteris paribus, farmers producing export crops spend 28% more on 
pesticides than farmers producing domestic crops7.  
However, with regard to the pesticide use function estimated for export farmers, 
no significant difference between the adopter categories is observed in terms of 
the value of pesticide use. This indicates that GlobalGAP adoption has no 
significant reduction effect of pesticide expenditures of smallholder export 
                                                 
7 When dummy variables are used in a model with a log-transformed dependent variable, the 
coefficient of the dummy variable multiplied by 100 is not the usual percentage effect of that 
variable on the dependent variable (Kennedy, 1981). Instead it should be calculated as: 
[ ]1))(2/1exp(*100 −−= ii vh ββ  where h  is the percentage change in the level of the 
dependent variable, iβ  is the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable and )( iv β  is the 
estimated variance of iβ , which is applied in this study. 
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producers8. This might be attributed to three factors. First, exporters who monitor 
and enforce compliance with GlobalGAP give much emphasis on physical 
appearance of the produce (e.g. spotless), which implicitly encourages chemical 
control of pests and diseases. Second, although GlobalGAP requirements advocate 
the use of alternative pest control strategies like Integrated Pest Management 
(IPM), export farmers rarely resort to this alternative due to the risk associated 
with outbreak and rapid multiplication of pests, the challenge that is exacerbated 
by the tropical climate (Okello, 2006b). Third, export companies that enforce 
GlobalGAP also indirectly promote the use of chemical control by handing 
farmers a weekly spray program and sometime involving in direct spraying by 
their technical personnel. These chemicals are often expensive compared to some 
chemicals available in the market. The same observation was made by Okello 
(2006b). In his study he did not find any significant difference between compliant 
and non-compliant green bean growers in terms of types and quantities of 
pesticides used. 
To examine if adoption of standards affects types of pesticide used, an alternative 
function is estimated by using the ratio of WHO Hazard Category I and II 
pesticides to the total pesticides as a dependent variable. Contrary to findings of 
Okello, the estimation results demonstrate that the adopter categories are 
distinguishable in types of pesticide used i.e. non-adopters uses significantly 
higher amount of WHO Hazard Category I and II pesticides compared to non-
adopters (see Table 5.6 below). These findings support the descriptive results 
presented earlier. 
The coefficients on variable FEPR is negative and statistically significant for both 
pesticide use functions whereas the price of pesticide (PEPR) is positively 
associated. This suggests that the expenditure on pesticide use is inversely related 
with the price of fertilizer and directly related with pesticide price which is in line 
with expectations. This depicts that farmers at the same time adjust their total 
                                                 
8 An alternative function is also estimated using quantity of pesticide used as dependent variable, 
however no significant difference between adopter categories is observed. 
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expenditures on pesticide use depending on the change in price of other inputs. 
On the other hand farmers having access to credit services (CRED) spend 
significantly higher amount on pesticides, which reveals that financial constraints 
are one impediment for pesticide use among export farmers. As expected the 
coefficients on pest pressure (PRES) is positive although it is not significant for the 
pesticide use function for export farmers. This indicates that farmers base their 
spray decisions on the actual prevalence of insect and diseases outbreak. 
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Table 5.5 Results of pesticide use function estimation 
Amount of pesticide use: Ln-total cost (KSh/acre) 
Domestic and export vegetable 
producers  
Export vegetable producers only  
Variable  
Estimated a 
coefficient 
Standard 
error t-value  
Estimated a 
coefficient 
Standard 
error t-value 
Constant 6.832*** 0.488 14.01  7.627*** 0.525 14.52 
ADOP estimated     -0.051 0.158 -0.32 
CRTY estimated 0.319** 0.141 2.27     
PEPR 0.148*** 0.037 3.97  0.128*** 0.035 3.57 
FEPR -0.025*** 0.007 -3.37  -0.028*** 0.007 -3.76 
AGEH -0.005 0.005 -1.02  -0.010* 0.006 -1.74 
HHSI -0.038* 0.025 -1.51  -0.041* 0.027 -1.61 
PRES 0.062* 0.033 1.86  0.052 0.036 1.42 
CONT 0.029 0.030 0.93  0.051 0.034 1.50 
GROU 0.178 0.028 0.61  0.042 0.028 1.48 
SYPT 0.059 0.038 1.56  0.048 0.041 1.17 
FACI -0.119 0.096 -1.23  -0.242** 0.107 -2.27 
TRAI -0.031* 0.018 -1.71  -0.027 0.021 -1.32 
DIST 0.087*** 0.022 3.93  0.074*** 0.023 3.11 
CRED 0.001* 0.000 1.81  0.001* 0.000 1.68 
APPL 0.335** 0.157 2.14  0.382** 0.180 2.12 
FERL -0.011 0.019 0.67  0.032 0.022 1.11 
DISTRICTS        
MERU (Base)        
KIRINYAGA -0.232 0.212 -1.09  -0.229 0.253 -0.91 
MURANGA 0.089 0.323 0.28  0.848** 0.401 2.12 
NYERI -0.017 0.202 -0.08  0.157 0.231 0.68 
MAKUENI -0.940*** 0.307 -3.07  -1.009** 0.404 -2.50 
Number of observation 539    439   
R-square 0.282    0.383   
Adjusted R-square 0.248    0.336   
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
Source: Own survey 
The parameter estimate for the level of training (TRAI) is negative and significant 
for the pesticide use function pointing to a positive effect of agricultural training 
on reduction of pesticide use. As expected the coefficient of distance to extension 
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service (DIST), which is used as a proxy for access to information and advice, is 
positively and significantly associated with the expenditure on chemical pesticide. 
This coefficient suggests that farmers who reside near the extension service can 
make use of the information and consultancy service, which have a negative 
impact on their decision of spending on chemical pesticide. Access to effective 
government extension service can help the farmers in Kenya to resort to more 
environmental friendly pest control strategies rather than relying on chemical 
pesticides. 
Household size (HHSI) in both functions is negatively correlated with pesticide 
use. This suggests that the more members the household has the more labor 
available for activities like weeding, which leads to low quantity of herbicides use. 
Age of the household head also seem to play a role in how much farmers expend 
for pesticides, i.e. younger vegetable farmers spend less than older farmers. This 
result is plausible as younger farmers are more likely to adopt integrated methods 
of pest control. The most interesting result is the coefficient that captures pesticide 
application (APPL). It had been expected that the more the household relied on 
hired casual labor to spray chemicals, the higher quantity (high spending) s/he 
would use because of the shift of risk associated with pesticide spraying to 
another party. However the result depicts a positive and significant correlation 
between the household head as primary applicator of pesticide and the spending 
on pesticides. Possibly farmers who spray themselves have a higher chance to use 
the money, which otherwise would have been spent on casual laborers for 
purchase of chemical pesticides.  
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Table 5.6 Results of pesticide use function for export vegetable producers  
Dependent variable: ratio of WHO Hazard Category I and II pesticides to the total pesticides  
 
Estimated a
coefficient 
Standard 
error t-value 
Constant 0.519*** 0.137 3.77 
ADOP estimated -0.056* 0.044 -1.62 
PEPR -0.019* 0.010 -1.85 
FEPR -0.004* 0.007 -1.87 
AGEH 0.001 0.002 0.367 
HHSI -0.009 0.009 -1.07 
PRES 0.020* 0.015 1.64 
CONT 0.006 0.009 0.72 
GROU -0.023 0.008 -0.29 
SYPT -0.002* 0.001 1.67 
FACI -0.009 0.030 0.33 
TRAI -0.0045 0.006 -0.86 
DIST -0.014** 0.006 2.17 
CRED 0.078* 0.046 1.70 
APPL -0.059 0.048 -1.24 
FERL -0.016 0.013 0.87 
DISTRICTS    
MERU (Base)    
KIRINYAGA 0.100 0.071 1.42 
MURANGA -0.058 0.108 -0.54 
NYERI 0.016 0.061 0.26 
MAKUENI -0.237** 0.120 -1.97 
Number of observation 439   
R-square 0.291   
Adjusted R-square 0.246   
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
Source: Own survey 
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Stage three: structural revenue model results 
The estimation of production functions are aimed to investigate potential 
differences in the productivity of pesticides and total output revenue between 
farmers producing for domestic market versus export market and GlobalGAP 
adopters versus non-adopters. The results of the parameter estimates of both 
production functions are presented in Table 5.7. The models have a satisfactory 
explanatory power with adjusted R-square ranging from 0.3 and 0.4, which are 
reasonable for cross-sectional data set. 
The results of the revenue function estimated for all vegetable producers indicate 
that although there is a positive correlation between choice to produce for export 
market (CRTY) and value of the crop yield, the coefficient is not significant. This 
result suggests that export farmers and domestic farmers are indistinguishable in 
terms of total revenue they earn from producing vegetables per acre during the 
long rainy season.  However if one considers the total annual revenue per acre, 
export farmers earn significantly higher than the domestic farmers for three basic 
reasons. First the volume of sale for export producers is higher due to year round 
production unlike most domestic farmers which are seasonal. Second, the price of 
the export produce is relatively higher during the dry season due to high demand 
in most European countries, which perhaps could lead to higher return. Third, 
exporter-oriented farmers have year-round access to markets, whereas domestic 
ones have a narrower marketing window. On the other hand the coefficient of 
GlobalGAP adoption (ADOP) is positive and significant in the revenue function 
estimated for export farmers, which indicates the positive impact of GlobalGAP 
adoption on total revenue per acre. Ceteris paribus, GlobalGAP adopters get 24% 
higher crop revenue than the non-adopters. 
The results show that for both production functions, the expenditure on seed, 
pesticide, and labor are the most important determinants of the final output 
obtained in vegetable fields. All these variables have the expected sign. The 
coefficient of fertilizer is not significant in both production functions. The 
coefficient of pesticide (PEST) shows that a 1% increase in pesticide expenditure in 
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vegetable fields will increase the value of vegetable output proportionally by 
0.002% for the first model and 0.003% for the second model. As expected product 
price (PRPR) have a positive impact on total revenue for both functions. The 
coefficients of seed (SEED) and labor (LABO) are positive and significant in both 
models pointing to the positive impact of these inputs on the output. The 
expenditure in seed captures variety specifics such as the potential yield for a 
variety and is a quality indicator, for instance in terms of germination rate. 
Theoretically, it would be expected that farm output would increase significantly 
as the management ability (measured in terms of farmer’s age) of farmer increases. 
However the results demonstrate that farmer’s age (AGEH) has a negative impact 
on the output of vegetables. Perhaps young farmers are more likely to face the 
risks associated with innovations, which could lead to high output. Two of the 
four district dummy coefficients (KIRINYAGA and MURANGA) have a negative 
sign whereas the coefficient of one district (MAKUENI) has positive sign. These 
indicate that farmers in Meru District have significantly higher revenue from 
vegetable production compared to Kirinyaga and Muranga Districts but less 
compared to farmers in Makueni Districts. Meru District is located at higher 
altitude, which has favorable climatic condition for most export and domestic 
vegetable crops. This entails high productivity, high quality and high price for the 
produce. On the other hand farmers in Makueni District have the advantage of 
using irrigation water since it’s situated at lower altitude. Farmers producing 
vegetable for domestic market have also the advantage of delivering their produce 
to Nairobi or Mombassa market, which could boost the price they receive 
compared to farmers in other districts9. 
                                                 
9 In an alternative model specification, which includes set of dummies for types of vegetables 
produced instead of district dummies, there is no significant change in the sign and level of 
significance of the interest variables although the significance level is changed by small percentage 
for two variables (LABO and AGEH).  
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Table 5.7 Estimates of the revenue function  
Revenue function: Ln-total revenue (KSh/acre) 
Domestic and export vegetable 
producers  
Export vegetable producers only  
Variable  
Estimated a 
coefficient 
Standard 
error t-value  
Estimated a 
coefficient 
Standard 
error t-value 
Constant 8.194*** 0.830 9.87  5.603*** 1.053 5.32 
CRTY estimated 0.379 0.096 0.94     
ADOP estimated     0.273** 0.118 2.30 
SEED 0.138*** 0.039 3.54  0.222*** 0.062 3.54 
FERT 0.034 0.039 0.88  0.073 0.071 1.02 
LABO 0.285*** 0.063 4.50  0.368*** 0.082 4.49 
AGEH -0.379** 0.161 -2.35  -0.276 0.197 -1.40 
CRNU 0.089 0.115 0.77  0.231* 0.149 1.64 
PRPR 0.231*** 0.073 2.89  0.198*** 0.045 2.45 
IRRI 0.052 0.034 0.54  0.039 0.029 0.42 
MARK -0.142 0.097 1.32  -0.132 0.076 1.45 
FERL 0.021 0.006 0.87  0.033 0.024 0.61 
DISTRICTS        
MERU (Base)        
KIRINYAGA -0.533*** 0.125 -4.26  -0.495*** 0.151 -3.27 
MURANGA -0.713*** 0.183 -3.89  -0.417* 0.245 -1.70 
NYERI 0.094 0.142 0.66  -0.007 0.174 -0.04 
MAKUENI 0.484** 0.223 2.17  0.649* 0.119 2.30 
Damage control 
function 
       
Constant (λ) 0.685*** 0.257 2.66  0.679* 0.392 1.73 
PEST estimated 0.002*** 0.000 3.29  0.003** 0.001 2.46 
Number of 
observation 
539    439   
R-square 0.372    0.335   
Adjusted R-square 0.353    0.308   
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
Source: Own survey 
Using the estimated coefficients presented in Table 5.7, the associated marginal 
value products (MVPs), actual and optimal amount of pesticides for GlobalGAP 
adopters, non-adopters and domestic farmers are computed and presented in 
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Table 5.8. These computations are based on the assumption of all other inputs 
being constant at the sample average values while only varying the pesticide 
value. For the logistic damage function specification, the derivation of the 
marginal value products of pesticide ( px ) is obtained in as follows10:  
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The result demonstrate that the production function model integrating damage 
control function generate marginal value products per unit cost of pesticide 
greater than unity for all the cases suggesting that both export farmers either 
GlobalGAP adopters or non-adopters and domestic vegetable producers use 
pesticides below the financial optimum. Results of the t-tests compared to null 
hypothesis that MVP = 1 are all statistically significant below 10% significance 
level (see table 5.8)11. Especially for the case of domestic vegetables, farmers are 
using pesticides below their optimal levels. For example GlobalGAP adopters 
spend 630 KSh/acre on pesticides below the optimal level; non-adopters use 
nearly 185 KSh/acre less and the domestic farmers spend almost 1,485 KSh/acre 
less than optimal. This under use may have several reasons including financial 
constraints, the perceived risk of detectable pesticide residues leading to product 
rejection by exporters,  the high variation  in crop prices and other non‐pest yield 
risks.  Pesticides  use  below  the  financial  optimum  level  has  been  reported  for 
conventional  cotton  in West Africa  (Ajayi,  2000)  and  Bt  cotton  in  South Africa 
(Shankar and Thirtle, 2005). However in China, Huang et al. (2002) demonstrated 
the over-use of pesticide in cotton production. 
                                                 
10 The mathematical derivation of marginal value product of damage control inputs is presented in 
the appendix.  
11 MVP analysis might have shortcomings when applied to pesticide use in general since a 
marginal decision rule is predicated upon the assumption of a divisible input. Pesticide labels 
clearly state that they are to be treated like medicines and applied at standard rates for reasons of 
safety and efficacy. However for most developing countries at large and Kenya in particular this 
may not be the case since farmers decision rule is determine by a number of constraints. Thus MVP 
analysis is expected to be informative on the decision of pesticide use. 
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Table 5.8 Estimated marginal value product of chemical pesticides in [KSh] 
Export market producers (N= 439) 
Variables GlobalGAP 
Adopters 
Non-
adopters Total 
Domestic market  
producers         
(N= 100) 
Marginal value products (KSh) 5.61        (2.43***)a 
1.64     
(1.96*) 
5.84 
(2.64***) 
21.04 8       
(3.77***) 
Actual pesticide use (KSh/acre) 1503 1860 1730 1093 
Optimal pesticide use (KSh/acre) 2135 2045 2595 2575 
aNumber in bracket shows a t-test compared to null hypothesis that MVP =1. Statistical 
significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability  
Source: Own survey 
Figure 5.1 shows the marginal value of pesticides use for different input levels of 
pesticides, which demonstrates the usual patterns of diminishing marginal 
returns. Increase in the monetary value of an additional vegetables output 
approach zero as expenditure on pesticide use increases to a level above 2,000 
KSh/acre for all the cases.  
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Figure 5.1 Marginal value products of pesticide use in vegetable production 
Source: Own survey 
It is important to note that the calculated optimal pesticide use levels do not take 
into account any environmental and health cost of pesticide use. If a ratio of 1:1 is 
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assumed for health costs alone (see Rola and Pingali, 1994), under use would no 
longer exist. 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter contributes to the growing literature on the implications of 
introducing food-safety standards in developing countries for farmers’ production 
system using the case of Kenyan vegetable producers. Results show that farmers 
producing vegetables for the domestic market use significantly less pesticides in 
terms of expenditure vis-à-vis export farmers. Ceteris paribus, farmers producing 
export vegetables spend 28% more on pesticides than farmers producing domestic 
crops. This study also showed that the adoption of standards by the export 
farmers does not have any significant impact on the total expenditures for 
pesticides. However, in export vegetables adopters and non-adopters of standards 
still use pesticides below the private economic optimum. On the other hand the 
adopter categories are distinguishable in terms of types of pesticide used i.e. 
adopters use safer pesticides based on WHO classification. The third stage 
structural revenue model results demonstrate a positive and significant effect of 
standards adoption on revenue of vegetable production. Nevertheless, export and 
domestic farmers are indistinguishable in terms of total revenue they earned from 
producing vegetables per acre during the long rainy season. 
While food-safety and quality standards can be barriers for resource poor 
smallholders to maintain their position in the lucrative export markets, they can 
also induce positive changes in production systems of small-scale farmers who 
adopt it as shown by the results presented. A shift to less hazardous pesticides as 
a result of GlobalGAP adoption implies less pesticide intoxication by farmers and 
farm workers, less adverse impact on the environment as well as enhanced food-
safety. 
Generally, the empirical results presented in this chapter support the notion that 
the adoption of emerging food-safety standards can play a positive role by serving 
as a catalyst of transforming the production systems towards safer and more 
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sustainable production. Hence these standards can have health and environmental 
benefits aside from the benefits that accrue for industrial country consumer. 
Nevertheless to extrapolate these results to the whole vegetable sector in Kenya, it 
is crucial to look closely at the scale of adoption of standards nationwide. 
According to a separate survey by Mithöfer et al. (2008), the scale of adoption 
among export vegetable producers seems to be rather low (i.e. the scale of 
adoption among export vegetable producers is below 20%) for achieving a direct 
significant impact within the smallholder vegetable export sector. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Health and Environmental Impact of EU Private-sector Standards in 
Kenyan’s Export Vegetable Growers1 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In recent years, governments and development agencies have sought to promote 
the diversification of African agro-food exports in order to accelerate economic 
growth, expand employment opportunities, and reduce rural poverty (Harris et 
al., 2001). Particular attention has been given to facilitating the export of high-
value horticultural products, which have grown steadily to become the single 
largest category in world agricultural trade, accounting for over 20% of such trade 
in recent years (Humphrey, 2006). A number of African countries have had some 
notable success in such export diversification amongst them Kenya is leading. 
Small-scale farmers have proven to be effective suppliers of horticultural products 
when satisfactory contracting arrangements are established with an exporter or 
processing firm (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). However, there are problems in 
horizon for export horticulture in Kenya – and may be equally applicable 
elsewhere in Africa and these problems will have a profound impact on small-
scale farmers. Increased intensity in export market production has led to the use of 
relatively large quantities of pesticides often not for the purpose of preventing 
yield loss but in order to satisfy export markets’ demand for aesthetic appeal. This 
intense use of chemicals has been associated with a high risk to human health 
(chronic and acute illness) and intolerable environmental pollution (Mwanthi and 
Kimani, 1990; Okello and Swinton, 2006b; Ohayo-Mitoko, 1997; Thrupp, et al, 
1995; Macharia, 2002; Rola and Pingali, 1993; Crissman et al., 1988 and Maumbe 
and Swinton, 2003; Garming and Waibel, 2008).  
In spite of the growing recognition of the hidden costs related to the 
environmental and health effects due to pesticide use and the potential of 
adoption of production standards such as GlobalGAP to reduce them, there is lack 
                                                 
1 A paper based on this chapter is under review for Environment and Development economics. 
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of empirical evidence to support these prepositions. Theoretically adopting food-
safety standards like GlobalGAP provides potential health and environmental 
benefits stemming from changes in pesticide use and hygienic practices. 
Standards, if adopted could reduce exposure of developing country farmers to 
highly toxic pesticides and hence cost of pesticide-related illnesses. Measures 
taken to meet export market requirements for food-safety usually have spill-over 
benefits for other (non-export oriented) local producers or for domestic 
consumers. Referring to these potential direct and indirect benefits, some argue 
that standards can play a positive role, providing the catalyst and incentives for 
the modernization of export supply and regulatory systems and the adoption of 
safer and more sustainable production practices in developing countries (Henson 
and Jaffee, 2006 and Maertens and Swinnen, 2006). 
Limited empirical evidence exists either to confirm or refute the hypotheses that 
food-safety standards generate a positive external on farmers adopting it. 
Incorporating these environmental and health effects in the analysis could help to 
improve understanding of the true impact of emerging production standards on 
developing countries farmers. Therefore this chapter addresses two major 
objectives: (1) to estimate the effect of standards on pesticide ascribed incidence of 
acute poisoning symptoms and its associated cost-of-illness and (2) to explore 
impact of standards on improved crop management practices as proxy for 
environmental benefits. Given time and resource constraint, this study focuses on 
self-reported health symptoms associated with pesticide use and its corresponding 
cost ignoring other potential health effects such as genetic and reproductive 
disorders as well as cancers.  
To attain the above-mentioned objectives, a theoretical non-separable farm 
household model is used as a starting point. This model gives a detailed 
explanation of households demand for health. Based on the health demand 
functions derived from the model’s first-order condition, an empirical  model is 
formulated and estimated. In addressing these two objectives, the contribution of 
this chapter to the literature is threefold. First, there is limited empirical evidence 
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on the link between private-sector standards, farmers’ health and crop 
management practices. Thus, it is important to empirically document the 
argumentation and hypotheses build up in the literature. Second, unlike previous 
studies this chapter addresses the potential self-selectivity (or endogeneity of 
adoption of standards) problems using two-stage econometric model techniques. 
Third, the chapter also draws upon a relatively large sample data set, which is 
collected via re-call and season-long monitoring survey, which was not the case in 
previous literatures. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 presents the 
theoretical concept of a non-separable household model. Section 6.3 shows the 
data collection methodology. The econometric model used for estimation is 
presented in section 6.4. Section 6.5 presents the estimation results and some 
conclusions and policy implications are pointed out in section 6.6.  
6.2 Theoretical model 
In order to assess the impact of production standards like GlobalGAP on 
households production decision and pesticide ascribed health and environmental 
effect, a household production model (Singh et al., 1986) is used as a framework. 
Given that production and consumption decision of rural households are non-
separable (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995), households would be maximizing the 
following utility function: 
);,,,( mimm zhlrcUU =                (6.1) 
Each household derives utility from consumption of on-farm goods mc , gain 
revenue from sale of its on-farm output to purchase other market goods mr , leisure 
(home time) ( il ), household health ( h ) and vector of other factors that shift the 
utility function ( mz ). The household maximizes utility subject to a set of 
constraints, namely production constraint (Equation 6.2), cash income constraints 
(Equation 6.4) and health constraint (Equation 6.5).  
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)));(),(,)),(,(),(( upiii zGTGMWGxPDhVQQ =            (6.2) 
where: 
)/,,( hzHWSGG =                  (6.3) 
The level of on crop production ( iQ ) depends on the availability of family and 
hired labor ( iV ), the occurrence of pests as represented by damage control function 
( D ), non-pesticide inputs such as fertilizer ( M ), household asset, (W ) 
environmental factors (T ) and household characteristics and other shifters ( )uz . 
The damage control function represents potential damage that pest and diseases 
can cause to farm production and depends on the pest pressure ( P ) and the use of 
pesticide inputs ( px ). In addition the use of pesticide and non-pesticide input use 
is determined by adoption of GlobalGAP production standards (G ) and in turn 
the adoption of GlobalGAP standards is influenced by social capital ( S ), 
household asset (W ), human capital ( H ) and household characteristics ( hz ). 
The second set of restriction is the cash income constraint, which can be expressed 
as: 
[ ] [ ]∑∑
==
≥+−−−−−
N
m
mmiknpxi
N
i
mii rpEkpMpxpwVcQp
11
)(          (6.4) 
where ip , w , xp , np , kp and mp denote the exogenous prices for agricultural 
outputs, labor, pesticide inputs, non-pesticide inputs, health inputs and purchased 
output. E  is net transfer received including remittances.  
The household utility maximization problem is completed by incorporating the 
household health constraint: 
);),(,,,( hhpimm zbGxkrchh =               (6.5) 
The health status of the farmer )(h  can be influenced by consumption of own farm 
goods ( mc ), market goods ( mr ), behavioral factors such as smoking and alcohol 
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consumption ( hb ), health inputs ( ik ) like health care services and protective 
devices, and occupational hazards from the use of chemical inputs ( )0)( ≤pxh  
(Crissman et al., 1988). An environmental factor (T ) which is represented by 
improved pesticide management practices is influenced by adoption of 
GlobalGAP production standards, human capital, household asset and household 
characteristics. 
)/,,( hzWHGTT =                  (6.6)  
The adoption of standards is expected to influence farmers’ health and 
environment via changing exposure to and management of chemical pesticides in 
three major ways. First, quantity of pesticide use under GlobalGAP is expected to 
be lower, as to ensure compliance with residue limits and partly may be replaced 
by non-chemical crop management practices. Second, change in type of pesticide 
used is more likely i.e. farmers complying with GlobalGAP standards are 
expected to shift to less hazardous type of chemicals compared to the non-
compliant farmers. Third, adoption of GlobalGAP is also expected to affect 
farmers’ pesticide management practices such as scouting pest before spraying, 
using protective clothing, bathing after spray, having chemical store and disposal 
pit etc. 
The Lagrangian associated with the constrained maximization problem is given 
as: 
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 Note that λ , φ  and μ  are the Lagrange multipliers for the cash income 
constraint, the production constraints and the health constraints, respectively. 
Solving the household utility maximization problem subject to the constraints, 
reduced form of factor demand for pesticide inputs ( px ) and non-pesticide inputs 
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( M ) as well as household demand for health ( h ) can be derived based on some 
set of explanatory variables. 
);,,,,,( hknx zGWwpppfF =               (6.8) 
where F  is a vector representing px , M and h . 
The main task in this chapter is to measure econometrically the coefficients of the 
G vector, which contains the estimated impacts of GlobalGAP adoption on the 
farmer health.  
6.3 Survey design and data  
Farm level data were collected for this study between August 2005 and September 
2006 via a cross-sectional survey of 449 households of Kenyan export vegetable 
producers. The sampling design followed a multi-stage procedure to select 
districts, sub-locations and small-scale vegetable producers, respectively. First, 
five districts were selected purposively from the two major vegetable producing 
provinces (namely Nyeri, Kirinyaga, and Murang'a Districts in Central Province 
and Meru Central and Makueni Districts in Eastern Province). The five study 
districts were selected intentionally because of the intensity of export vegetable 
production and differences in agro-ecology and types of crop produced. Meru 
District is located at higher altitude primarily producing French beans while 
Nyeri, Kirinyaga, and Murang'a Districts are situated at middle altitude 
producing a range of green beans and peas. Makueni District is located at lower 
altitude mainly producing Asian vegetables. These districts represent 
approximately 50% of smallholders producing vegetables for the export market 
(Mithöfer et al., 2008). Second, 21 sub-locations were randomly selected from the 
five districts based on Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling technique. 
Overall, a total of 439 farm households were randomly selected from the export 
crop producing households living in the selected sub-locations of which 149 of 
them are GlobalGAP adopters export farmers and 290 non-adopter export 
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farmers2. GlobalGAP adopters in this case are defined as small-scale export 
producers who have either already obtained GlobalGAP certificate or are in the 
process of obtaining the certificate under Option 2.  
For each randomly selected farmer the survey combined a single visit (re-call 
survey) and a season-long monitoring of household production practices. The data 
were collected by trained enumerators supervised by the researcher using 
structured questionnaires. Prior to commencing the survey the questionnaire was 
pre-tested on non-sampled farmers separately for validation. The re-call survey 
questionnaire covered specific information on the characteristics of household 
members, household income (both farm and off-farm), household assets such as 
land size, livestock ownership, farm machinery and household equipments and 
access to different services like credit, irrigation, formal contract and group 
membership. The respondents were also asked to re-call incidence of intoxication 
after applying pesticides on export vegetables during the past three years. 
Nevertheless while conducting the survey it was realized that using health 
information collected via recall survey could lead to misleading conclusion since 
most farmers could hardly remember the pesticide ascribed health problems in 
prior years. Hence it is decided to collect health information together with 
production inputs and outputs related to export vegetable production by means of 
a season-long monitoring survey.   
The monitoring questionnaire was administered exclusively to the household 
head every three weeks throughout the cropping season. A health symptom that 
the respondents reported is regarded to be associated with pesticide spraying if 
the symptom only began during the spraying operation or within 24 hours after 
spraying. If the household members experienced any sort of pesticide intoxication, 
then he/she was asked to report for each symptom, the number of times the 
symptom occurred, the number of work-days lost partially or completely due to 
the health symptoms and the type of medication taken by victims. Other data 
                                                 
2 Unlike chapter 5 that compares domestic versus export producers, this chapter uses only 439 households 
producing for export market since the primary objective is to compare GlobalGAP adopter categories. 
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collected include direct costs of the symptoms, i.e. pharmacy cost and consulting 
fees, and indirect costs such as travel expenses to and from health centers. Beside 
health economics information, data were also collected on type of pesticides 
sprayed, the quantity sprayed, duration of spraying, and other pesticide 
management practices indicators such as whether protective clothing was used by 
the person who sprayed, precautionary measures taken against wind, condition of 
spraying equipment used etc.  
Evaluation of health costs of pesticides 
An estimate of pesticide related health cost is computed as the sum of farmer-
reported medical treatment costs to clinics and private physicians, the opportunity 
cost of work days lost to illness, travel costs to and from health facility, time spent 
in traveling and the cost of home-based health care. This estimate can be expected 
to be the lower bound estimate of the true cost-of-illness since other costs such as 
loss of labor by family members nursing the victim, work efficiency loss in farm 
due to illness, the value of leisure forgone due to illness, cost of defensive 
expenditure and the cost of traditional healing strategies are not included in the 
computation due to lack of information.  
Contingent valuation methods, which measure the respondents’ willingness to 
pay for hypothetical health improvements could have been used as an alternative 
procedure to estimate cost-of- illness, as used in some other studies (Atreya, 2005; 
Kenkel et al., 1994; Garming and Waibel, 2008). However, these methods are often 
expensive to design properly (Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Maumbe and 
Swinton, 2003). Beside the hypothetical nature of this procedure introduces some 
sources of potential inaccuracy and imprecision since the choice constrains 
imposed by true market conditions are not truly binding on respondents. In this 
respect, the cost-of-illness approach has the advantage that it is based upon real 
market condition (Maumbe and Swinton, 2003). The contingency valuation 
method on the other hand has the advantage of taking into account other costs 
such as pain, suffering, discomfort and other intangible costs, which cannot be 
captured via cost-of-illness method. As a result often the estimation based on 
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contingency valuation method exceeds the cost-of-illness estimate (Atreya, 2005; 
Kenkel et al., 1994). 
6.4 Empirical models 
This chapter specifies three empirical models to explain the principal factors 
affecting farmer’s health and improved management practices. The first model 
involves the estimation of the cost-of-illness and the primary interest is to estimate 
the impact of standards on the pesticide ascribed health cost. The second and third 
models involve the estimation of determinants of acute symptoms of pesticide 
poisoning and improved pesticide management practices, respectively. Following 
Angrist (2001), Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (2005), Green (1997), Rosenbaum (1983) 
and Wooldrige (2002), different econometric techniques is applied to correct for 
potential selection bias in estimating the impact of adoption of GlobalGAP 
standards on farmers’ health and improved management practices. 
Treatment effect model and propensity score methods 
In the first regression model an attempt is made to control for potential 
endogeneity problem using a two-stage standard treatment effect model. The 
major question is what would the cost-of-illness of GlobalGAP adopters have been 
if they had not adopted standards? To answer this question a suitable comparison 
group of non-adopters whose outcomes, on average, provide an unbiased estimate 
of the outcomes that the adopters would have had in the absence of standards 
needs to be identified. The choice of counterfactual is crucial because adopters are 
not placed randomly and the decision to adopt depends on individual, household, 
community characteristics and other exogenous factors. Formally, given the 
unobserved variable and its observed counterpart, the treatment-effect equation 
can be expressed as: 
iii uXG += β*                    (6.9) 
iiii eGVH ++= γα                      (6.10) 
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where *iG is the unobservable or latent variable for GlobalGAP adoption, iG  is its 
observable counterpart (dummy for adoption of GlobalGAP), iH  is a vector 
denoting the cost-of-illness, iV  are vectors of exogenous variables thought to affect 
health cost  and iX  are non-stochastic vectors of observed farm and non-farm 
characteristics determining adoption. ie  and iu  is random disturbances associated 
with the cost-of-illness model and the adoption of GlobalGAP.  
Note that it is not possible to simply estimate (Equation 6.10) because the decision 
to adopt may be determined by unobservable variables that may also affect health 
cost. If this is the case, the error terms in (Equation 6.9) and (Equation 6.10) will be 
correlated, leading to biased estimates of γ , the impact of adopting GlobalGAP. 
The selection bias can be corrected by assuming a joint normal error distribution, 
and using a two-step procedure. In the first step a probit model is used to estimate 
adoption. Using the probit results, the predicted probability of adoption is 
computed for each observation. In the second stage, cost-of-illness is regressed on 
the explanatory variables and the predicted probability of the probit model 
(Greene, 1997). However whether or not the effect of a treatment (GlobalGAP 
adoption) can be correctly estimated using a two-stage regression importantly 
depends on the validity of the exclusion restriction. Hence for identification 
purpose, the usual order condition that iX  contains at least one element not in iV  
is followed imposing an exclusion restriction in Equation 6.10. 
To assess the robustness of these results, an alternative propensity scores is used 
as control functions in case the adoption variable interact with unobserved 
heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2004) – a method pioneered by Rosenbaum (1983): 
iiii ePscoreGVH +++= μγα             (6.12) 
where: 
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)/1Pr()( XGXPscore i ==              (6.13) 
The propensity score (Pscore) is the conditional probability of adoption given 
observed covariates iX  and can be estimated by a probit model. The estimated 
propensity scores are used in the structural equation as a control function for 
selection bias. A key assumption underlying this method is ignorability of 
treatment, which implies that the potential outcomes are independent of 
participation conditional on the set covariates (Wooldridge, 2004; Rosenbaum, 
1983). 
XGHH i /),( 21 ⊥               (6.14) 
where H1 and H2  are the outcomes of interest (cost of illness) for adopters and 
non-adopters, respectively. 
Two-stage Poisson regression model 
The second and third regression models involve the estimation of determinants of 
acute symptom incidence of pesticide poisoning and improved pesticide 
management practices, respectively. Acute symptom incidences refer to short-
term illness episodes experienced by the farmers and these include both the 
dermal and oral (ingestion) symptoms. Thus, the total incidence model aggregates 
skin irritation, diarrhea, sneezing, headache, dizziness, vomiting, stomach 
poisoning, blurred vision, eye irritation and backache episodes incurred by the 
household members during and/or soon after spraying pesticides. Counts of 
improved pesticide management practices include owning pesticide store, full 
protective clothing, disposal pit, special pesticide mixing container, pest scouting 
before spraying, observing pre-harvest interval, inspecting sprayer before 
spraying, calibrating nozzle of the sprayer regularly, record keeping of inputs and 
observing wind direction before spraying.  
The response variable in both situations is a quantitative variable, but has the 
property that it is discrete, taking on only integer values. These dependent 
variables are addressed via Poisson regression model. The basic idea for this 
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model is that the predictor information is related to the rate or susceptibility of the 
response to increase or decrease in counts. Econometric model of count data give 
consistent estimate only when the regressors are exogenous. In the present study, 
however, the main regressor of interest is adoption of standards, which is likely to 
be endogenous. Hence to account for potential endogeneity problem of adoption 
of standards, a two-stage estimation procedure is applied.  
The estimation of linear models with endogeneity is to some extent 
straightforward, but a situation in which a count dependent variable depends on a 
binary endogenous variable is more complex because a simple reduced form does 
not exist. There are two standard approaches to estimation. The first approach is a 
full information maximum likelihood, FIML, model in which the joint distribution 
is specified and the joint log-likelihood function is maximized. Alternatively, a 
limited information maximum likelihood, LIML, two-step procedure can also be 
adopted. In this approach, the first model is estimated, since it does not involve 
the second parameter vector. Subsequently, the second parameter vector is 
estimated conditional on the results of the first step estimation. Consider the 
following two equations: 
iiii
iiiiiiiii
GZ
uGZuGZM εγα γαγα )exp( )exp()exp()exp( 1 111 +=
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    (6.15) 
iii uXG += β*               (6.16) 
where iM1  is a count endogenous variable, iG  is a binary endogenous variable, 
iZ and iX  are exogenous variables, iε  and iu  are disturbance terms that follow a 
gamma distribution and a logistic distribution, respectively and *iG is an 
unobservable variable. From the viewpoint of model estimation, however, the 
model described above cannot be estimated using fully simultaneous estimation 
due to logical consistency (Winkelmann, 2003; Windmeijer and Santos Silva, 1997; 
Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Mullahy, 1997). As a result, the parameters are 
estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function using limited information 
Chapter 6  115 
maximum likelihood estimation3. The matrix accum and matrix vecaccum stata 
commands are used as provided by Hardin (2002) for estimation and the standard 
errors are also adjusted to account for the two-step procedure. 
Choice of explanatory variables 
The explanatory factors for the models explaining health costs and acute 
symptoms incidence incorporate four broad classes of variables namely those 
related to household characteristics, household wealth, household health and 
pesticide exposure and institutional settings. Age (and its square) of household 
head (AGEH & AGSQ), his or her educational attainment (EDU1) and the level of 
education of that household member who had the highest educational attainment 
(EDU2) are taken as proxies to measure the human capital. While for education 
the relationship is assumed to be negative the opposite may be the case for age as 
young farmers may show a higher tendency to adopt innovations and protect 
against pesticide intoxication. Gender of household head (GEND) is also expected 
to affect pesticide ascribed health symptoms and its associated cost although the 
direction of the effect is not clear a priori.  
Household wealth variables such as total income earned during 2005 (INCO) and 
facility index (FACI) are included in the cost-of-illness model to capture the ability 
of the households spending on health service. Pesticide exposure indicators 
include quantity of pesticide used by classes of toxicity based on WHO 
classification (from Hazard Category I, which is highly toxic up to moderately 
toxic Hazard Category IV), whether the farmer used cocktail of chemical (COCK), 
total number of hours sprayed (HRSP), eat in the vegetable field while spraying 
(EATE), wash the protective gear after use (WASH), take bath after spraying 
chemicals (BATH), knowledge of label meaning (LABE), maintained sprayer ever 
(MAIN) and the family members are a primary applicator (APPL). Health related 
variables include the duration in years of smoking (SMOK) and drinking alcohol 
                                                 
3An exclusion restriction is imposed in equation (6.15) i.e. iX  contains at least one element not in 
iZ . 
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(ALCH) by the household head. Another set of variables incorporate institutional 
and access related variables such as major agricultural training attended (TRAI) 
and contact with extension service (EXTE). A set of district dummies are also 
included to capture the heterogeneity in the ecological and service provision. A 
variable of interest is adoption of GlobalGAP standards (ADOP), which is 
hypothesized to influence the health symptoms and cost negatively4.  
For the third model, count of improved pesticide management practices is used as 
the left-hand variable. The right hand variables in the regressions include (a) 
household characteristics including gender and age (and its square) of the head 
and level of education (categorized into education level of the head and highest 
education level attained by other adult household members); b) household wealth: 
annual total household income and facility index; c) access to different services: 
amount of credit used in the past three years (CRED), years of group membership 
(GROU), years of participation in formal contract (CONT), radio use per week 
(RADI) and contact with extension personnel’s; d) adoption of GlobalGAP 
standards and e) the geographical location of the household (in this case dummies 
for districts). Descriptions of the variables used in the analyses and basic statistics 
are provided in Table 6.1. 
                                                 
4Four major variables namely number of protective clothing used, owning chemical store, owning 
special mixing container and observing wind direction when spraying are excluded from the 
health model since they are highly correlated with the adoption variable. Their presence in the 
model obscures the effect of standards on the farmers’ health due to multicollinearity problem. A 
test is also performed to check the multicollinearity problem between variables WASH and FACI, 
BATH & FACI. 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive summary of variables used in estimations (N = 439) 
Variables Unit Adopters  (N = 149) 
Non-
adopters   
(N = 290) 
t-stata 
(chi-
square) 
Dependent variables     
Acute pesticide poisoning cases (ACUT) count 1.61 2.21 1.74* 
Health cost-of-illness (COST) KSh 165.54 324.33 2.42** 
Improved pesticide management practices (MANA) count 8.27 6.40 -6.70*** 
Household characteristics variables     
Age of the household head (AGEH) years 45.38 46.18 0.53 
Age square (AGSQ) years 2,212.41 2,297.23 0.57 
Male household head dummy (GEND) 1/0 0.89 0.81 3.57* 
Highest grade attained by household head only (EDU1) years 9.42 8.07 -3.28*** 
Highest grade attained by other adult household members (EDU2) years 9.77 8.89 -1.67* 
Household wealth variables     
Total annual income (INCO) KSh 144,141 148,100 0.11 
Total land size (LAND) acres 2.97 2.66 -0.99 
Facility index (FACI) - 1.59 1.03 -5.68*** 
Pesticide exposure and health related variables     
Hazard Category I pesticide (PES1) gram 13.06 29.64 2.32** 
Hazard Category II pesticide (PES2) gram 64.21 74.32 1.06 
Hazard Category III pesticide (PES3) gram 105.41 100.42 -0.17 
Hazard Category IV pesticide (PES4) gram 156.26 99.96 -2.96*** 
Use cocktail of chemicals dummy (COCK) 1/0 0.59 0.77 10.89*** 
Wash the gear after use dummy (WASH) 1/0 0.92 0.69 20.67*** 
Bath after spraying dummy (BATH) 1/0 0.99 0.93 5.49** 
Eat while spraying dummy (EATE) 1/0 0.12 0.02 14.67*** 
Knowledge on the label of pesticide dummy (LABE) 1/0 0.96 0.89 4.47** 
Number of hours sprayed (HRSP) hours 4.68 4.91 0.38 
Maintained sprayer ever dummy (MAIN) 1/0 0.46 0.43 0.64 
Primary applicator of pesticide dummy (PRIM) 1/0 0.81 0.61 12.75*** 
Smoking duration (SMOK) years 2.34 3.89 1.62* 
Alcohol intake duration (ALCO) years 1.32 2.42 1.44 
Institutional and access related variables     
Radio use per week (RADI) hours 27.82 25.36 -1.42 
Number of major agricultural training subjects attended (TRAI) count 6.81 5.26 -3.61*** 
Contact with extension service dummy (EXTE) 1/0 0.86 0.73 6.25** 
Amount of credit used for the past three years prior 2005  (CRED) KSh 5,535 4,459 -0.55 
Number of years the head has been a group member (GROU) years 3.15 1.33 -5.83*** 
Number of years the head has been involved in formal contract 
(CONT)  years 2.66 2.30 -1.18 
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability. Categorical 
variables are analyzed using chi-square test. 
Source: Own survey 
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6.5 Results and discussion 
Descriptive analysis  
Table 6.1 presents the t-test and chi-square comparison of means of selected 
variables between GlobalGAP adopters’ categories. Level of education of the 
household head and other household members is significantly higher for 
GlobalGAP adopters. No significant difference is observable in the age of the 
household head.  Adopters seem to have more access to facilities as indicated by 
facility index however there is no significant difference in total annual income and 
total land size. As far as pesticide exposure and health related variables are 
concerned, non-adopters use significantly high quantity of Hazard Category I 
pesticide, which WHO classifies as highly toxic, whereas the adopters use higher 
amount of Hazard Category IV, which WHO classifies as moderately toxic. The 
result also depicts that the adopter categories are distinguishable in terms of 
knowledge on the label of pesticides. Non-adopters have a tendency to use of 
cocktail of chemicals and eat in the vegetable fields while spraying compared to 
adopters. The adopters more often take a bath after spraying chemicals and wash 
the protective gear used than their counterparts. The primary applicator of 
pesticide is more often the household head in adopters group than non-adopters. 
The duration in years of smoking is significantly higher for non-adopters although 
there is no significant difference in years of alcohol intake. Moreover the length of 
membership in grower groups, level of agricultural training and contact with 
extension personnel are also significantly higher for GlobalGAP adopters 
compared to their counterparts. 
Incidence of pesticide-related acute illness symptoms and its associated health cost 
are significantly higher for non-adopters as shown by t-test comparison. For the 
2005 cropping season, the estimated average cost of pesticide-related health risks 
is 165 KSh and 324 KSh for adopters and non-adopters, respectively. These costs 
equal 86.4% of the mean household pesticide expenditure per cropping season for 
non-adopters and 39.6% of those adopters. Table 6.2 underscore that non-adopters 
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reported more cases of acute health symptoms ascribed to pesticide compared to 
their adopter counterpart. 
Table 6.2 Pesticide related health symptoms among export vegetable producers  
GlobalGAP Adopters 
(N=149) 
Non-adopters        
(N=290) 
Total                
(N=439) Symptoms 
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Skin irritations 18 29.0 44 71.0 62 100 
Eye irritations 9 17.3 43 82.7 52 100 
Headache 11 18.6 48 81.4 59 100 
Sneezing 28 29.5 67 70.5 95 100 
Stomach poisoning 7 28.0 18 72.0 25 100 
Backache 4 16.0 21 84.0 25 100 
Dizziness 16 29.6 38 70.4 54 100 
Blurred vision 7 20.6 27 79.4 34 100 
Diarrhea 1 6.3 15 93.8 16 100 
Vomiting 2 15.4 11 84.6 13 100 
Source: Own survey 
Table 6.3 presents the list of proxies used to measure improved pesticide 
management practices and compares degree of practices between the adopter 
categories. The chi-square test results depict that a higher proportion of 
GlobalGAP adopters own pesticide store, full protective clothing, disposal pit and 
special pesticide mixing container. The groups are also significantly 
distinguishable in terms of practices such as pest scouting before spraying, 
observing pre-harvest interval, inspecting sprayer before spraying, calibrating 
nozzle of the sprayer regularly, record keeping of inputs and observing wind 
direction before spraying.  
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Table 6.3 Improved management practices in export vegetable production  
Variables 
GlobalGAP 
Adopters  
(N=149) 
Non-adopters 
(N=290) 
Total 
(N=439) Chi-square 
a 
Own pesticide store (0,1) 0.93 0.62 0.74 33.22*** 
Own disposal pit (0, 1) 0.92 0.60 0.72 34.52*** 
Pest scouting (0, 1) 0.98 0.86 0.90 12.22*** 
Observe pre-harvest interval (0,1) 0.98 0.87 0.91 10.26*** 
Inspect sprayer before spraying (0, 1) 0.82 0.71 0.75 4.65** 
Maintained sprayer ever (0, 1) 0.46 0.43 0.44 0.21 
Own special mixing container (0,1) 0.59 0.33 0.43 18.31*** 
Calibrates nozzle (0,1) 0.68 0.44 0.53 16:54*** 
Record keeping (0, 1) 0.99 0.81 0.87 21.64*** 
Observe wind direction (0,1) 0.93 0.78 0.84 10.98*** 
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability  
Source: Own survey 
In the subsequent part of the chapter, a rigorous analytical model is estimated to 
investigate whether these and other variables influence household’s health and 
environment using pesticide related acute illness, the corresponding costs of 
illness and counts of improved management practice as dependent variables.  
Results of pesticide-ascribed acute illness model  
The results of a two-stage Poisson regression model used to estimate determinants 
of self-reported acute symptoms of pesticide poisoning are presented in Table 6.4. 
Pesticide use significantly affects farmer’s health impairments. The statistically 
significant and positive coefficient for categories I and II pesticides indicates the 
incidence of farmer’s health impairments rises with the increase in highly toxic 
pesticide use. Although the coefficients are insignificant, categories III pesticide 
types are positively correlated with incidence of acute poisoning whereas negative 
correlation is observed with category IV pesticide type. It is hypothesized that 
using pesticide cocktails can increase incidence of symptoms in the household due 
to the possible interaction between pesticides that can lead to unknown chemical 
reactions (Yánez et al., 2002). The results do not support this notion since the 
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coefficient is not significant below 10%.  It is interesting to note the significant 
negative coefficient for age, which indicates the older the farmer, the more 
experience in pesticide use resulting in better health. However as displayed with 
the positive and significant coefficient of age square, the ability of farmers to 
appropriately use pesticides decreases after a certain threshold of age resulting in 
health problems. The regression results also depicts that incidence of health 
impairment is higher among male farmers than females, which is consistent with 
the researchers’ observation during the field survey. Pesticide applicators in the 
study area are primarily male farmers whereas the female farmers engage in other 
farming activities such as weeding and harvesting.   
Previous studies have shown that the higher the level of training or education of 
the household head or members, the more likely to report pesticide-related health 
symptoms simply because of the awareness of negative effects on health. However 
the findings show that participation in agricultural trainings tends to decrease the 
number of reported pesticide-related acute illness. Likewise the incidence of acute 
illness symptoms is also mitigated by knowledge of pesticide labels as indicated 
by negative and significant coefficient of the variable.  
Other human capital variables such as education level of the head and other 
household members and contact with extension service also have a negative sign 
as expected although the coefficients are statistically insignificant. The implication 
is that households with higher education level and trained farmers have more 
knowledge on crop management and input use and thus are more likely to handle 
pesticides with more caution. In line with our expectation, households with higher 
access to facilities experience significantly less incidence of acute illness as 
indicated by the negative coefficient of facility index5. 
                                                 
5A test is conducted to detect the problem of multicollinearity between variables WASH and FACI, 
BATH & FACI using a technique of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). The results show that there is 
no strong correlation among the variables since the values of VIF are by far less than 10.  
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Table 6.4 Determinants of self reported acute symptoms of pesticide poisoning –
 two-stage Poisson regression results (N = 439) 
Dependent variable: Count of total acute pesticide symptoms per cropping season 
Variable 
Estimated a 
Coefficient 
Murphy-Topel 
Standard Error t-value 
Constant 4.250 2.681 1.59 
AGEH -0.175* 0.093 -1.86 
AGSQ 0.002** 0.000 2.03 
GEND 0.912** 0.401 2.27 
EDU1 0.047 0.050 0.95 
EDU2 -0.045 0.036 -1.24 
FACI -0.464* 0.243 -1.91 
PES1 0.007* 0.004 1.88 
PES2 0.003* 0.002 1.85 
PES3 0.005 0.004 1.39 
PES4 -0.001 0.001 -0.83 
COCK 0.723 0.555 1.30 
WASH -1.022*** 0.593 -2.68 
BATH -0.765 1.022 -0.75 
EATE 1.022*** 0.454 3.65 
LABE -0.878*** 0.338 -2.59 
HRSP 0.025 0.029 0.85 
MAIN -0.852** 0.347 -2.45 
PRIM 0.807 0.517 1.56 
SMOK 0.036* 0.020 1.83 
ALCO -0.171** 0.073 -2.33 
TRAI -0.125** 0.058 -2.13 
EXTE -0.289 0.335 -0.86 
MERU (Base)    
KIRINYAGA -0.793 0.435 1.62 
MURANGA 3.247*** 1.136 5.17 
NYERI 0.975** 0.461 2.12 
MAKUENI 1.000* 0.512 1.95 
ADOP -0.784** 0.313 2.50 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -153.929  
Pseudo R2  0.361  
Wald Chi2    198.35  
Prob > Chi2    0.000  
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
Source: Own survey 
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Most importantly, the regression analyses demonstrate the substantial role of 
adoption of EU private standards in reducing incidence of acute illness associated 
with pesticide use. With all other factors in the model held constant, farmer who 
adopt GlobalGAP standards experience about 78% lesser incidence of acute illness 
compared to non-adopters farmers. The results demonstrate that the adoption of 
emerging standards confer a positive externality effect on adopters and may serve 
as a means to transform the production systems that contribute to better health for 
the producers in developing countries. 
Eating in the vegetable field while spraying tend to increase substantially the 
incidence of acute illness perhaps due to the fact that there might be no 
availability of water in the field to wash hands and food before eating, which will 
increase the direct contact with pesticides. Contrary to the findings of Okello and 
Swinton (2006b) taking a bath after spraying chemicals does not significantly 
reduce the impact of poisoning. Hiring a laborer for pesticide application tend to 
substantially reduce the incidence of health symptoms within the household. This 
is perhaps due the fact that household members are less likely to experience direct 
pesticide exposure and shift the risk associated with pesticide spraying to another 
party. Likewise the incidence of acute pesticide related illness symptoms is 
mitigated by maintaining the sprayer and washing the protective gear after use. 
The safe use of pesticides has often been considered a pivotal aspect in mitigating 
episodes of pesticide poisoning (Cropper 1994; Atkin et al., 2000). Studies 
conducted by Ajayi (2000), Murphy (1999) and Mancini (2005) have demonstrated 
that farmers from developing countries use pesticide in unsafe and hazardous 
manner, describing mixing pesticides with bare hands, lack of protective clothing, 
using leaking backpack sprayers and storing pesticides in kitchens or bedrooms, 
which enhanced the health risk of pesticides. The four district dummies 
controlling for agro-ecology and differences in institutional settings are significant 
in three instances. Export farmers in Muranga, Nyeri and Makueni districts 
experience significantly high cases of pesticide ascribed health symptoms 
compared to the base district, which is Meru district.  
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Results of cost-of-illness model 
Table 6.5 presents results of factors determining cost-of-illness among export 
vegetable producers in Kenya. Test results of the model show that the 
assumptions of normality and homoskedasticity of the error terms are violated. 
Thus robust standard errors are estimated using White’s heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors. Standard errors are also computed with clustering at 
the smallholder group level since farmers are organized into growers groups.  
The pesticide health costs are determined overwhelmingly by adoption of 
GlobalGAP standards as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of 
adoption variable (ADOP) in the three econometric models pointing to the 
robustness of the results. Adoption of GlobalGAP standards decreases cost-of-
illness by about 60% compared to non-adopters in the two-stage treatment effect 
model whereas about 50% on average in the regression based on propensity score. 
This result corroborates with the pervious findings on the negative correlation 
between adoption of standards and the incidence of acute health symptoms. Cost-
of-illness seems to decrease with age of the household head although at an 
increasing rate as can be seen from the coefficient of the age squared. Female-
headed households incur significantly lower health costs compared to their male-
headed counterparts perhaps due to their limited role in pesticide handling.  
Contrary to the expectation the effect of facility index is negative and statistically 
significant (at 5%). This could perhaps be explained by the fact that farmers with 
better access to facilities have experienced lower incidence of acute illness as 
presented before and this is translated to lower cost. However total income of the 
household during 2005 cropping season is not significant6 
                                                 
6 Prior to running the model, a test is conducted to detect the problem of multicollinearity between 
facility index and total annual household income.  The test result depicts no strong correlation 
between the variables. The model is also estimated excluding the income variable but the signs and 
significance level of other variables didn’t change. 
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Table 6.5 Estimates of cost‐of‐illness associated with pesticide poisoning  
Dependent variable: Natural log of farmer’s health cost of pesticide intoxication in KSh (N=439) 
Regression based on propensity-score Two-stage standard 
treatment effect model without control variables with control variables 
Variable 
Estimated a 
Coefficient 
Rob. Stand. 
Error 
Estimated a 
Coefficient 
Rob. Stand. 
Error 
Estimated a 
Coefficient 
Rob. Stand. 
Error 
Constant 1.996** 0.800 -0.047 0.097 2.051** 0.812 
AGEH -0.056* 0.032   -0.058* 0.031 
AGSQ 0.001* 0.000   0.001* 0.000 
GEND 0.181* 0.101   0.195* 0.117 
EDU1 -0.016 0.017   -0.006 0.016 
EDU2 -0.005 0.014   -0.012 0.013 
INCO 0.001 0.000   0.000 0.000 
FACI -0.236** 0.092   -0.154* 0.099 
PES1 0.002*** 0.000   0.002*** 0.000 
PES2 0.001* 0.000   0.001* 0.000 
PES3 0.002 0.002   0.002 0.002 
PES4 -0.001 0.000   -0.000 0.000 
WASH -0.485*** 0.168   -0.474** 0.194 
EATE 0.871*** 0.287   0.984*** 0.332 
HRSP 0.008 0.015   0.006 0.018 
MAIN -0.216* 0.113   -0143 0.130 
PRIM 0.202 0.129   0.176 0.148 
SMOK 0.012 0.008   0.011 0.009 
ALCO -0.019** 0.009   -0.018* 0.009 
TRAI -0.031* 0.017   -0.024* 0.019 
EXTE -0.222* 0.141   -0.156 0.143 
MERU (Base)       
KIRINYAGA -0.149 0.172   -0.218 0.183 
MURANGA 0.889*** 0.303   0.954*** 0.306 
NYERI 0.124 0.185   0.242 0.195 
MAKUENI 0.850** 0.416   0.794* 0.453 
ADOP -0.630*** 0.124 0.442** 0.138 0.563** 0.120 
Pscore   0.269* 0.257 0.319* 0.249 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -481.234     
Wald Chi2   209.39     
Prob > Chi2   0.000     
F-test   3.65  6.33 
Prob > F   0.000  0.000 
R-squared / adj. R-squared   0.13/0.11  0.33/0.26 
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
Source: Own survey 
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More educated and highly skilled households are expected to experience lower 
cost-of-illness and the result supports this notion. Human capital related variables 
such as education status of the head and other household members, level of 
agricultural training and number of contacts with extension personnel’s all have a 
negative impact on health cost attributed to pesticide use although the coefficients 
is not significant for the former. In line with the expectation, pesticide exposure 
related variables have their expected signs. Households who eat in the vegetable 
field while spraying chemicals incur significantly higher health cost however the 
coefficient of the number of hours sprayed is not significant in the model. Another 
set of variables that explain significantly the variation in the health cost among 
export producers is whether the farmers has maintained their sprayer ever and 
they wash the protective gear after use, both indicating a negative sign. 
Household who maintain their sprayers and wash the protective gear after use 
display significantly lower health cost-of-illness. Alcohol intake is not significant 
however household heads with long year of smoking experience significantly high 
cost-of-illness. 
With respect to the quantity of different class of pesticide use, hazard category 
pesticide type I and II are found to be significantly explaining the cost-of-illness 
among export producers, which is not surprising given that they are classified as 
highly toxic. Out of the four district dummies included in the model to control for 
agro-ecology and other institutional settings, two of them are found to be 
significantly explaining the variation in cost-of-illness. The results display that 
farmers in Meru district experience significantly low cost-of-illness compared to 
farmers in Nyeri and Muranga districts. 
Determinants of improved pesticide management practices  
As illustrated in the theoretical model the adoption of production standards like 
GlobalGAP may also affects the way farmers manage agricultural inputs. This 
question was addressed using a two-stage Poisson regression model using data 
collected from export vegetable producers in Kenya. Results are presented in 
Table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6 Determinants of improved pesticide management practices – two-stage 
 Poisson regression results (N = 439) 
Dependent variable: count of improved pesticide management practices 
Variable 
Estimated a 
Coefficient 
Murphy-Topel 
Standard Error t-value 
Constant 1.779*** 0.203 8.76 
AGEH 0.006 0.008 0.68 
AGSQ -0.001 0.000 -1.01 
GEND 0.078* 0.047 1.65 
EDU1 0.011** 0.004 2.49 
EDU2 0.010*** 0.002 3.90 
INCO 0.000*** 0.000 3.23 
FACI 0.059** 0.023 2.50 
GROU 0.013* 0.006 1.88 
RADI 0.002 0.001 1.57 
CRED 0.000 0.000 1.42 
CONT 0.015* 0.007 1.93 
EXTE 0.042 0.032 -1.28 
ADOP 0.227** 0.106 2.13 
MERU (Base)    
KIRINYAGA -0.052 0.046 -1.12 
MURANGA -1.506*** 0.123 -12.23 
NYERI -0.131*** 0.040 -3.25 
MAKUENI -0.219*** 0.061 -3.58 
Log pseudo-likelihood   -587.022  
Pseudo R2  0.240  
Wald Chi2    347.45  
Prob > Chi2    0.000  
a Statistical significance at the 0.01 (***), 0.05 (**) and 0.1 (*) level of probability 
Source: Own survey 
As hypothesized, the adoption of GlobalGAP standards (ADOP) does have a 
significant and positive effect on pesticide management practices. Other factors 
being equal, adopting GlobalGAP production standards at the farm level increases 
the level of good pesticide management practice by about 22% compared to the 
non-adopter export farmers. It is hypothesized that the decision on different 
pesticide management practices is not necessarily made by the head of the 
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household alone but also by other educated adult members of the household. The 
results also support this notion. As shown in Table 6.6, the coefficients of 
education level of the head and other household member take a positive sign and 
are significant indicating the positive effect of intra-household literacy on the 
decisions on pesticide management practices. Contact with extension service and 
frequency of radio use also play a positive role in the way farmers manage 
pesticide although the coefficient is insignificant. This indicates the importance of 
knowledge on the management practices.  
Another important variable that significantly explains the variation in pesticide 
management practices among export farmers is the number of years the farmer 
has been involved in formal contract with the exporters and the number of years 
they have been member of growers group. Results also show strong and positive 
effect of participating in formal contract and group membership on good pesticide 
management practices. It also demonstrates the positive role household income 
and access to facilities on improved management practices. Likewise access to 
credit service measured by the amount of credit received for the past three years 
prior 2005 play a positive role on safe pesticide management practices although 
the coefficient is insignificant. Given the required financial resources to invest in 
pesticide store and purchase protective gear, access to financial resources play a 
crucial role in improving the way farmers manage pesticides use. As shown by 
significant coefficients of district dummies, agro-ecology and location variations 
affect management of pesticides among export farmers.  
6.6 Conclusions 
The primary aim of this chapter is to empirically investigate whether adoption of 
EU private food-safety standards confer positive externalities in terms of 
improved health and environment. Two-stage econometric approaches are 
applied to estimate factors determining pesticide related acute poisoning, cost-of-
illness and improved pesticide management practices among export vegetable 
producers.  
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Results show the average costs of pesticide-related health risks are about 165 KSh 
and 324 KSh per cropping season for GlobalGAP adopters and non-adopters 
export producers, respectively. These costs equal 86.4% of the mean household 
chemical expenditure per cropping season for non-adopters and 39.6% of those 
adopters. Compared to the results obtained in other studies (Rola and Pingali, 
1993) the ratio of health cost to pesticide cost presented in this chapter is 
conservative since the computation of health costs is based on the actual market 
cost of direct short term health impairments and it does not refer to the costs to 
restore farmers’ health status completely as followed by Rola and Pingali (1993) 
and Garming and Waibel (2008). Estimation results also show that adoption of 
GlobalGAP standards has a positive and significant impact on farmer’s health 
both in terms of reduction of pesticide related acute poisonings and its associated 
cost-of-illness. Farmer’s who adopt standards experience 78% lesser incidence of 
acute illness and spent about 50% less on restoring the damaged health compared 
to non-adopters. On the other hand incidence of pesticide-related acute illness 
symptoms and its associated health cost increase significantly with the use of 
highly toxic pesticides. Maintaining the spraying equipment and washing the 
protective gear after spraying significantly mitigate the incidence and its related 
cost whereas eating in the vegetable field while spraying substantially increase the 
pesticide poisoning. Human capital proxies such as education level of the head 
and other household members, knowledge of pesticide labels, level of agricultural 
training and contact with extension service also tend to decrease the incidence of 
acute illness although the coefficients are statistically insignificant for the 
education variables. These indicate the need for farmer education in exposure 
averting strategies.  
Results also depict that the negative environmental impact is minimized by 
adoption of the GlobalGAP corroborating the view that standards induce changes 
in farm production systems in developing countries. Ceteris paribus, adopting 
GlobalGAP production standards at the farm level increases the degree of 
improved pesticide management practice by about 22% compared to the non-
adopter export farmers. Improved pesticide management practices entail less 
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pesticide intoxication by farmers and farm workers, improved environment and 
potential efficiency gain. 
Although there are concerns that the enhanced stringency of food-safety standards 
that are imposed by high-income countries can negatively affect the 
competitiveness of producers in developing countries, this study strongly indicate 
that adoption of such standards can play a positive role, providing the catalyst 
and incentives for the adoption of safer and more sustainable production practice. 
Thus, one can conclude that adoption of safety standards can have significant 
health and environmental benefits for small-scale farmers in Kenya, which are in 
addition to the financial gains reported earlier.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
7.1 Synthesis and conclusions 
The overall objective of this study is to investigate the impact of the most widely 
known private standards, GlobalGAP standards, on small-scale vegetable 
producers’ welfare in Kenya. GlobalGAP is a private sector standard, which 
exceeds the requirements of the EU regulatory standards. It has been developed 
by supermarket chains in Europe. The standards are prescriptive, production-
oriented guidelines for fresh fruit and vegetables and they require certification by 
an independent internationally accredited certification body. To comply with 
these standards producers have to change their production technology, e.g. switch 
to less harmful pesticides and invest in structures like grading shed, charcoal 
cooler, disposal pit, toilet, pesticide store etc. 
From the general objective, five specific objectives are defined and analyzed in 
separate chapters. These includes i) investigate the nature and magnitude of costs 
of compliance with GlobalGAP standards, ii) examine determinants of adoption of 
GlobalGAP standards and estimate its impact on farm financial performance, iii) 
examine the impact of GlobalGAP standards on pesticide use and farm-level 
productivity; iv) estimate the effect of GlobalGAP standards on pesticide ascribed 
incidence of acute illness symptoms and its associated cost-of-illness and, v) 
explore impact of GlobalGAP adoption on improved management practices as 
proxy for environmental benefits. 
This study has addressed these objectives using data collected from a random 
cross-section sample of small-scale vegetable producers in Kenya. Overall, 21 sub-
locations were randomly selected from the five districts by Probability 
Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling technique and a total of 539 vegetables 
producer households were chosen randomly for the interviews. For each 
respondent the survey combined a re-call survey and season-long monitoring of 
crop production practices. The season-long monitoring data were collected for 
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both dry (November 2005 to February 2006) and rainy season (May 2006 to 
August 2006). However the data collected during the first round monitoring 
survey (i.e. dry season) were incomplete due to prevalent drought in the survey 
areas. Thus, the dry season data set was excluded from the analysis and only the 
data collected during rainy season as well as the re-recall survey data were used 
for the analysis. 
Chapter four uses a two-stage standard treatment effect model and propensity 
score matching techniques to explore factors that explain the decision of small-
scale producers to adopt private standards and examine whether investments in 
private standards compliance pays off for small-scale producers. Results show 
that adopters and non-adopters are distinguishable by their wealth status, access 
to services and level of education. It is shown that resource-poor farmers with 
limited access to information and services are less likely to adopt standards and 
could potentially be marginalized from the lucrative export market. Nevertheless, 
farmers who adopt standards enjoy a substantial income benefit. The financial 
internal rate of return, computed for different cost and benefit scenarios display 
that investment in EU private food-safety standards pays off for small-scale 
producers in Kenya. The pay off period analysis demonstrates that smallholders 
can recover their investment cost in two to three years if they plant three crops a 
year and up to seven years for two cropping seasons.   
Chapter five provides an empirical analysis of GlobalGAP impact on pesticides 
use and farm-level productivity among smallholder vegetable producers in 
Kenya. An extended three-stage damage control production framework that 
accounts for multiple endogeneity problems is applied. Results show that export 
producers complying with standards significantly use less toxic pesticides; 
however, there is no significant difference on the total quantity of pesticides used. 
Contrary to findings in Asia, the econometric evidences show that both domestic 
and export vegetable farmers in Kenya use pesticide below the economic 
optimum. However export vegetable producers use significantly higher quantity 
of pesticides compared to domestic producers and enjoy higher level of revenue. 
Chapter 7  133 
The third stage structural revenue model results demonstrate a positive and 
significant impact of standards adoption on revenue of vegetable production. 
The sixth chapter evaluates the impact of EU retailer food-safety standards on 
producers’ health and environment. To attain the objective, a theoretical non-
separable farm household model is used as a starting point. Based on the optimal 
health demand functions derived from the model’s first-order condition, an 
empirical model is formulated and estimated. Using different econometric 
approaches it is shown that pesticide ascribed incidence of acute illness symptoms 
and its associated cost-of-illness significantly decrease with adoption of standards. 
Ceteris paribus, farmers who adopt standards experience 78% lesser incidence of 
acute illness and spent about 50% less on restoring their health compared to non-
adopter farmers. Likewise adoption of standards has a significant positive impact 
on improved crop management for example safer and environmentally more 
benign pesticide use, which is likely to reduce external costs of production. 
Generally the results support the notion that standards reduce externalities from 
vegetable production if adopted in large-scale corroborating the view that it may 
serve as a catalyst to transform the farm production systems in developing 
countries. 
In the following recommendations are developed for policy suggesting alternative 
measures  for a pro-poor development strategy in Africa in general and in Kenya 
in particular. In addition further research topics are suggested related to the 
impact of emerging food-safety standards on small-scale producers. These topics 
could not be addressed to greater detail in this thesis. 
7.2 Recommendations 
This research has provided some insights into what the determinants of adoption 
of emerging EU food-safety standards and their impact on smallholder producers’ 
welfare. It also provides policy implications on possible support schemes in the 
supply chain.   
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Given the ability to invest in required structures, the results of this study generally 
support the notion that smallholders can enjoy substantial financial and non-
financial benefits from adopting emerging private standards. Adoption of 
emerging food-safety standards can serve as a catalyst in transforming the 
production systems of developing countries towards safer and more sustainable 
production. However, the question is whether many small-scale farmers in 
developing countries at large and in Kenya in particular can finance the initial 
investment cost in year zero to start up the implementation of the protocol and at 
the same time the donor/ exporter continue their financial and technical support. 
There is no question that by raising the bar for new entrants and placing a 
premium on effective safety management and logistical coordination, higher 
private standards can weaken the competitive position of the poorest among 
smallholders to remain active and profitable in export supply chains. But food-
safety standards are here to stay, and there is no slowing down their rate of 
change or applying for special and differential treatment from export market. 
However as the GlobalGAP secretariat in 2007 has benchmarked Kenya’s 
standards, KenyaGAP, against GlobalGAP that could help the smallholders to get 
certificate under option 3 and 4.  
The government and private sector can help farmers expand and upgrade their 
range of assets and practices to meet the new requirements of supermarkets and 
other coordinated supply chains. The options include public investments in 
increasing farmers’ productivity and connectivity to markets, and public-private 
partnerships to promote collective action and build the technical capacity of 
farmers to meet the new standards. This would not only address the problem 
associated with standards rather it addresses the bigger question of linking 
smallholders to emerging markets either domestic or export. In short developing 
countries need institutional frameworks to help them overcome the problems 
associated with being poor or small. Out grower programs for smallholder 
farmers and systems of training could be effective instruments. So far the role of 
donors tends to be significant in providing the necessary training and subsidizing 
the overall certification schemes. 
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The challenge of new risk of exclusion of smallholders was recognized by 
numerous donor agencies and for many of them the immediate challenge was to 
ensure that the implementation of GlobalGAP in Kenya did not undermine their 
broader goals of reducing poverty and delivering pro-poor growth through 
promoting a vibrant small-scale farmer sector. According to Humphrey (2006), the 
goal of many donors was not in many cases framed in terms of integrating small-
scale farmers and farmer groups into those horticultural export value chains that 
required GlobalGAP certification. Rather, it was framed in terms of making the 
compliance of GlobalGAP easier for small-scale farmer and particularly farmer 
groups, to achieve the certification. 
Although the financial support by donors or private companies was crucial for 
smallholders to achieve certification as also presented chapter four, subsidizing 
GlobalGAP certification among smallholders may not be justified from a 
development perspective for a number of reasons. Firstly, donor support may be 
insufficient to offset increased smallholder disadvantage and there is a danger that 
farmers do not maintain their level of certification once donor support ends 
rendering smallholders’ involvement in GlobalGAP production unsustainable. 
Most of the donor funds are limited to short-term issues towards certification and 
ignore the long-term perspectives. Second, the stipulated period of donor funds 
utilizations is too short and does not allow enough time to exclude the kind of 
farmers who eventually pull out after having spent substantial amounts of funds. 
Third, large farms growing vegetables employ large numbers of laborers, who are 
often poorer segments of rural population than the farmers adopting GlobalGAP. 
Thus, subsidies for smallholders can have a digressive impact on income 
distribution among the rural poor. Fourth, as mentioned earlier a majority of the 
largest fresh produce export companies are involved directly or indirectly with 
donor-funded schemes for farmer certification. However, it is not yet clear who is 
benefiting most from the subsidies in the supply chain. Therefore it is possible that 
farmers are indirectly paying for the subsidy through lower product prices.  
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This does not mean that financial and technical support for small-scale producers 
is unjustifiable, but it requires further research that assesses the costs of helping a 
larger part of the smallholder population to achieve food-safety standards and 
compare these with alternative options for attaining poverty alleviation and rural 
development. For development agencies, first it’s crucial not to only define the 
challenge in terms of the certification process but also the management systems 
that lay behind it. Certification is not the end in itself, but rather verification that a 
quality system has been put in place. Second, both the costs of certification and the 
costs of maintaining the quality system need to be emphasized. Third, the focus of 
donors should not be only on farmers and farmer groups rather the value chain 
linkages in the export horticulture business and the critical role played by 
exporters in securing access to those buyers that required GlobalGAP certification. 
There is no simple answer to these challenges. What is clear, however, is that as 
the requirements of export markets become more sophisticated exporters will play 
a critical role. There is merit in donors working with private companies and try to 
determine when their support provides genuine increase in aggregate output. The 
opportunities of smallholders to remain viable in lucrative export market also 
grossly depend on the strategies chosen by export companies. It is apparent from 
the results that smallholders not well supported or contracted by their exporter 
have low probability of adopting GlobalGAP and that most either fail to certify or 
drop out of the compliance system within short period time. Therefore it is 
important that companies adopt strategic planning in their contract farming 
schemes to minimize the negative impact of enhanced standards on the poorest 
segment of the rural producers. Private companies may not have financial 
incentives to do so but there is the corporate social responsibility that implicitly 
binds them to act.  
From the standard setters point of view it is also important that the emerging 
private standards like GlobalGAP be smallholder friendly, which is acceptable to 
both buyers and producers and could be implemented without a significant donor 
support. To produce a truly smallholder friendly standards that small-scale 
growers could operate cost effectively without external support is probably 
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impossible. In order to make the compliance content requirements specifically 
address the needs of smallholders would undermine the integrity of the standards 
thus making the modifications unacceptable to the buyer of the end product. 
Rather, a balance is required between the desire of the production end of the 
supply chain for simplicity and reduced compliance cost and the buyers’ desire 
for high levels of control and guarantees of integrity. For this to happen, an 
extensive dialogue among all stakeholders in the horticulture sector including 
exporters, smallholders, donors, standard setters and public representatives is 
highly recommendable. Any discussion of how to achieve improvements and 
sustainability in the system is also linked to the question of who actually need to 
pay for compliance to private standards such as GlobalGAP. The main 
beneficiaries of these standards are the end consumers and out of fairness they 
should contribute to the cost of compliance by offering a higher price for certified 
produce rather than pushing them down the chain to the suppliers. 
It is also mandatory to consider alternative strategies that can complement or 
replace participation of small-scale producers in the most demanding, competitive 
and fast developing global markets. Rather than exclusively focusing on keeping 
smallholders participating in export markets, alternatives need to be assessed 
including opportunities in regional as well as domestic markets. There may be 
scope for expanding exports to export markets with less rigid standards such as 
Middle East and Asian countries. These may be the rapidly growing markets of 
the future.  
It is important for smallholders to diversify their product categories and invest in 
post-harvest technologies. It is possible that not all smallholders will be able to 
qualify to produce for the fresh export market. The dynamics of the fresh produce 
export market will be getting more complex as the trend of private standards is 
moving from supermarket-only export markets into traditional wholesale and 
food-service markets and smallholders without support and good linkages to the 
market may not be able to keep up with them. Besides the export market may not 
be large enough to accommodate every producer. It is therefore important for a 
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sustainable development of Kenya’s agriculture to improve production and 
market access for producers, without necessarily focusing on a particular fresh 
export market. For example, the development of value-adding at the production 
level could avoid high-season waste (e.g. drying fruit, tomatoes etc.), as well as 
provide access to different segments of the market. Domestic markets are often 
poorly developed in Africa at large and in Kenya in particular and this is an area 
of development that is often overlooked. Despite the limited size of the fresh 
produce export market, a lot of attention, effort and resources have been put into 
it, often at the expense of developing and growing local domestic markets. Such 
markets could provide an important outlet for smaller producers excluded from 
the export market. Results reported in chapter five supports the notion that 
farmers involved in domestic vegetable production can benefit as much as those 
involved in export crops if the domestic markets structures would function more 
effectively and efficiently. Thus the question of a supportive institutional 
environment, improved service provision and linkages of smallholder farmers has 
an equal relevance for the development of domestic or regional markets 
Finally, it is also worth considering integrating the marginalized asset-poor 
farmers to large-scale farms via wage employment as a possibility for an effective 
poverty reduction strategy. Some researchers have argued that for achieving the 
overall policy goal of poverty reduction as a component of agricultural 
development policy, then a strategy of allowing smallholders to decline and focus 
instead on improving conditions for waged employees might serve the purpose as 
well (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006b; Humphrey, 2006;  McCulloch and Ota, 2002). 
One should not hold on to a target number of small holders to remain in export 
market for purely sector policy reasons. 
7.3 Further research 
A follow up study is recommended in order to assess the impact of compliance 
with GlobalGAP on fresh produce traded in developing countries’ domestic 
markets. During the survey, it is observed that adoption of standards do not only 
have direct impact but further results in positive externalities in terms of enhanced 
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food-safety at the domestic market and the non-certified export market, which are 
mostly attributable to more judicious use of pest control strategies. Such spillover 
effects may affect the production as well as the policy level, with both levels being 
interlinked. Thus, there are some research questions that need to be answered in 
future study both at the policy level and production level. It is not clear how the 
international debate influenced awareness on food-safety issues and standards of 
Kenyan policy makers and whether the increased awareness has been translated 
in adoption of new strategies/ policies. It is also important to investigate to what 
extent the certified export producers apply their new knowledge to domestic 
production and it’s impact in the production system. Another question is 
wheather the non-certified smallholder export producers adopted production 
technologies from certified farmers and it’s impact on their production. Future 
research should also investigate whether there is a significant shift from 
smallholder contract-farming towards estate farm worker, induced by increasing 
food-safety standards. Despite the recognition of emerging private standards as an 
entry barrier for asset-poor smallholder farmers, it is not yet clear what farmers 
who are drop out of the export markets are doing. Thus further research should 
also investigate what alternative livelihood-strategies are available for drop-out 
farmers in Kenya and other countries.  
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Appendix 1 GlobalGAP certified growers’ worldwide (option 1 and 2) 
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Source: Moeller, 2006  
 
 
Appendix 2 Countries with GlobalGAP certified growers 
 
 
Source: Moeller, 2006 
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Appendix 3 GlobalGAP and other private food-safety standards logo 
 
Source: Various internet sources1 
 
                                                 
1 www.ethicaltrade.org; www.msc.org; www.brc.org.uk; www.transfair.oeg; www.carrefour.ch; 
www.plus.de/www.eurep.org; www.food-care.info; nationalzoo.si.edu; www.tescocorporate.com.  
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Appendix 4 Locations of the surveyed small-scale farmers  
 
 
Source: United Nations, 2006 
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Appendix 5 Mathematical derivation of marginal productivity of damage control 
inputs  
Let us consider that the observed crop yield, iQ , can be specified as a function of 
both standard production inputs, ix  and damage control measures, px , as: 
αβ )(*)( p
n
i
i xDWQ i ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= ∏                   (A1) 
Integrating the simple logistic form of damage control function, we obtain 
[ ]∑ −−++= n
i
pii xWQ ))exp(1(ln)ln(ln 0 αββ              (A2) 
where iW  is the vector of ‘conventional’ production inputs (labor, fertilizer, seed), 
farm-specific factors (i.e. farm household characteristics) etc. The iβ  are the 
respective coefficients to be estimated. The term ),( pxD  is the damage abatement 
function that is a function of the level of control agents, px  (in our case the 
pesticide used by the farmer to control pests during outbreaks).2 
By definition, the marginal productivity is the increase in output arising from a 
marginal increase of a certain input. It can be computed by taking the first 
derivative of the production function with respect to that input. In the Cobb-
Douglas specification, the coefficient iβ  estimates the output elasticity of the 
productive input iW  in the Equation (A2) from which the marginal productivity of 
the inputs is derived. 
i
i
i W
W
Q
Q
∂
∂= *β                  (A3) 
The marginal productivity of iW using appropriate derivation can be expressed as: 
i
i
i W
Q
W
Q *β=∂
∂
                            (A4) 
                                                 
2 Following Babcock et al (1992) and Carrasco-Tauber and Moffit (1992) the parameter restriction 
1=α was imposed on equation (1) to facilitate the estimation. 
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The derivation of the marginal value product of the damage control inputs px  is 
obtained in an indirect manner. It can be expressed as follows: 
p
p
pp x
xD
xD
Q
x
Q
∂
∂
∂
∂=∂
∂ )(*
)(
                             (A5) 
The marginal value product of )( pxD is: 
)(
*
)( pp xD
Q
xD
Q
∂=∂
∂ α           (A6) 
By substituting
)( pxD
Q
∂
∂
, the marginal value product of the damage control px  can 
be expressed as follows: 
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                (A7) 
Substituting for )( pxD  in the functional form of damage control function (logistic) 
Equation (A2), the marginal value product of a specific damage control input px  is 
expressed as follows: 
)(
)( exp*exp1
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p
x
x
p
Q
x
Q αμ
αλ α −−−=∂
∂
                (A8)
Appendices   161 
Appendix 6 Survey questionnaire used for data collection 
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